Canada, the International Criminal Court, and the intersection of international politics and finances
| Published date | 01 June 2019 |
| Date | 01 June 2019 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0020702019852700 |
| Subject Matter | Scholarly Essays |
Scholarly Essay
Canada, the
International
Criminal Court, and
the intersection of
international politics
and finances
Kirsten J. Fisher
Department of Political Studies, College of Arts and Science,
University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada
Laszlo Sarkany
Department of Political Science, King’s University College at
Western University, London, Ontario, Canada
Abstract
In 2018, Prime Minister Trudeau made two announcements regarding the International
Criminal Court, both, it seems, aimed at reinforcing Canada’s claim of human rights
promotion and multilateralism: Canada declared Myanmar’s actions against the
Rohingya people genocide and urged the United Nations Security Council to refer
the situation to the International Criminal Court, and it joined a collective referral of
the Venezuela situation to the Court. As public measures of support, these are positive
developments for the International Criminal Court, which has been suffering poor
public relations and challenges to its legitimacy. However, Canada could do more by
better supporting the financial viability of the Court. Currently, it aims to increase the
Court’s workload without supporting an increased budget, as reflected in Canada’s
involvement at the December 2018 Assembly of States Parties meeting. A seemingly
sure way to undermine the International Criminal Court would be to add to its
workload without ensuring it has the financial resources to do the work.
Keywords
ICC, Canada, Assembly of States Parties, international criminal law, multilateralism, ICC
budget
International Journal
2019, Vol. 74(2) 206–224
!The Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0020702019852700
journals.sagepub.com/home/ijx
Corresponding author:
Kirsten Fisher, University of Saskatchewan College of Arts and Science, Political Studies, 9 Campus Drive,
Arts 283B, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, S7N 5A5, Canada.
Email: kirsten.fisher@usask.ca
In the latter half of 2018, a number of important events occurred in the relationship
between the International Criminal Court (ICC) and Canada: Canada made two
public statements calling for the ICC to increase its workload through the referral
of two new situations, and Canada provided no support at the Assembly of States
Parties (ASP) meeting in December for the budget that the Court claims it requires
for its ever-increasing work. In September 2018, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau
made two announcements regarding the ICC—both, it can be interpreted, aimed at
reinforcing his claim ‘‘We’re back!’’
1
as a country of human rights promotion and
multilateralism.
2
On 26 September, in the wake of America’s renewed antagonism
toward the ICC, Canada joined Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru
in a collective referral of the situation in Venezuela.
3
Trudeau, in a press conference
at the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly, referred to Canada being
‘‘pleased to be joining with a broad number of other countries to continue to
look for solutions[,]... including using the International Criminal Court.’’
4
This
came only a week after Canada declared Myanmar’s military actions against the
Rohingya people a genocide, and urged the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) to refer the situation to the ICC.
5
As a public measure of support,
these are positive developments for the ICC. As part of a larger objective for
Canada to be seen as an international steward, and perhaps even leading to a
Canadian non-permanent seat on the UNSC, such acts seem well placed.
However, referring or asking for referrals to be made both signals faith in the
Court and its work, and also calls for an increase in the Court’s workload,
6
thereby
1. ‘‘‘We’re back,’ Justin Trudeau says in message to Canada’s allies abroad,’’ National Post,
20 October 2015, http://nationalpost.com/news/politics/were-back-justin-trudeausays-in-message-
to-canadas-allies-abroad/wcm/919c5f99-29ba-4082-a060-c341d0d2ff21 (accessed 23 October 2018).
2. Canada has long held itself to be a global leader in peacekeeping, the promotion and protection of
human rights, and the development of international justice. See Walter Dorn, ‘‘Canada: The once
and future peacekeeper?’’ Peace Magazine (October–December 2006): 16; Peter Stoett and Mark
Kersten, ‘‘Beyond ideological fixation: Ecology, justice, and Canadian foreign policy under
Harper,’’ Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 20, no. 2 (2014): 229; and Chrystia Freeland,
‘‘Address by Minister Freeland on Canada’s foreign policy priorities,’’ Global Affairs Canada.
Government of Canada. 6 June 2017, https://www.canada.ca/en/globalaffairs/news/2017/06/
address_by_ministerfreelandoncanadasforeignpolicypriorities.html (accessed 14 December 2018).
3. ‘‘Canada joins hemispheric partners in referring Venezuela to ICC,’’ Global Affairs Canada,
Ottawa, 26 September 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2018/09/canada-calls-
on-venezuela-to-cooperate-with-international-criminal-court.html (accessed 23 October 2018).
4. Andrew Russell, ‘‘Canada joins international calls for ICC to investigate Venezuela for crimes
against humanity,’’ Global News, 26 September 2018, https://globalnews.ca/news/4488297/
canada-icc-investigate-venezuela/ (accessed 15 March 2019).
5. Kathleen Harris, ‘‘MPs unanimously declare Myanmar crackdown on Rohingya a ‘genocide,’’’
CBC News, 20 September 2018, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/rohingya-myanmar-military-1.
4831956https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/rohingya-myanmar-military-1.4831956 (accessed 15
October 2018).
6. As laid out in Article 13 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, the Court can only exercise jurisdiction
over crimes committed within state parties or by nationals of state parties unless a situation is
referred by the United Nations Security Council. Since referrals from member states of the Court
can only be made of other member states, Canada was able to directly refer Venezuela but not
Myanmar, as the latter is not a state party to the Rome Statute. Therefore Canada’s only recourse
to ask that the Myanmar situation be examined by the ICC was to request of the UNSC that it refer
the situation.
Fisher and Sarkany 207
To continue reading
Request your trial