Book Review: Military and Scientific Affairs: History of the Soviet Army
| Published date | 01 June 1967 |
| Date | 01 June 1967 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002070206702200223 |
| Subject Matter | Book Review |
BOOK REVIEWS
327
affected
the
outcome
in
the
United
States.
The
first
of
these
fighting
arms
does
not
exist
in
Canada
and
the
latter
is
relatively
less
important.
On
the
other
hand
the
congressional system prevented
any
one
side
from
gaining
its
full
objectives.
Under
the
parliamentary
system
a
cabinet
minister
supported
by
his colleagues
could
do
what
would
be
impossible
in
the
United
States-for
good
or
for
ill.
The
real
question,
which
Caraley
does
not
discuss
for
the
United
States
between
1943
and
1947
and
which few
have
examined
in
Canada
recently
is
how
can
the
national
resources
and
effort
be
best
devoted
to
achieving
a
maximum degree
of
national
security
?
Is
it
best
to leave
the determination
of
strategic
objectives
and
the
sharing
of
the
budget
pie
to
three
separate
services
meeting
in
committee
or
fighting
it
out
on
the
floor
of
the
Commons
Or
should
a
civilian
politician,
whose first
interest
is
very
likely
to
be economy,
have
complete
control
of
both
strategy
and
finances?
There
is
obviously no
easy
answer.
Anybody
in
a
position
of
influence
who
thinks
there
is
is
dangerous.
Talk
about
the
need
to
maintain
service
traditions
or
about
concern
for
the preservation
of
civil
supremacy
is
merely
begging
the
question.
Duke
University
RICHARD
A.
PRESTON
HISTORY
OF
THE
SOVIET
ARMY.
By Michel
Garder.
1966.
(New
York:
Frederick
A.
Praeger.
Toronto: Burns
&
MacEachern,
vi,
226pp.
$9.00)
Within
the
limits
of
a
short
review
it
is
difficult
to
do
justice
to
the
inadequacies
of
this
book. Colonel
Garder,
who
is
already
on
record
as
predicting
the
imminent
collapse
of
the
Soviet
regime,
has
attempted
to
give
us
a history
of
the
Russian
and
Soviet
army
with an assessment
of
its
evolving
relationship toward
those
in
political control
of
the
state.
This
is
an
important
subject, never more
so
than
today
Un-
fortunately
the
text
is
marred
by
so
many
errors
and distortions
that
its
usefulness
is
seriously-and
to
this reviewer
irreparably-impaired.
To
begin
with,
there
are
far
too
many
factual
mistakes.
These
range
from
minor
slips
to
the
rather
more
serious.
A
few
examples
only
of
the
latter
must
suffice.
It
is,
for
instance,
simply
not
true
to
say
let
alone
base
one's
argument
on
the
claim,
that
discipline
among troops
at
the
front
in
1917
was
"exemplary
The
testimony
of
too
many
witnesses
unanimously
points
to
the exact
contrary
Nor
was
Nicholas
II
then
still
regarded
as
the
inviolable
"Lord's
Anointed"
by
the
soldiers.
They
far
from
being
"stupefied"
at
his
removal, either
acquiesced
or
joyfully hailed
the
abdication
and
by
autumn
there
was
not
even
"a
token
holding
of
the
front"-by
Lenin's
own
admission
conscripts
voting "with
their
feet"
themselves
took
Russia
out
of
the
war.
Moving
into
the
Soviet
period,
Colonel
Garder's assertion
that
the
slogan
of
the
first Five
Year
Plan
was
to
"catch
up
with
America"
is
misleading
to
say
the
least; this
did
not
become
a
specific
Soviet
economic
objective
until
Khrushchev's
Seven
Year
Plan
of
1959.
Similar
inaccuracies
abound.
The
author's
personal
tastes
colour
the
narrative
throughout.
His
admiration for
the
old
Imperial army
especially
the
Guards Regiments,
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