Can small states wage proxy wars? A closer look at Lithuania’s military aid to Ukraine
| Published date | 01 March 2024 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00108367221116532 |
| Author | Vytautas Isoda |
| Date | 01 March 2024 |
https://doi.org/10.1177/00108367221116532
Cooperation and Conflict
2024, Vol. 59(1) 3 –22
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/00108367221116532
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Can small states wage
proxy wars? A closer look
at Lithuania’s military aid
to Ukraine
Vytautas Isoda
Abstract
Proxy wars are an increasingly common feature of great power competition in the 21st century.
In this context, the role of the small states is less clear and has not been properly addressed in
the academic literature. Although states of this type have often been chosen as battlegrounds
for such wars and have even acted as proxies for the superpowers, this article argues that they
are also capable of conducting proxy warfare themselves. Since the start of the 2014 conflict in
Donbas, Eastern Ukraine, this country has experienced proxy interventions from many external
actors, both large and small, that provided resources to both conflict parties. One of the smallest
states which has been trying to affect the course of this conflict in support of the Ukrainian
government is Lithuania. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with the security and defence
policy-makers in Vilnius, the article aims to explain why Lithuania is punching above its weight and
interfering with this conflict from backstage. The empirical evidence points to an almost perfect
alignment of interests between the current governments in Kiev and Vilnius in that they both see
Russia as their long-term ‘enemy’ which makes Ukraine a surprisingly suitable proxy for Lithuania
to exploit.
Keywords
capacity building, donated assistance, Donbas conflict, Lithuania, proxy war, small states, Ukraine
Introduction
Proxy war is by no means a new phenomenon in the history of international conflict. Its
use and significance, however, has only increased over the course of the last few decades
as the so called ‘major wars’ became nearly obsolete (Mueller, 1989, 2004). According
to UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, back in the 1960s, civil wars with a recorded
foreign state interference – although increasingly rife – still comprised only 10%–20%
Corresponding author:
Vytautas Isoda, Department of Political Science, General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania, 5A
Šilo Street, LT-10322 Vilnius, Lithuania.
Email: vytautas.isoda@lka.lt
1116532CAC0010.1177/00108367221116532Cooperation and ConflictIsoda
research-article2022
Article
4Cooperation and Conflict 59(1)
of the total number of armed conflicts in the world; by late 2010s, conflicts of this type
amounted to nearly 40% (Strand et al., 2019). With the arrival of nuclear weapons and
global economic interdependence, it is only logical that major powers prefer to conduct
their competition through various proxies and on distant lands rather than engage in
direct military confrontation. In this context, the role of the small states is less clear and
has not been properly addressed in the academic literature. Since ‘small states are often
treated as objects, not as subjects of international relations’ (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006:
18), one would assume them to be the battlegrounds for proxy wars or – at best – to do
the biddings of the powerful rather than to pick fights of their own. However, various
case studies have found smaller states to be both ‘clients’ of the superpowers and inter-
national ‘meddlers’ of their own making (e.g. Gleijeses, 2006; Hadar, 2006; Nanes,
2019). Now is as good time as any to finally address the question of when (under what
conditions) and why the small players follow in the footsteps of the powerful – albeit to
a smaller effect – by interfering in conflicts outside their own borders.
The post-Soviet space, including Ukraine, has long been viewed as a ‘playground’ for
the great powers (Loftus and Kenet, 2015; Nitoiu, 2016), primarily Russia, the United
States, the European Union, and – more recently and to a lesser extent – China (Kaczmarski,
2017; Song, 2018). All of them have been described as both instigators of civil and cross-
border conflicts in this region and drivers for conflict resolution (Dunn and Bobick, 2014;
Fawn, 2020; Mearsheimer, 2014; Popescu, 2011). However, it was not until the 2014 war
in Donbas, Eastern Ukraine, that the great powers of the Euro-Atlantic area engaged in
what essentially is a war by proxies with recorded elements of direct military interven-
tion.1 As important as this geopolitical clash of the ‘titans’ is for the dynamics of this
conflict (Barkanov, 2015; Cadier, 2014), Ukraine has also seen a surprisingly robust inter-
ference from the smaller states of the post-Soviet space, such as Georgia (Potočňák and
Mareš, 2019) and Lithuania (Dapkus, 2017). Although not so decisive for the outcome of
the conflict, their military assistance is greatly appreciated by the conflict parties them-
selves (e.g. Poroshenko, 2017). It is therefore worth analysing the role and motivation of
the small players as well, so as to grasp the full picture behind the frontline and maybe get
a better understanding of who (or what) has been fuelling the war in Donbas for the past
several years. In terms of research objective, this article is limited to a case study of a
single small state’s policy-making, but its secondary aim is to open up new avenues for
future research which would involve cases beyond the post-Soviet region.
Lithuania has a long-standing record of advocating Ukraine’s, Georgia’s, and
Moldova’s integration into the ‘Western’ geopolitical structures, namely North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU; Galbreath and Lamoreaux,
2007; Park and Jakstaite-Confortola, 2021; Vilpišauskas, 2013: 134–137). The ultimate
goal of this stratetgy is to create a stable, prosperous, and democratic zone to the East of
the Baltic Sea as much as to counter Russia’s political influence and potential territorial
expansion westwards (Galbreath and Lašas, 2013: 162; Jakniūnaitė, 2016: 123). As
Maria Mälksoo (2006) puts it in academic terms, ‘while Russia remains conventionally
“othered” and securitized by the Baltic states, attempts are being made to concurrently
shift the European <. . .> borders further towards the new Eastern neighbours of the
EU’ (p. 289). However, up until recently, Lithuanian efforts to support Ukraine’s ‘Euro-
Atlantic path’ have mostly involved diplomatic and/or economic measures and as such
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