Book Reviews : The North Korean Communist Leadership 1945-1965 Koon Woo Nam. University of Alabama Press. $7.50. 214pp
| DOI | 10.1177/004711787200400619 |
| Date | 01 December 1972 |
| Published date | 01 December 1972 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
736
last
resort
of
nation
states&dquo;.
But,
the
rules
of
the
game
have
changed
and
at
present
the
main
theatre
is
that
of
subversion
and
guerrilla
warfare
and
these
forms
of
the
use
of
force
are
subject
to
no
rules
and
respect
no
frontiers.
In
the
first
chapter,
&dquo;Resort
to
Force&dquo;,
he
goes
on
to
examine
the
subject
in
broad
perspective,
highlighting
some
of
the
paradoxes
which
are
implicit
in
the
existing
situation,
one
being
that
in
a
world
climate
of
opinion
increasingly
reluctant
to
contemplate
employing
war
as
an
instru-
ment
of
policy-at
least
as
regards
its
use
by
the
major
Powers-the
economic
health
of
a
nation
may
depend
to
a
considerable
extent
upon
a
thriving
arms
industry.
Unfortunately
today,
since
the
language
has
become
debased
almost
beyond
recognition
and
practically
every
term
employed
is
tainted
by
the
prevelant
&dquo;double-talk,
double-think&dquo;,
every
statement
made
requires
so
much
qualincation
to
almost
need
a
chapter
to
itself
to
define
accurately
the
meaning
in
which
it
is
used.
While
the
major
Powers
are
deterred
from
open
war
by
the
still
operative
&dquo;balance
of
terror&dquo;,
choosing
instead
the
weapon
of
detente,
this
does
not
apply
to
smaller
states
who
continue
to
wage
undeclared
wars
with
the
tacit
or
open
assistance
of
their
Great
Power
supporters.
In
succeeding
chapters,
Kenneth
Kinney
discusses
&dquo;The
Use
of
Force
by
the
Great
Powers&dquo;,
Chris
Farrands
&dquo;The
Regional
Use
of
Force&dquo;,
Adrian Guelke
&dquo;Force,
Intervention
and
Internal
Conflict&dquo;,
Jack
D.
Ruebensaal
&dquo;Substitutes
for
Force:
The
Example
of
Subversion&dquo;,
Trevor
Taylor
&dquo;Force
in
the
Relations
Between
Great
Powers
and
the
Third
World&dquo;,
Barry
Buzan
&dquo;Internal
Restraints
on
the
Use
of
Force&dquo;,
Jeffrey
Golden
&dquo;Force
and
International
Law&dquo;,
and
David
Dunn
&dquo;War
and
Social
Change&dquo;.
Amongst
the
other
aspects
of
the
subject
considered
are
what
are
the
factors
taken
into
account
by
the
decision
makers
before
the
decision
to
use
force
is
made?
Is
force
used
because
no
other
means
are
available
or
only
after
other
means
have
been
tried
and
seen
to
fail
or
because
the
use
of
force
is
the
easiest
policy,
one
combining
a
high
degree
of
efficacy
with
low
risk?
Will
the
reactions
to
the
use
of
force
spread
the
conflict
rather
than
resolve
it?
Are
regional
arrangements
likely
to
deter
aggression
or
do
they
lead
to
conflict
within
the
alliance?
The
rapidity
of
the
techno-
logical,
social
and economic
changes
which
are
taking
place
not
only
lead
to
increasing
international
instability
but
offer
an
increasing
temptation
for
states
to
intervene
in
the
ensuing
internal
turmoil
either
to
maintain
peace
or
to
extend
or
sustain
their
influence.
What
role
does
international
law
play
and
on
what
sanctions
does
it
ultimately
rest?
What
are
the
moral
issues
which
should
influence
the
use
of
force?
All
in
all,
this
is
a
stimulating
and
thought-provoking
collection
of
papers-the
more
attractive
since
most
of
the
writers
acknowledge
that
they
are
seeking
knowledge
rather
than
outlining
solutions.
The
North
Korean
Communist
Leadership
1945-1965
Koon
Woo
Nam.
University
of
Alabama
Press.
$7.50.
214pp.
This
is
an
examination
in
depth
of
the
evolution
of
the
North
Korean
leadership
since
1945.
The
author
acknowledges
in
his
foreword
that
the
sources
upon
which
he
has
had
to
rely
are
scanty
and
there
are
many
gaps
which
it
is
almost
impossible
to
fill,
but
in
spite
of
this,
the
study
is
a
very
impressive
contribution
to
an
understanding
of
the
Korean
evolution.
Following
the liberation
of
Korea
in
1945,
after
36
years
of
Japanese
colonial
rule,
&dquo;Three
major
Korean
Communist
groups
emerged
in
North
Korea.
There
was
the
native
Communist
group,
the
Yennan
faction,
and
the
Soviet-returned
group.
The
native
Communist
group
consisted
of
communists
who
had
operated
inside
Korea,
the
Yennan
faction
were
communists
who
had
come
back
from
Yennan,
the
communist
base
in
China,
after
years
of
exile,
and
the
Soviet-returned
group
were
those
who
had
been
in
the
USSR
and
came
with
the
Soviet
Army
who
occupied
North
Korea
following
the
Japanese
defeat ...
In
the
early
phase
of the
North
Korean
regime,
power
was
shared
by
all
three
groups ...
Yet
the
spirit
of
co-operation
was
rather
slight
and
the
factional
struggle
for
power
within
the
regime
continued
from
the
early
days.
In
the
process ...
power
gravitated
towards
the
sub-group
among
the
Soviet-returned
communists
and
continued
to
do
so
until
the
time
when
this
sub-group,
led
by
one
man,
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