Building impartial electoral management? Institutional design, independence and electoral integrity

AuthorCarolien van Ham,Holly Ann Garnett
DOI10.1177/0192512119834573
Date01 June 2019
Published date01 June 2019
Subject MatterSpecial Issue Articles
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512119834573
International Political Science Review
2019, Vol. 40(3) 313 –334
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0192512119834573
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Building impartial electoral
management? Institutional design,
independence and electoral integrity
Carolien van Ham
Radboud University, The Netherlands
Holly Ann Garnett
Royal Military College of Canada, Canada
Abstract
Electoral integrity is a persistent concern in both established and transitional democracies. Independent
Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) have been championed as a key institutional reform measure to
strengthen electoral integrity and are now the most common model of electoral management worldwide.
Yet, empirical research has found conflicting evidence on the link between formal EMB independence and
electoral integrity. We argue that conflicting findings might be driven by the lack of detailed data on EMB
institutional design, with most studies using rudimentary classifications of ‘independent’, ‘governmental’ and
‘mixed’ EMBs, without addressing specific dimensions of EMB formal independence such as appointment
procedures, budgetary control and formal competences. In this paper we analyse new detailed data on
EMB institutional design in 72 countries around the world, develop a more detailed typology of dimensions
of de jure EMB independence, and demonstrate how de jure EMB independence affects de facto EMB
independence and electoral integrity.
Keywords
Election management, election management bodies (EMBs), electoral integrity, EMB institutional design,
EMB independence
Introduction
Problems with electoral integrity are of increasing concern in both established and transitional
democracies. Consequently, the role of electoral management in safeguarding electoral integrity is
increasingly scrutinized. The 2000 and 2016 presidential elections in the United States sparked a
debate on the need for improving electoral management and strengthening citizen trust in elections
Corresponding author:
Carolien van Ham, Professor of Empirical Political Science (as of August 2019), Radboud University Nijmegen,
Nijmegen 6525 XZ, The Netherlands.
Email: C.vanHam@fm.ru.nl
834573IPS0010.1177/0192512119834573International Political Science Reviewvan Ham and Garnett
research-article2019
Special Issue Article
314 International Political Science Review 40(3)
(Alvarez et al., 2008, 2012; Bowler et al., 2015). In Europe, electoral management failures in
Britain and Ireland have also drawn increased attention (Buckley and Reidy, 2015; Clark, 2015;
Farrell, 2015; James, 2017). In emerging democracies too, particularly in Latin America and
Africa, electoral management bodies are often faulted for problems with election integrity and seen
to play a key role in shaping voters’ and elites’ perceptions of election integrity (Kerr, 2014; Otaola,
2017; Rosas, 2010).
In an attempt to address these challenges, independent election management bodies (EMBs)
have been championed as a key institutional reform measure to strengthen electoral integrity. In
fact, independent EMBs are now the most common institutional model for electoral management
in the world (Catt et al., 2014; López-Pintor, 2000; Wall et al., 2006).
Yet despite the widespread assumption that independent electoral management bodies will be
better at their tasks of organizing, monitoring and certifying elections in an impartial manner,
research has found conflicting evidence on the link between formal EMB independence and elec-
toral integrity. While regional studies have found a positive impact of independent EMBs on elec-
toral integrity in Latin America and Africa (Fall et al., 2011, Hartlyn et al., 2008), global comparative
studies suggest that EMB institutional design is either negatively, or only very weakly, related to
electoral integrity (Birch, 2011; Birch and van Ham, 2017; Norris, 2015).
These conflicting findings may be driven by the lack of detailed comparative data on EMB
institutional design. Most studies use rudimentary classifications of ‘independent’, ‘governmental’
and ‘mixed’ EMB designs (Catt et al., 2014; López-Pintor, 2000; Wall et al., 2006), without
addressing more specific aspects of EMB institutional design such as appointment procedures,
budgetary control, and formal competences that may shape EMB independence. In addition to data
limitations, conflicting findings may also be driven by differences in how scholars operationalize
EMB independence, with some studies focusing on formal or de jure EMB independence while
others emphasize de facto EMB independence (or conflate the two).1 Moreover, the causal connec-
tions between institutional design, de jure and de facto institutional independence are likely to be
quite complex. Disentangling these causal links may generate more precise insights into if and how
EMB independence affects electoral integrity.
In this article we therefore address the following research questions:
1. What differences in EMB institutional design exist that shape EMB de jure independence?
2. How does variation in EMB de jure independence affect EMB de facto independence?
3. How does variation in EMB de jure and de facto independence affect electoral integrity?
To answer these questions, we present the results of a survey of the organizational structure of 72
electoral management bodies around the world collected in 2016 and 2017 and develop a detailed
typology of the dimensions of EMB institutional design that shape de jure EMB independence. We
subsequently demonstrate how de jure EMB independence affects de facto EMB independence,
and ultimately electoral integrity.
The next section reviews existing research on EMB independence and electoral integrity. The
third section presents our theoretical framework, and the fourth presents four dimensions of de jure
EMB independence. In the fifth section we discuss the data and methods used. The results and
conclusion are presented in the final sections.
EMB independence and electoral integrity
Following the introduction to this special issue, we define EMBs as the organization(s) that are
tasked with ‘managing some or all the elements that are essential for the conduct of elections’ (Catt
et al., 2014: 5). This includes determining voter and candidate eligibility, conducting polling, and

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