Bromage and Another v Prosser

bromage and another against prosser. 1825. 'In an action for words spoken of the plaintiffs in their trade as bankers, it was proved that A. B. met the defendant and said, "I hear that you say that the plaintiffs' bank at M. has stopped. Is it true?" Defendant answered, "Yes, it is. I was told so. It was so reported at O., and nobody would take their bills, and I came to town in consequence of it myself." It was proved that C. D. told the defendant that there was a run upon the plaintiff's bank at M. Upon this evidence, the learned Judge, after observing that the defendant did not appear to have been actuated by any ill will against the plaintiffs, directed the jury to find their verdict for the defendant if they thought the words were not maliciously spoken: Held, upon motion for a new trial, that although malice was the gist of the action for slander, there were two sorts of malice, malice in fact and malice in law; the former denoting an act done from ill will towards an individual; the latter a wrongful act intentionally done, without just cause or excuse; and that in ordinary actions for slander, malice in law was to be inferred from the publishing the slanderous matter, the act itself being wrongful and intentional, and without any just cause or excuse; but in actions for slander, prima facie excusable on account of the cause of publishing the slanderous matter, malice in fact must be proved : Held, therefore, in this case, that the Judge ought first to have left it as a question for the jury, whether the defendant understood A. B. as asking for information, and whether he had uttered the words merely by way of honest advice to A. B. to regulate his conduct, and if they were of that opinion, then, secondly, whether in so doing he was guilty of any malice in fact. [S. C. 6 D. & R. 296; 3 L. J. K. B. 0. S. 203; and at Nisi Prius, 1 Car. & P. 475. Referred to, Wasm v. Walter, 1868, L. R. 4 Q. B. 87; Henwood v. Harrison, 1872, L. R. 7 C. P. 626; Clark v, Molyneux, 1877, 3 Q. B. D. 247; Hicks v. FauVeener, 1878, 8 Q. B. D. 175; Capital and Counties Sank v. Henty, 1882, 7 App. Cas. 767; Mogul S.8. Company v. M'Gregor, 1889-91, 23 Q. B. D. 613; [1892] A. C. 25; M'LaugUn v. Doey, 1893, 32 L. R. Ir. 527; B. v. Mwnslow, [1895] 1 Q. B. 763; Nevill v. Fine Arts, &c., Insurance Company, [1895] 2 Q. B. 161; [1897] A. C. 68; Allen v. Flood, [1898] A. C. 18; Quinn v. Leathern, [1901] A. C. 524.] This was an action for words spoken of the plaintiffs in their trade and business (a) Littledale J. was absent. 1052 BROMAGE V. PROSSER 4B.&C. 248. as bankers at Monmoutb.. The declaration stated that the plaintiffs carried on the trade and business of bankers in partnership at Monmouth? and Brecon, and had always conducted themselves [248] with credit and punctuality towards their creditors and customers; and until the speaking of the words, &c., had never been suspected of being guilty of any act of insolvency, or of having stopped or made default in payment of the monies due or owing from them in their said trade and business, but were in good credit and gaining great profits, yet defendant contriving, &c., spoke the following words : " The bank of Bromage and Snead (the plaintiffs) at Monmouth is stopped." The second count stated, that in a discourse which the defendant had with one L. Watkins in the presence and hearing of other subjects of the realm, of and concerning the plaintiffs in the way of. their trade and business, and of and concerning the said bank of the plaintiffs at Monmouth, he, the defendant, further contriving and intending as aforesaid, in the presence and hearing of the said L. Watkins and the said last-mentioned subjects, and in answer to a certain question and observation put and made by the said L. Watkins to the defendant as to the said plaintiffs in their said trade and business, and as to the said defendant having said that the bank of the plaintiffs at Monmouth was stopped, falsely and maliciously spoke and published of and concerning the said plaintiffs, in the way of their aforesaid trade and business, and of and concerning the bank of the plaintiffs at Monmouth aforesaid, the words following: "Yes, it is. I was told so," thereby meaning that the plaintiffs had stopped and made default in the payment of the monies due and owing from them in their said trade and business of bankers at Monmouth aforesaid. The third count stated, that in answer to a question and observation put and made by Watkins to defendant as to the plaintiffs in their trade and business, and as to their bank at Mon-[249]-mouth aforesaid being stopped, defendant spoke the words, " Yes, it is." Plea, not guilty. At the trial before Park J. at the Summer Assizes for Monmouth, 1824, it appeared that Watkins, on the 13th of January 1824, met the defendant in Brecon, and addressing him, said, " I hear that you say the bank of Bromage and Snead at Monmouth has stopped. Is it true?" Defendant answered, " Yes, it is. I was told so. It was so reported at Crickhowell, and nobody would take their bills, and I came to town in consequence of it myself." Watkins then said, " You had better take care what you say ; you first brought the news to town, and told Mr. John Thomas of it." Defendant repeated, "I was told so." It was proved on the part of the defendant that one George Brown, to whom the defendant had paid two one pound notes issued by the plaintiffs, told the defendant on the 12th of January, that there was a run upon the plaintiffs' bank, and that if there was any thing in it, he must take the notes back; and that he, Brown, afterwards returned the notes to the defendant on that ground; but he never told the defendant that the bank had stopped, or that nobody would take their bills. The learned Judge told...