Buyer Power in Health Plan Mergers

DOI10.1093/joclec/nhp020
Date13 November 2009
Pages375-391
Year2009
Published ByOxford University Press
BUYER POWER IN HEALTH PLAN MERGERS
Cory S. Capps
ABSTRACT
In light of recent increased policy attention directed toward health insurance,
the next significant health plan merger is almost certain to receive close scru-
tiny from many quarters, including representatives of providers, such as the
American Medical Association and the American Hospital Association, and
the U.S. Department of Justice. In this paper, I review the key buy-side econ-
omic questions and analytic frameworks that are likely to be at the forefront in
future investigations of health plan mergers. In particular, I explain how indus-
try structure implies that shares of purchases from individual providers as well
as area-wide shares of purchases are likely to inform antitrust analysis of poten-
tial monopsony harm in health plan mergers. I also discuss the appropriate
treatment of government payers in calculating and assessing buy-side market
shares. I conclude with a discussion of how competition and market power in
downstream markets for the sale of commercial insurance interact with the
potential exercise of monopsony power in upstream markets for the purchase
of provider services.
JEL: I11; K21; L40
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent signs point toward heightened interest in health plan mergers.
During his presidential campaign, Senator Obama generally criticized the
vigor of antitrust enforcement over the last eight years, and he specifically
identified two areas as warranting closer scrutiny: (1) reverse payments by
branded drug manufacturers to a would-be generic entrant and (2) concen-
tration in the health insurance industry.
1
The now defunct proposed merger
of Highmark BCBS and Independence Blue Cross in Pennsylvania—a
merger that primarily involved potential rather than actual competitors—
was extensively reviewed by the Pennsylvania Health Insurance Commission
Principal, Bates White, LLC; 1300 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 600E, Washington, D.C. 20005,
USA. E-mail: cory.capps@bateswhite.com. I thank Marius Schwartz, Scott Thompson, Jose
Guardado, and Slava Zayats for helpful comments. All errors or omissions are my own.
1
Statement of Senator Barack Obama for the American Antitrust Institute (Feb. 20, 2008),
available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/aai-%20Presidential%20campaign%
20-%20Obama%209-07_092720071759.pdf. President Obama again referenced health
insurance concentration in a 2009 speech before a joint session of Congress. Remarks by the
President to a Joint Session of Congress on Health Care (Sept. 9, 2009), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-to-a-Joint-Session-of-
Congress-on-Health-Care.
Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 6(2), 375–391
doi:10.1093/joclec/nhp020
Advance Access publication 13 November 2009
#The Author (2009). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org
over the course of nearly two years,
2
was the subject of two Senate hear-
ings,
3
was twice reviewed, but not opposed by the Department of Justice
(DOJ),
4
and was extensively debated in the press. The next proposed
merger of major insurers is likely to receive at least that much, and probably
even more, attention. Monopsony power is likely to be one of the primary
concerns during future investigations of health insurer mergers.
5
In this paper, I discuss the key buy-side economic questions that are likely
to be at the forefront in future investigations of health insurer mergers. In
Section II, I briefly describe the theory of monopsony and buyer power harm
in general. I then discuss these theories in more detail in the context of health
insurer mergers. I discuss interactions between sell-side market power and
buyer power theories of harm in Section III. I conclude in Section IV.
II. BUY-SIDE THEORIES OF HARM IN HEALTH PLAN MERGERS
A. The Logic of Monopsony
Monopsony is commonly described as the mirror image of monopoly.
6
In
buy-side markets, a buyer with market power in an input market (mono-
psony power) has the ability to decrease the price of that input by purchasing
less of it.
7
The intuition for this is revealed by reversing the sell-side logic
and examining a monopolist’s incentive to purchase additional units of an
input over which it has market power. If the monopsonist wishes to purchase
additional units, it will have to pay a higher price. Absent the ability to price
discriminate, the monopsonist will have to pay that higher input price on
every unit it purchases rather than just on marginal units. Accordingly,
2
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Insurance Department, Form A Filings Document Log,
available at http://www.ins.state.pa.us/ins/cwp/view.asp?a=1347&Q=547942&PM=1. Last
modified on January 6, 2009.
3
Examining Health Care Mergers in Pennsylvania: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
110th Cong. (2007), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=2677 and
Consolidation in the Pennsylvania Health Insurance Industr y: The Right Prescription? Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Antitrust Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, 110th Cong. (2008), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/
hearing.cfm?id=3522.
4
Justice Department Signs Off on Proposed Highmark-IBC Merger,PITTSBURGH BUS.TIMES.,
July 18, 2008. The second DOJ review occurred after the merger failed to close within one
year of the initial filing. No public news source indicates that the DOJ issued a second request
in either instance, available at http://albany.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/stories/2008/07/14/
daily36.html.
5
American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, 2008 Transition Report 54 (Nov. 2008),
available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-comments/2008/11-08/comments-obamabiden.
pdf.
6
U.S. DEP’TOFJUSTICE &FED.TRADE COMM’NHORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, § 0.1,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/hmg1.html.
7
This requires that the supply curve of the input be upward sloping (that is, that the elasticity
of supply of the input is positive rather than infinite).
376 Journal of Competition Law & Economics

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