Canada as a peninsula state: Conceptualizing the emerging geopolitical landscape in the 21st century
| Author | Tsuyoshi Kawasaki |
| Published date | 01 September 2019 |
| Date | 01 September 2019 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0020702019874798 |
| Subject Matter | Scholarly Essay |
Scholarly Essay
International Journal
2019, Vol. 74(3) 345–362
Canada as a peninsula
! The Author(s) 2019
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state: Conceptualizing
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DOI: 10.1177/0020702019874798
the emerging
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geopolitical landscape
in the 21st century
Tsuyoshi Kawasaki
Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University,
Burnaby, BC, Canada
Abstract
An unprecedented geopolitical landscape, driven by the reduction of Arctic ice and the
rise of China as ‘‘a Polar power,’’ is emerging. What does this mean for Canada, and how
should Canada respond to it in a systematic and strategic manner? We need a coherent
and holistic conceptual framework to answer these key policy questions. Yet, the cur-
rent literatures do not offer us such a concept. In an attempt to fill the void, this article
presents a vision that conceives of Canada as ‘‘a peninsula state’’ exposed to great
power politics in its vicinity, involving China as a rising power as well as the United
States and Russia as resident powers. Furthermore, it argues that Canada should be
prepared for three kinds of strategic dynamics as it enters the game of great power
politics: theatre-linkage tactics and wedge-driving tactics vis-a`-vis China and Russia,
as well as quasi-alliance dilemma with the United States. Moreover, in order for
Canada to cope with this complex international environment effectively, this article calls
for creating a cabinet-level unit to coordinate various federal bureaucracies’ foreign and
security policies.
Keywords
Canada, grand strategy, geopolitics, the Arctic, China, a peninsula state
Corresponding author:
Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive,
Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada.
Email: kawasaki@sfu.ca
346
International Journal 74(3)
A new geopolitical landscape is emerging, driven by two long-term structural
changes. On the one hand, we are witnessing the opening of the Arctic Ocean
for navigation because of global warming, which seems to be irreversible. On the
other hand, the global balance of power is shifting significantly: China as a rising
power is expanding its influences often at the expense of the resident global hege-
mon, the United States—most acutely in the Western Pacific, but also in other
parts of the world.1 The power struggle between these two giants will be a funda-
mental feature of world politics in years to come. The combined effect of these two
‘‘tectonic shifts’’ is China’s increasing keenness to get involved in Arctic affairs as
‘‘a near-Arctic state.’’ In particular, Beijing is seeking to open up a new ‘‘Polar Silk
Road’’ through the Arctic Ocean to Europe as a part of global trade networks
centring on China. It also wants to cooperate with Moscow in acquiring natural
resources in the Arctic as a part of its energy security agenda.2
If these trends continue, Canada will likely face an unprecedented geopolitical
situation that has two main features. First, the China–US power struggle may
spread from the Pacific theatre to the Arctic. These two theatres will then
become connected in the strategic calculations of the United States and China.3
Second, while historically Canada has been accustomed to interacting with the
United States, Russia, and other European powers near its borders, China will
join this group of surrounding great powers, with a potentially antagonistic posture
to Canada, as demonstrated by recent events.4 In short, Canada will be exposed to
the game of great power politics in its vicinity. Admittedly, this geopolitical land-
scape, in which the Arctic no longer occupies a ‘‘historical secondary status,’’ may
not become a reality soon.5 But in the long run, it will certainly materialize itself,
given the unstoppable melting of Arctic ice.
At the present historic juncture, therefore, Canada needs a coherent conceptual
framework to comprehend the emerging geopolitical landscape and to orient and
organize its strategic thinking. Yet, it is difficult to find such a framework in the
1.
The December 2017 US ‘‘National security strategy’’ identifies China and Russia as revisionist
powers challenging the United States (see especially 25–28), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf (accessed 8 March 2019).
2.
On these terms, see ‘‘China’s Arctic policy,’’ published on 26 January 2018 by China’s State Council
Information Office, http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660
336.htm (accessed 8 March 2019).
3.
On this strategic competition and Canada’s place in it, see Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, ‘‘Where does
Canada fit in the US-China strategic competition across the Pacific?,’’ International Journal 71,
no. 2 (2016): 214–230.
4.
Upon a US request through the Canada–US extradition treaty, the Canadian authorities arrested
Meng Wanzhou, Chief Financial Officer of Huawei, a giant Chinese telecommunication company,
at the Vancouver airport on 1 December 2018. Demanding her release, Beijing has resorted to a
series of hard-line measures against Ottawa—widely seen in Canada as retaliatory—while the
Trudeau government has kept its position that it will not politically intervene in the legal process
of the extradition case. Canada’s relations with China have not seen this level of deterioration since
the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989.
5.
The term ‘‘historical secondary status’’ comes from Natalie Mychajlyszyn, ‘‘The Arctic:
Geopolitical issues,’’ Parliamentary Information and Research Service InfoSeries, 24 October
2008, 08–06E.
Kawasaki
347
current Canadian literature of Arctic policy generally, and in that of China’s Arctic
interests in particular.6 Nor is the conventional literature on Canadian foreign
policy toward China helpful in this regard.7 While rich and insightful in their
own ways, these works as a whole fail to provide us with the unified geopolitical
framework that we are looking for. In the first place, they generally treat Canadian
involvements in the Arctic in a more or less self-contained manner, separated from
those in the Pacific, and vice versa. They show an insufficient awareness of the
potential connectivity between the two strategic theatres. Furthermore, when dis-
cussing Canada–China relations in the Arctic, the existing literature largely stays
on a bilateral framework of analysis. It does not place them in the triangle relations
of Canada, the United States, and China—or, for that matter, in a larger group
including Russia and European powers. In their respective ways, all these
Canadian writings only look at parts. They offer fragmented pieces, without a
holistic picture that we ardently need.8
To help solve this problem, this article presents one conceptual framework:
Canada as a ‘‘peninsula state.’’ It claims that Canada, while not a peninsula in
the literal sense, will have the key geopolitical features of a peninsula. On the one
hand, Canada is surrounded by three ocean fronts (the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the
Arctic) and will increasingly be exposed to the trans-oceanic influences of China, a
6.
A bibliographical list of works on Canada’s Arctic policy is available at http://www.cfp.utoron-
to.ca/reading/arctic.html (accessed 8 March 2019). Some Canadian analysts are cautious toward
China’s Arctic policy, while others are more sanguine. The former group includes Adam P.
MacDonald, ‘‘China looking north: Compromising Canada’s Arctic sovereignty and security?,’’
Canadian Military Journal 18, no. 1 (2017), http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol18/no1/page4-
eng.asp (accessed 8 March 2019); and ‘‘China as an emerging Arctic player: Compromising
Canada’s northern interests?,’’ Canadian Naval Review 12, no. 2 (2018): 4–9. For a more sanguine
perspective, see P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Adam Lajeunesse, James Manicom, and Fre´de´ric
Lasserre, China’s Arctic Ambitions: And What They Mean for Canada (Calgary: University of
Calgary Press, 2018). We see the same division in Canadian reactions to the 2018 ‘‘China’s
Arctic policy’’ document: Adam P. MacDonald, ‘‘Ottawa should be wary of China’s vision for
the Arctic,’’ Macdonald-Laurier Institute, 20 February 2018, https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/
ottawa-should-be-wary-of-chinas-vision-for-the-arctic-adam-macdonald-for-inside-policy/
(accessed 8 March 2019); Adam Lajeunesse and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, ‘‘China’s Arctic ambi-
tions: The new Arctic policy of a ‘near-Arctic state,’’’ iPolitics, 2 February 2018, https://ipolitics.ca/
article/chinas-arctic-ambitions-new-arctic-policy-near-arctic-state/ (accessed 8 March 2019); and
Adam Lajeunesse, ‘‘Finding ‘win-win’: China’s Arctic policy and what it means for Canada,’’
Canadian Global Affairs Institute, December 2018, https://www.cgai.ca/finding_win_win_china-
s_arctic_policy_and_what_it_means_for_canada (accessed 8 March 2019). This division largely cor-
responds to the ‘‘realist’’ approach of Rob Huebert and its ‘‘liberal’’ counterpart promoted by
Franklyn Griffiths in the Canadian Arctic policy literature: Franklyn Griffiths, Rob Huebert,
and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Canada and the Changing Arctic: Sovereignty, Security, and
Stewardship (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2011).
7.
Recent works include Pitman B. Potter and Thomas Adams, eds., Issues in Canada-China Relations
(Toronto: Canadian International Council, 2011); Asif B. Farooq and Scott McKnight, eds.,
Moving Forward: Issues in Canada-China Relations (Toronto: Asian Institute and China Open
Research Network, the University of...
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