Brown (Uriah) v The Queen
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Judge | Lord Carswell |
| Judgment Date | 13 April 2005 |
| Neutral Citation | [2005] UKPC 18 |
| Court | Privy Council |
| Docket Number | Appeal No. 62 of 2003 |
| Date | 13 April 2005 |
[2005] UKPC 18
Present at the hearing:-
Lord Steyn
Lord Slynn of Hadley
Lord Hutton
Lord Rodger of Earlsferry
Lord Carswell
Privy Council
[Delivered by Lord Carswell]
On 4 March 2000 a serious traffic accident involving several vehicles occurred on the road between Montego Bay and St Ann's Bay, Jamaica. A police car being driven in the direction of St Ann's Bay by the appellant, a serving police officer, with another officer Sergeant Christie as passenger, came into collision with a Nissan car travelling in the opposite direction. The collision also involved a Ford Ranger pick-up truck driven by Michael McKennon, which was travelling in the same direction as the appellant's car. Both the Nissan and the police car, which was in close contact with it after the collision, went on fire. The two occupants of the Nissan, Mark Williams and Gregory Vassell, were killed, the appellant was seriously injured and his passenger Sergeant Christie also sustained injuries.
The appellant was indicted on two counts of manslaughter. His trial took place before Harrison J and a jury in the Circuit Court for the parish of St Ann. On 7 June 2002 he was found guilty on both counts and on 13 June 2002 he was sentenced to two years' imprisonment with hard labour on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. He applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against conviction and sentence, but on 7 March 2003 the court (Downer, Walker and Smith JJA) dismissed the application. The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal to the Privy Council, certifying that the matter involved a point of law of exceptional public importance, which it framed as follows:
"Whether in cases of Manslaughter by criminal negligence, involving motor vehicle driving, it is a sufficient direction to the Jury to adopt the test of the ordinary principles of negligence set out by the House of Lords in R vs Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171 (which was not a case involving motor vehicle driving) or that stated by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Kong Cheuk Kwan (1986) 82 Cr. App. R. 18 for gross negligence and adopted in R v Charlie Williamson (1993) 30 JLR 457, by the Court of Appeal."
The appellant has been on bail for virtually all of the period since his arrest.
The account of the facts which follows has been put together from the directions of the trial judge to the jury, since regrettably their Lordships were not furnished with a transcript of the evidence. Nor does it appear possible, in the absence of any photographic or mapping evidence, to arrive at anything but an approximation of sight lines, the location of skid marks or the position of vehicles after the accident, which might have assisted in obtaining an understanding of the course of events immediately before the occurrence of the collision.
The trial court received two diametrically opposed versions of the events, one from Michael McKennon, the eye witness called to give evidence on behalf of the prosecution, and the other from the appellant and his passenger. These versions were recounted in some detail by the judge when he was directing the jury. There was little room for a conclusion that one account or the other may have been a genuine error, and the factual issue accordingly was one of credibility, that is to say, which account the jury accepted as correct.
Mr McKennon stated that he was driving on a straight section of the road in question at about 12.15 pm on a bright and sunny day with good visibility. The road was approximately 26 feet wide at that point, asphalted and dry. His truck was the lead vehicle in a line, with some five cars behind him. He was travelling at a speed which he estimated at about 76 kilometres per hour, just below the speed limit on that part of the road of 80 kph. There were no road markings to indicate any restrictions on passing, such as an unbroken central white line.
Mr McKennon said that he saw a vehicle coming from behind him, overtaking the line of cars. This was the police car driven by the appellant, and he estimated its speed as 120 kph. As it drew alongside him there appeared approaching from the opposite direction two cars, a Toyota Starlet and behind it a Nissan, both travelling on the proper side of the road. When faced with the appellant's car on its wrong side of the road, the driver of the Starlet swerved to his left on to the soft shoulder and escaped a collision. The driver of the Nissan braked hard and may have attempted to swerve on to the soft shoulder, but skidded and turned sideways, so that it was "at a bit of an angle" when the appellant's car crashed into it. The impact drove the appellant's car into McKennon's truck, and when the Nissan and the police car came to a stop McKennon ran into the police car.
The account of the accident given by the appellant in his evidence at trial, as retailed by the judge in his directions to the jury (pages 50-51 of the record), was as follows:
"I was travelling on the Llandovery Main Road, at about 55 to 60 kilometers. I was at the front of the line of traffic. As I approached the middle of the hill, there was a line of traffic, a white Starlet car approached over the brow of the hill. After overtaking a line of traffic, the Starlet cut suddenly in front of the car that was at the front of that line of traffic. He continued on the road surface.
A grey Nissan motorcar, which was following close behind the Starlet also came over the hill, overtook the line of traffic and cut suddenly in front of the last car it overtook. I saw when the Nissan went to the extreme left, skidded and cut across the road right in front of my car. When I saw the Nissan heading across the road, I held the steering wheel firmly, held on my brakes, there was nothing else I could do. The car slammed in the left side of the Nissan motorcar. Immediately after that impact, I heard and felt a bang in the rear of my motorcar."
The judge set out in his directions to the jury some information about the damage to the several vehicles and the skid mark or marks found on the road. It is somewhat difficult to follow this information or appreciate its significance without a transcript of the evidence or a map or photographs. Their Lordships do not, however, find it necessary to go into the factual details of this part of the case or to consider the discrepancies enumerated by the judge between the appellant's evidence given in court and the statement which he made to the police in July 2000. There were two completely conflicting versions of the accident: on the prosecution case the appellant was overtaking other vehicles and was across on the right hand or wrong side of the road, whereas on the appellant's case he was on his own side, not overtaking at all, and the approaching Starlet and Nissan were overtaking and were on their wrong side. The jury must by their verdict have accepted the prosecution version and it was not suggested in argument before the Board that they were not entitled to do so on the evidence given at trial. It is accordingly unnecessary to go into the facts any further.
The ground on which leave to appeal to the Privy Council was given by the Court of Appeal was that arising from the point of law set out in the certificate, that the judge had misdirected the jury on the content of the charge of manslaughter. At the hearing before the Board Mr Knox for the appellant sought leave to rely on two further grounds (a) that the judge's charge was unbalanced and unfair against the appellant and (b) that since the appellant's counsel had failed to call evidence of the appellant's good character he did not receive from the judge the good character direction to which he was entitled. He contended that on both grounds there was a miscarriage of justice, which gave cause for the appeal to be allowed under section 14 of the Judicature (Appellate Jurisdiction) Act of Jamaica. Their Lordships permitted counsel to put forward these grounds and have given them consideration.
Manslaughter is a common law crime in Jamaica and is not defined by any statutory provision. That branch of it which is concerned with the driving, management and control of motor vehicles is commonly and conveniently termed "motor manslaughter". A defendant indicted for motor manslaughter may under section 30 of the Road Traffic Act of Jamaica be found guilty of one of the lesser offences of causing death by reckless driving or dangerous driving. Section 30 is in the following terms:
"30.(1) A person who causes the death of another person by the driving of a motor vehicle on a road recklessly, or at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the nature, condition and use of the road, and the amount of traffic which is actually at the time, or which might reasonably be expected to be, on the road, shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding five years.
(2) Upon the trial of a person who is indicted for manslaughter in connection with the driving of a motor vehicle by him, it shall be lawful for the jury, if they are satisfied that he is guilty of an offence under subsection (1) to find him guilty of that offence, and upon the trial of a person for an offence under subsection (1) it shall be lawful for the jury, if they are satisfied that he is guilty of an offence under section 27, to find him guilty of that offence, whether or not the requirements of section 38 have been satisfied as respects that offence."
The judge directed the jury on the meaning of manslaughter in the following terms (pages 15-16 of the record):
"Manslaughter is an unlawful and dangerous act committed against the person of...
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