Breadner and Others v Granville-Grossman and Others
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Court | Chancery Division |
| Year | 2000 |
| Date | 2000 |
Power of appointment - Special power - Exercise - Trustees having discretionary power to appoint amongst beneficiaries subject to time limit - Purported appointment one day late - Whether appointment invalid
In 1976 the trustees of a discretionary trust fund, of which the principal beneficiaries were the settlor's son, J, and J's three cousins, exercised a limited power of appointment (“the 1976 appointment”) creating trusts in which each of the principal beneficiaries had a life interest in a quarter share of the fund, subject to the trustees' power (“the 1976 power”) to override those trusts by resolving upon fresh trusts prior to a “closing date”, defined as one day before the day on which the first of the four children should attain 25 years of age, which became ascertained as 2 August 1989. In default of exercise of the 1976 power the fund was to be held in trust entirely for J and his cousins (and their future children). It was not until the closing date itself that the trustees met, discussed the matter and by deed (“the 1989 deed”) purported to execute the limiting power by appointing J and his children the sole beneficiaries of the fund.
On the hearing of an originating summons by the trustees, seeking determination whether the share of the fund which had since 1976 been held upon trust for the three cousins now was or ought in equity to be held upon the trusts declared by the 1989 deed or by the 1976 appointment—
Held, that the 1976 power was a mere power and not a trust power which the trustees had a positive duty to exercise; that it had expired on the day before the trustees had taken any collective decision to exercise it, with the consequence that the interests of the cousins under the default trusts of the 1976 appointment had already become indefeasible; that the cousins had no need to rely on any breach of duty by the trustees, but could simply rely on the terms of that appointment and the fact that there had never been and no longer could be any valid exercise of the 1976 power; that, while the court might undo something trustees had done, it would stop short of doing something they could have but had not done; that there was nothing unconscionable in the cousins wishing to retain the interests conferred on them by the 1976 appointment, so as to justify the court in granting equitable relief to the trustees from their own defective execution of their power; that what mattered was the intention of the person who created the power, who had made it of the essence that it be exercised not later than two days before the relevant cousin's twenty-fifth birthday; and that, accordingly, the trustees held three-quarters of the fund on trusts for the primary benefit of the cousins and their children (post, pp 609B, D–E, F–H, 611D–G, 614C–E, 617C–D, 622D–E).
The following cases are referred to in the judgment:
Allen-Meyrick's Will Trusts, In re [
Baden's Deed Trusts, In re [
Buckley v Hudson Forge Ltd [
Cooper v Martin (
Drummond v Walker
Green v Cobham (unreported) 19 January 2000, Jonathan Parker J
Gulbenkian's Settlements, In re [
Hambro's Marriage Settlements, In re [
Hastings-Bass, decd, In re [
Hay's Settlement Trusts, In re [
Inglewood (Lord) v Inland Revenue Comrs [
Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [
Kennard v Kennard (
Locker's Settlement, In re [
Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [
Mettoy Pension Trustees Ltd v Evans [
Stannard v Fisons Pensions Trust Ltd [
Tollet v Tollet (
Walker, In re [
Witty, In re [
The following additional cases were cited in argument:
Davis v Richards & Wallington Industries Ltd [
Harvey v Stracey (
R v Inland Revenue Comrs, Ex p MFK Underwriting Agents Ltd [
The following additional cases, although not cited, were referred to in the skeleton arguments:
Anstis, In re (
Farncombe's Trusts, In re (
Hodge, In re [
Manisty's Settlement, In re [
Mills, In re [
Norwegian American Cruises A/S v Paul Mundy Ltd (The Vistafjord) [
Turner v Turner [
ORIGINATING SUMMONS
By an originating summons dated 17 February 1999 the plaintiffs, Roger Lester Breadner, Stewart Henderson Fleming and Abacus Trust Co (Isle of Man), as trustees of a discretionary settlement made by Leonard Granville-Grossman on 27 December 1973, sought the directions of the court to determine whether they held the settlement funds solely on behalf of the first defendant, Jonathan Granville-Grossman (“Jonathan”), by virtue of a deed executed by them on 2 August 1989, or in equal shares between Jonathan and his cousins, the second, third and fourth defendants, Deborah Lansing, David Granville-Grossman and Helen Isles (“the cousins”), by virtue of an appointment made by the trustees on 29 March 1976 by virtue of a power of appointment contained in the 1976 appointment.
The facts are stated in the judgment.
Nicholas Warren QC and Caroline Furze for the trustees.
Charles Turnbull for Jonathan.
Brian Green QC and Judith Bryant for the cousins.
28 June. PARK J handed down the following judgment.
Abbreviations|
“The settlor” “Jonathan” “The cousins” “The settlement” “The 1976 appointment” “The 1976 power” “The 1989 deed” “CTT” |
Mr Leonard Granville-Grossman Jonathan Granville-Grossman Jonathan's three cousins, the children of the settlor's brother A discretionary settlement made by the settlor on 27 December 1973 An appointment made by the trustees of the settlement on 29 March 1976 A power of appointment contained in the 1976 appointment A deed executed by the trustees of the settlement on 2 August 1989 Capital Transfer Tax (now re-titled Inheritance Tax) |
1 The present trustees of the settlement ask the court to determine questions which arise in connection with the settlement, the 1976 appointment and the 1989 deed. The essential question is whether the trust fund is held on trust entirely for Jonathan (and his future children) or on trust in four equal shares for Jonathan and his three cousins (and their respective future children). (For brevity in this judgment I will sometimes omit references to the interests of future children of Jonathan and the cousins, and I will refer simply to whether the fund is held on trust for Jonathan alone or for Jonathan and the cousins.) In my judgment the latter is the case: the fund is held for Jonathan and the cousins, not for Jonathan alone.
2 I will describe the details later, but in outline the issue arises in this way. The settlement in its original form was a conventional discretionary trust. The trustees had an overriding power of appointment. By the 1976 appointment they appointed trusts in favour of Jonathan and the cousins in equal shares. (At least that is what on the face of it they did, although there are arguments, which I will consider later, that the 1976 appointment failed to have any effect.) The 1976 appointment itself contained a further power of appointment under which it was open to the trustees, among other things, to reappoint the fund in favour of Jonathan alone. This was the 1976 power. By the 1989 deed the trustees sought to exercise the 1976 power, and to appoint the whole fund in favour of Jonathan and his children. However, the 1976 appointment provided that the 1976 power had to be exercised before a date, which in the event was 2 August 1989. The trustees purported to exercise the power on the date, that is on 2 August 1989. To initial appearances this was a day too late.
3 So at first sight the effect appears to be as follows. The 1976 appointment created trusts under which Jonathan and the cousins all had interests. The 1989 deed purported to change that by appointing the whole fund away from the cousins and in favour of Jonathan, but failed to take effect because it was executed after the 1976 power had expired. Therefore the trusts of the 1976 appointment, under which the cousins as well as Jonathan had interests, remained in force. That position can no longer be changed. So Jonathan's interest is only the interest in the quarter of the fund which was conferred on him by the 1976 appointment.
4 Although that is how the matter appears at first sight it has been urged upon me that, on fuller examination and analysis in the light of the authorities, the true effect is different, and that the fund is held on trust for Jonathan (and his children) on the terms set out in the 1989 deed. That result is contended for by the trustees and by Jonathan. Several different arguments have been advanced by them, and I shall consider them all as this judgment progresses. However I say now that, having considered most carefully all the arguments and the authorities on which they are based, on final examination the matter still seems to me as it seemed on first examination. The conclusion that Jonathan and his children have an interest in a quarter of the trust fund, and not in the whole of it, appears to...
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