Book Review: Western Europe: Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia 1926–1933. A Study in Diplomatic Instability
| Published date | 01 June 1967 |
| Date | 01 June 1967 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002070206702200233 |
| Subject Matter | Book Review |
BOOK
REviEws
339
Dorothy
Pickles
a
rdussi
en
180
pages
A
d~gager
les
motivations
profondes, les
faits
les plus
significatifs
et
les
tendances
les
plus
mm-
portantes
de Ia
politique
6trang~re
de
la
France
sous
la
prdsidence
du
General
de
Gaulle,
"cet
homme
d'avant-hmer
et
d'aprLs-demam"
I1
s'agit
d'une
dtude
cisel6e
et
perspicace
que
presuppose
une
compr~hen-
sion
profonde
de
la
psychologie du
President
actuel
de
la
France
et
du
peuple
francais.
C'est un
tour
de
force que
bien
peu
d'observateurs
etrangers
ont
r~ussi
A
accomplir.
La
lecture
de
The Uneasy
Entente
m'a
convaincu
que
Dorothy
Pickles
dtait
un
de
ceux-lA.
Universitd
d'Ottawa
Louis
SABOURIN
WEIMAR
GERMANY
AND
SOVIET
RuSSIA 1926-1933.
A
Study
in
Diplomatic
Instability
By
Harvey
Leonard
Dyck.
1966.
(London:
Chatto
&
Windus.
Toronto:
Clarke, Irwin.
279pp.
$9.25)
The
diplomatic
settlement
following
the
First
World
War
smashed
Germany's drive
for
hegemony
in
Europe,
frustrated
the
expansionist
designs
of
Russian
communism,
and
excluded
Germany
and
Russia
from
the
international
system. The
hostilities had
scarcely
ceased
before
they
drew
together
in
their
efforts
to
alter
the
status
quo.
This associa-
tion, however,
was
tenuous
at
best,
for
the
periodic
interference
of
the
Communist
International
in
German
domestic
politics
prevented
the
full
development
of
diplomatic,
military
and
economic
ties.
Professor
Dyck
traces
the
ups
and
downs
of
the
relations
between
Germany
and
Russia
from the
Treaty
of
Berlin
in
April
1926
to
the
final
days
of
the
Weimar
Republic
in
January
1933.
Relying
as he
must
on
Ger-
man
documents,
the
author
is
particularly
adept
in
showing
the
diversity
of
views
within
the
German
Foreign
Office,
in
assessing
the
various
policy
alternatives
under
consideration,
and
in describing
the
dis-
cussions
between
German
and
Russian
officials.
His
account
is
well
documented,
written
clearly
and
it
should
be
of
value
to
both
the
specialist
and
general observer
of
international
affairs.
Despite
the
many
virtues
of
this
book,
it
does
suffer
from
a
few
faults.
As
Professor
Dyck
states,
he
is
interested
in
policy,
not
per
sonalities.
Unfortunately
he has
perhaps
gone too
far
in
this
direction.
In
failing,
for
example,
to
offer
brief
personality
sketches
of
the
leading
figures,
he
imposes
unfairly
on
the
reader
and
produces
a
book
drier
than
necessary.
His
emphasis
on policy
almost
to
the
exclusion
of
personality
leads
to
more
serious
objections
by
the
specialists,
how-
ever.
Although
one
might
concede
that
the
role
of
Gustav
Stresemann
has
been
overemphasized
in
the
past,
few
will
recognize
this
portrayal
of
the
German
Foreign Minister
as
merely
the
policeman
who
pro-
tected
the
Foreign
Office
from the
blows of
its
domestic
opponents.
Beyond
this,
Stresemann,
aside
from
placing his
final
stamp
of
approval
on decisions,
rarely
enters
into
the
formulation
and
execution
of
policy
While
the
author's
view
may
have
some
validity
this
reviewer
finds
it
difficult
to
believe
that
a
man
who
so
ably managed the
dissonant
elements
of
his
party
and
the
German
Reichstag
did
not
also
taKe
the
lead
in
his
own
ministry
It
may
be
that
Professor
Dyck's
selection
of
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