Bunting v Revenue and Customs Commissioners
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Court | Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) |
| Neutral Citation | [2025] UKUT 96 (TCC) |
| Year | 2025 |
2025 Feb 19; March 19
Revenue - Capital gains tax - Relief for loan to trader - Taxpayer releasing company from obligation to repay loan in return for issue of shares with no value - Whether taxpayer entitled to loss relief when company going into liquidation - Whether loan “outstanding” following release of company’s repayment obligation -
The taxpayer and the company entered into an agreement for the capitalisation of part of a loan, pursuant to which the company issued shares to the taxpayer in consideration for the taxpayer releasing the company from its obligations in respect of the capitalised sum. Following the company’s entry into liquidation, the taxpayer claimed loss relief under section 253(3) of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992F1 in respect of the capitalised sum on the basis that the “outstanding amount” of the principal of the loan had become irrecoverable. The revenue refused the taxpayer’s claim, but the First-tier Tribunal allowed the taxpayer’s appeal, holding that principal was “outstanding” for the purposes of section 253(3) where the amount loaned had not been paid; and that the capitalised sum had not been paid by the issue of the shares because they had been worthless at the time of their issue.
On appeal by the revenue—
Held, allowing the appeal, that, for the purposes of section 253(3) of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992, “outstanding” in relation to a loan connoted that the loan continued to exist, in that the lender had a continuing legal entitlement to enforce the debt; that, therefore, once a loan had been voluntarily waived or released it could no longer be “outstanding” for the purposes of section 253(3); that, for the purposes of section 253(3) a loan could be both “outstanding”, in the sense that obligations remained to be performed under it which there was an entitlement on the part of the lender to enforce, and also “irrecoverable”, in the sense of impossible to get back; that, in the present case, where the shares were fully paid up in cash by the release of the capitalised sum, that sum had thereby been satisfied and was no longer “outstanding”, in the sense that the company was under no ongoing obligation to pay that part of the loan and the taxpayer had no entitlement to pursue it, the fact that the open market value of the shares had been negligible at the time of their issue being irrelevant; that, thus, the First-tier Tribunal had been wrong to focus on the question of whether the capitalised sum had been “paid” rather than considering whether it had ceased to be outstanding; and that, accordingly, at the time of the taxpayer’s claim for loss relief the capitalised sum had not been “outstanding” within the meaning of section 253(3) (post, paras 40–47, 52).
The following cases are referred to in the judgment of the Upper Tribunal:
Atherley v Revenue and Customs Comrs
Bunting v Revenue and Customs Comrs
Collector of Stamp Revenue v Arrowtown Assets Ltd
Crosby v Broadhurst [
Drown v Revenue and Customs Comrs
Pioneer Freight Futures Co Ltd v Cosco Bulk Carrier Co Ltd
R (O) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
Rossendale Borough Council v Hurstwood Properties (A) Ltd
The following additional cases were cited in argument or referred to in the skeleton arguments:
Ali Shipping Corpn v Jugobanka DD Beograd (unreported) 13 November 1997,
Fitzgeorge, In re; Ex p Robson [
Johnson v Davies [
Ramsay (WT) Ltd v Inland Revenue Comrs [
APPEAL from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)
On 29 February 2016 the taxpayer, Timothy Bunting, sought to claim a capital loss in the sum of £2.2m under section 253(3) of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 on the basis that the outstanding amount of the principal of a loan that he had made to a company, Rectory Sports Ltd, which had since gone into liquidation, had become irrecoverable. By a closure notice dated 1 September 2022 the revenue refused the taxpayer’s claim on the basis that his agreement with the company to capitalise the loan satisfied the whole of the debt, with the consequence that the conditions prescribed in section 253(3) of the 1992 Act were not met since there was no amount “outstanding” which had become irrecoverable. The revenue subsequently upheld the closure notice on review.
By an appellant’s notice the taxpayer appealed. On 27 March 2024 the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) (First-tier Tribunal Judge Amanda Brown KC and Michael Bell) [2024] UKFTT 275 (TC) allowed the appeal.
By an appellant’s notice and pursuant to permission granted by the First-tier Tribunal the revenue appealed on the ground that the tribunal had erred in law in holding that: (1) the loan was outstanding in circumstances where the loan no longer existed; and (2) the loan was outstanding and irrecoverable in circumstances where it had been satisfied by the provision of an asset.
The facts are stated in the judgment of the Upper Tribunal, post, paras 5–6.
Quinlan Windle (instructed by
Thomas Chacko (instructed by
The tribunal took time for consideration.
19 March 2025. JOANNA SMITH J and UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ALEKSANDER gave the following judgment of the Upper Tribunal.
Introduction1 This appeal concerns the interpretation of section 253(3) of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 (“TCGA 1992”). In summary, section 253(3) provides that a taxpayer who has made a loan to a trader may claim an allowable loss if the outstanding principal of the loan has become irrecoverable, and certain other requirements have been met.
2 The short issue in this appeal is whether a claim can be made under section 253(3) in circumstances where a loan was released in consideration for the issue of ordinary shares prior to the claim being made.
3 References in this decision to sections, are to sections in the TCGA 1992, unless stated otherwise.
4 Mr Bunting was represented by Mr Chacko, and HMRC were represented by Mr Windle. Although greatly assisted by their detailed and helpful submissions, both written and oral, we have not found it necessary to refer to each and every argument advanced or all of the authorities cited in reaching our decision.
First-tier Tribunal’s (“FTT”) decision5 The facts in this appeal were not in dispute. The FTT made factual findings with reference to the available evidence in para 7 of its decision Bunting v Revenue and Customs Comrs [2024] UKFTT 275 (TC) (“the Decision”), which we summarise by reference to the key facts as follows:
(1) In the early 2000s, Mr Bunting wanted to establish a business dealing in sports history books and memorabilia. It was intended that the business would trade with a view to a profit, and its holding of stock was expected to appreciate in value (para 7(3)).
(2) On 7 July 2004 Rectory Sports Ltd (“the Company”) was incorporated. Mr Bunting’s wife was appointed as the sole shareholder and director. The company was capitalised by one ordinary share of nominal value £1 fully paid (para 7(4)).
(3) The activities of the business were funded by Mr Bunting who personally invested £3,452,771 by way of a series of unsecured
(4) The Loan represented money lent to the Company which was used by it wholly for the purposes of its trade in books and memorabilia and was not a debt on security (para 7(6)).
(5) There was some initial success for the business but by 2012 it had become clear to Mr Bunting (and his wife) that the stock held was depreciating rather than appreciating in value and the targeted market was falling away. The business was becoming unsustainable (para 7(7)).
(6) On 31 January 2013 Mr Bunting and the Company entered into an agreement for the capitalisation of £2.2m of the Loan (“the Capitalisation Agreement”). Pursuant to that agreement the Company issued 2,200,000 ordinary £1 shares to Mr Bunting (“the Consideration Shares”), and in consideration he agreed to “fully and irrevocably release and discharge the Company from any and all claims or demands [he] [had] or may have against the Company and duties, obligations and liabilities that the Company [had] or may have to [him] under or in respect of [£2.2m]” (para 7(8)).
(7) The Capitalisation Agreement does not represent an assignment of the capitalised proportion of the Loan (para 7(9)).
(8) On 31 January 2013 the Company, and therefore the Consideration Shares, had no value (para 7(10)).
(9) The capitalisation of £2.2m of the Loan was undertaken for the purposes of, and in the belief that, Mr Bunting would, in consequence of the conversion, be entitled to claim income tax losses pursuant to section 131 Income Tax Act 2007 on the basis that the shares had become of negligible value (para 7(11)).
(10) On 18 March 2013, the Company and Mr Bunting entered a further agreement for the release and discharge of £1,325,771 of the Loan in consideration for the transfer to Mr Bunting of identified assets (including the Company’s name, fixed and moveable assets and stock) (para 7(12)).
(11) On 28 March 2013 the Company resolved that it should be liquidated, and liquidators were appointed
(12) Mr Bunting claimed £2.2m of income losses in his self-assessment tax return for the tax year ended 5 April 2013 (para 7(14)).
(13) On 27 January 2015 HMRC...
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