Bundles of Joy: the Ubiquity and Efficiency of Bundles in New Technology Markets

DOI10.1093/joclec/nhn013
Date19 April 2008
Pages1-47
Year2008
Published ByOxford University Press
BUNDLES OF JOY: THE UBIQUITY AND
EFFICIENCY OF BUNDLES IN NEW
TECHNOLOGY MARKETS
Stan J. Liebowitz& Stephen E. Margolis
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the economic logic underlying bundles and tie-in sales
and uses the lessons learned from that examination to analyze seven specific
instances of bundling that have been the subject of antitr ust scrutiny or other
policy initiatives. Of particular interest are products that are nonrivalrous in
consumption, making all-you-can-eat pricing a viable candidate for efficiency.
The main economic points are the following: A
`-la-carte pricing may populate
economic models, but most products are bundles. They are bundles because
bundles are generally more efficient. Tie-in sales are much less common and
often not properly understood in textbook discussions. Market foreclosure, the
principal efficiency concern with tying and bundling, is likely to be exceedingly
rare. The seven instances of bundling (ties) examined in the paper are: cable
television; patent pools; blanket licenses; iPods and iTunes; telephones; music
albums and songs; operating systems and component programs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bundling and tie-in sales are well-worked topics in both economics and law.
Economists have largely answered, in the negative, the question of whether
tying the purchase of a monopolized good to some other good readily
provides the monopolist with rents from a second monopoly. Although a
tie-in can create a new monopoly, it can do so only under extremely limited
circumstances. Beyond that, economists have hatched some clever theories
that explain why firms might nevertheless engage in tie-in sales. Most of
these explanations find that tie-ins can be socially harmless, harmful,
or beneficial, but nevertheless not monopolizing. Economists have also
turned their attention to bundling. Most of these examinations try to
Ashbel Smith Professor of Economics, University of Texas at Dallas. E-mail: leibowit@
utdallas.edu.

Professor of Economics, North Carolina State University College of Management. E-mail:
steve_margolis@ncsu.edu. The authors would like to acknowledge helpful comments from
Bruce Kobayashi, Christopher Yoo, and the participants at Searle Center Roundtable on the
Law and Economics of Innovation at Northwestern University and the George Mason
University Law School/Microsoft Annual Conferenceon Regulation of Innovation.
Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 5(1), 1–47
doi:10.1093/joclec/nhn013
Advance Access publication 19 April 2008
#The Author (2008). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org
explain conditions whereby bundles might increase profits. In some recent
considerations of bundling and tying, the distinction between them appears
to be blurring.
In law, tie-in sales were made illegal under Section 3 of the Clayton Act
in instances where they would tend to create monopoly. Since then, doc-
trines developed in case law now extend the provisions of the Sher man Act
to tie-in sales, expanding awards and easing the burden of proof by making
tie-in sales a per se violation of the law once certain threshold conditions are
met.
1
Tie-ins and bundles have also long been addressed by patent abuse
doctrines, and most recently they are under attack in telecommunications
regulation.
Much of the economics literature on tie-ins and bundling is predicated
on the assumption of either simple monopoly or a dominant fir m. Market
foreclosure theories, which are the basis for what limited economic support
there is for a rule against tie-in sales, require that the dominant firm’s sales
of tied goods could capture a very large share of its industry. We will have
more to say on this later.
Lately though, some economists have called attention to the important
fact that a great deal of actual bundling takes place in industries in which
there appears to be considerable competition.
2
In fact, a great majority of
bundling instances can be found in markets that either are an adequate
approximation of the economist’s theoretical model of competition, or that
exhibit the sort of rivalr y that common usage and common sense would call
competition, even if some economists would not. The fact that bundling
occurs in competitive markets is evidence that the practice has efficiency
explanations, for otherwise it would be competed away. In turn, if bundling
is efficient when practiced in highly competitive markets, it may well have
similar properties when practiced by a monopolist. Finally, although it may
well be efficient, bundling always restricts choice to some extent and there-
fore consumers interested in that choice may express frustration and unhap-
piness with a welfare-enhancing arrangement that is nevertheless not ideal.
In this case, the ideal is the enemy of the efficient.
This paper considers the economics and law of tie-in sales with particular
attention to innovation. Markets affected by innovation will involve inven-
tion, creative works, other new goods, and new ways of producing or deliver-
ing goods. Typically these are markets in intellectual property, or markets
that are fundamentally affected by intellectual property. Many of the con-
temporary controversies over bundling and tie-ins involve these markets and
many innovation markets seem to collide with a regulatory disposition that
is antagonistic to bundling. Although regulators’ antagonism to bundling is
widely noted, we will also observe that, in impor tant cases, regulators or
1
Jefferson Parrish Hospital District v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
2
For example, see Kobayashi (2006), Hazlett (2006), and Evans and Salinger (2005).
2Journal of Competition Law & Economics
would-be regulators proposing to “unbundle” have actually been hostile to
full unbundling, although the nature of the bundling is often hidden in
these cases. We will return to that below.
This paper offers support for three general claims. First, bundling not
only occurs under some competitive conditions, but it is pervasive in the
economy and is the dominant for m of sales, for reasons that have to do with
efficiencies of a simple and obvious nature: most goods are bundles.
Second, the conditions required for tying or bundling to create monopoly
power for reasons other than product improvement are very restrictive, so
restrictive in fact, that such episodes are likely to be a vanishingly small frac-
tion of all tie-ins or bundles. Of course, most bundles do have the potential
to foreclose sales by others in a simple and obvious way. Houses with
kitchens, by way of example, will reduce the demand for restaurants. But
most bundling has nothing to do with monopoly power in any sense. Third,
in light of the first two, tying and bundling should not be per se illegal
in antitrust law; instead, all cases should require a demonstration of a high
likelihood of actual exclusion and the absence of an efficiency defense.
Equivalently, telecommunications policies that implement mandatory
unbundling should be reconsidered or abandoned.
We begin by offering some clarifications of current termino logy and a
general discussion of tying and bundling. We focus on some variations of
bundling practices (for example, all-you-can-eat buffets versus a
`-la-carte
pricing) that describe actual market sales that do not fit neatly into either
tying or bundling. After that, we review some of the competing expla-
nations of bundling and tie-ins, with par ticular attention to markets
in intellectual property. We follow that with a list of new-technology
bundling-related practices that currently encounter regulatory scrutiny and
then provide a more detailed case-by-case discussion of these markets. We
examine actual bundling practices to see how they relate to the proffered
explanations, how they are regulated, and what problems they may address.
Finally, we consider briefly the legal treatment of tie in sales, noting recent
progress, in the antitrust world at least, away from a per se doctrine against
bundling and tie-ins.
II. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK
The terminology in this literature has been, in our opinion, getting
muddled. We will use “tying” or “tie-in sale” throughout to refer to any
arrangement in which a buyer’s access to one good (the tying good) is con-
ditioned on his consenting to purchase a variable amount of one or more
other (tied) goods from the seller. Typically, this takes the form of an “all
requirements” clause, by which the buyer of a tying good agrees to satisfy all
requirements for some other good through purchases from the seller of the
tying good. We will also refer to virtual ties when firms try to reach this type
Bundles of Joy 3

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