Breaking the Chain of Causation: Reasonable Foreseeability and the ‘Exact Form’ of a Subsequent Act: R v A [2020] EWCA Crim 407; [2020] 1 WLR 2320

Published date01 December 2020
DOI10.1177/0022018320972529
Date01 December 2020
Subject MatterCase Notes
Case Note
Breaking the Chain
of Causation: Reasonable
Foreseeability and the ‘Exact
Form’ of a Subsequent Act
RvA[2020] EWCA Crim 407; [2020] 1 WLR 2320
Keywords
Caustion, intervening act, dangerous driving, terminating ruling, reasonable foreeseeability
It is an accepted principle at common law that a third party is capable of breaking the chain of causation
in circumstances where their conduct is a ‘free, deliberate and informed’ intervention. One aspect of this
is whether the third party’s actions are reasonably foreseeable. If they are, the chain of causation will
remain intact and the defendant will be liable; if they are not reasonably foreseeable, the chain will be
broken and the defendant relieved of liability.
Aconcerned a prosecution appeal against a terminating ruling made by the trial judge. The issue
revolved around the extent to which the subsequent acts of the third party had to be reasonably foresee-
able: did the defendant have to reasonably foresee the ‘exact form’ of subsequent act, or was foresee-
ability of a more general consequence acceptable?
In November 2017, the respondent (A) had been involved in a collision with another driver (L) on the
M1 motorway. A and her friends (C, M and K) were travelling home in the early hours of the morning;
A being the designated driver following an evening of clubbing with her friends. A had stopped the car
on the hard shoulder of the motorway due to an argument that had ensued between herself and M. While
on the hard shoulder, K got out of the car and refused to return, while A and her other friends remain in
the car. A witness for the prosecution testified that no hazard or other lights were displayed while the car
was stationary. The collision was caused when a lorry, driven by L, traversed from the outside lane of the
motorway, into the hard shoulder where A’s car was stationary. The prosecution presented evidence that
the lorry was begin driven at about 70 mph in the outside lane before suddenly swerving across all three
lanes and colliding with A’s car. While it could not be said for certain what had caused the lorry to
traverse in such a fashion, the prosecution alleged that L must have fallen asleep behind the wheel of the
lorry. The collision killed C and seriously injured all other parties. A and L were jointly charged with two
offences, namely: causing death by dangerous driving (count 1) and causing serious injury to M by
dangerous driving (count 2). L, alone, was also charged with causing serious injury to A by dangerous
driving (count 3). L pleaded guilty to all three charges. This appeal and case note concerns the offences
allegedly committed by A.
At trial, the prosecution proceeded on the basis that both A and L were the cause of the collision, and
each contributed to the subsequent death and injury caused. At the close of the prosecution case, the
defence made a submission of no case to answer on two grounds. The first concerned the issue of
dangerousness, alleging that there was insufficient evidence of a danger posed by A’s conduct. This
ground was refused on account that there was sufficient evidence that could be left to the jury to consider
the dangerousness of A’s conduct, namely that she had stopped on a hard shoulder without legitimate
The Journal of Criminal Law
2020, Vol. 84(6) 626–629
ªThe Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0022018320972529
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