Camrose (Viscount) v Basingstoke Corporation
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS,Lord Justice Russell,The Master Of The Rolls |
| Judgment Date | 25 May 1966 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1966] EWCA Civ J0525-4 |
| Court | Court of Appeal |
| Date | 25 May 1966 |
[1966] EWCA Civ J0525-4
In The Supreme Court of Judicature
Court of Appeal
From the Lands Tribunal
The Master of the Rolls
(Lord Denning)
Lord Justice Davies and
Lord Justice Russell
Mr Anthony Cripps, Q.C. and Mr C. Sparrow, Q.C. (instructed by Messrs Slaughter and May) appeared as Counsel for the Appellants.
Mr. Arnold, Q.C. and Mr M. Mann (Instructed by Messrs Sharp: Pritchard & Co., Agents for the Town Clerk, Basingstoke) appeared as Counsel for the Respondents.
In 1952 some of our great cities were congested and over-populated. In order to relieve the congestion, Parliament passed the Town Development Act 1952. The overspill was to be siphoned off to the smaller towns. These towns were to expand so as to receive the influx. They were given compulsory powers to acquire land for the purpose. Basingstoke was one of the towns selected to receive an influx from London. It made a development plan designating large areas near the town for residential purposes, other areas for industrial purposes, others for open spaces, and so forth. A goodly portion of the land they required, namely, 550 acres, was owned by the Viscount Camrose and The Hon. Michael Berry. The Basingstoke Council agreed to buy this land. The price was to be the sum which would have been payable if it had been compulsorily acquired. Mr Hobbs, a member of the Lands Tribunal, sat to fix the price. He fixed it at £478,500. This figure has in large measure been accepted by the landowners, but they have raised queries on two items: first, an area of 233 acres allocated for residential purposes; secondly, an area of 79 acres allocated for industrial purposes.
1. The 233 acres for residential purposes
Out of the 550 acres, the Council are taking 383 acres for residential purposes. 150 acres are near to the present town. Mr Hobbs fixed their value at £291,400. But 233 acres are much further away. Mr Hobbs fixed their value at £95,000. The landowners accept the figure for the 150 acres: but not the figure for the 233 acres.
The Member of the Lands Tribunal fixed the price of the two portions in this way: He assumed that planning permission would be given co as to permit development of the whole 383 acres for residential purposes, see Sections 15 and 16 of the Land Compensation Act 1961: but he ignored any increase in value which was due to the proposed town development. He asked himself, therefore: What would have happened to Basingstoke if therehad not been the artificial inflation due to the Town Development Act 1952? In other words, if there had not been an induced, influx from London, but only the natural increase to be expected? The Tribunal answered that question by saying that the existing sewage system was full up already, It would take 2½ years to increase its capacity. Then the natural increase would be 1,000 persons a year over the next ten years. This would take up 15 acres of land a year, making 150 acres in all, stretching from 2½ years to 12½ years. The Tribunal assessed the value of these 150 acres (with planning permission) at £3,500 an acre, but then made a deduction for the fact that development would be deferred for an average of 7½ years, and also for the risk that it might not take place. The calculation for the 150 acres on this basis came to £291,400. The landowners do not quarrel with this figure. Those 150 acres were close to the existing town and quite likely to be developed. But then came the 233 acres which were far distant and not likely to be developed for a long time. The Tribunal thought that these 233 acres would not, in the natural course of events, have been developed for some years. So far ahead, indeed, that it would not be "realistic to use a method of deferring a present value". The Tribunal valued it, therefore, as a "hope" or accommodation value, and put it at £400 an acre. The calculation for the 233 acres on this basis came to £95,000. The landowners complain of this figure. They say that these 233 acres should be valued on the same basis as the 150 acres, namely, a present value subject to a deduction for deferment and risk. They say that, in putting the value at £400 an acre, the Tribunal treated the 233 acres as agricultural land, ignoring the fact that it is to be valued on the footing that it has planning permission. I cannot accept this criticism. Even though the 233 acres are assumed to have planning permission, it does not follow that there would be a demand for it. It is not planning permission by itself which increases value. It is planning permission coupled withdemand. The Tribunal thought that the demand for these 233 acres was so far distant as to warrant only a "hope" of development, and valued them accordingly. I see nothing wrong with this method of calculation.
But the landowners have also raised a point of law about these 233 acres. They say that, in malting the valuation, the Tribunal must distinguish between the relevant land (that is, the whole 550 acres of the Camrose Estate) and the other land (that is, the land belonging to other people which is being compulsorily acquired). The landowners say that the Tribunal can increase the price of the relevant land by reason of the artificial influx from London on to the "relevant land" itself; but it must not increase the price by reason of the influx on to the "other land". That is said to follow from Section 6(1) of the Land Compensation Act 1961, and the First Schedule, Part I. In those provisions Parliament clearly prohibits the Tribunal from taking into account any increase due to the development of land "other than the relevant land". And this, so it is said, impliedly permits the Tribunal to take into account an increase in value due to the development of "the relevant land" itself, which is due to town development.
I can see that, on a literal reading, there is something in this argument. But it is contrary to common sense. I cannot see how any valuer could value on that footing. It is an impossible hypothesis. In many cases the "relevant land" cannot be developed unless the "other land" is developed first. Sewers and roads may have to be inserted in the "other land" before you reach the "relevant land". In such cases you cannot envisage the "relevant land" as being developed while the "other land" is not developed.
The explanation of Section 6(1) is, I think, this: The legislature was aware of the general principle that, in assessing compensation for compulsory acquisition of a defined parcel of land, you do not take into account an increase invalue of that parcel of land if the increase is entirely due to the scheme involving the acquisition. That was settled by the Pointe Gourde case, 1947 Appeal Cases, p. 565, where the Privy Council disallowed the £15,000 increase in value of the quarry (which was compulsorily acquired) which was due to the scheme for a naval base. That decision has since been approved by the House of Lords in Davy v. Leeds Corporation, 1965, 1 Weekly Law Reports, p. 445. It is left untouched by Section 6(1). But there might be some doubt as to its scope. So the legislature passed Section 6(l) and the First Schedule in order to make it clear that you were not to take into account any increase due to the development of the other land, i.e. land other than the claimed parcel. I think that the decision in Pointe Gourde covers one aspect: and Section 6(1) covers the others with the result that the Tribunal is to ignore any increase in value due to the Town Development Act, both on the relevant land and on the other land. That is the way the Tribunal did value it here. The Tribunal said: "Not only is the development already carried out and the development in prospect, in so far as both are consequent on town development, to be ignored on land other than the relevant land, but it must also be ignored on the relevant land itself". I think that was right. The point of law taken by the landowners is wrong.
2. The 79 acres for industrial development
Out of the 550 acres, the Council are taking 79 acres for industrial development. The Member of the Lands Tribunal valued it in this way: Ho asked himself: What would have been the industrial development in Basingstoke if there had not been the artificial influx from London? The Tribunal thought that, apart from town development, there would be no great demand for...
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