Care Standards Tribunal, 2025-08-27 (Transition Care Peterborough Ltd v Ofsted)

First Tier Tribunal Care Standards

The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care) Rules 2008

2025-01562.EY-SUS

Neutral Citation Number: [2025] UKFTT 01026 (HESC)

Heard on the papers on 22 August 2025 remotely via video

BEFORE

Mr SJW Lewis (Judicial Member)

Dr GK Sharma (Specialist Member)

BETWEEN:

TRANSITION CARE PETERBOROUGH LTD

Appellant

v

OFSTED

Respondent

DECISION

The Appeal

1. The Appellant, an organisation registered under the Care Standards Act 2000 (“the Act”) to carry on a supported accommodation service in Peterborough, brings this appeal (“the Appeal”) against a decision (“the Decision”) by the Respondent, set out in a written notice of 11 July 2025 (“the Notice) to restrict accommodation, with immediate effect until 3 October 2025, under section 22B of the Act (“the Restriction”).

2. The Appellant had been able, prior to the Decision, to accommodate up to 13 people, in five shared or group-living premises, limited to accommodating looked-after children or care leavers.

3. The Decision has the effect that no child may be accommodated by the Appellant at any premises unless the child was being accommodated at the time that the Notice was served and has continued to be accommodated since.

4. The Respondent opposes the Appeal.

The Hearing

5. The hearing (“the Hearing”) proceeded on the papers, with no attendance from the parties or representatives. That was in line with the case management decision made by Judge Khan on 7 August 2025, which was itself in line with the views expressed by the parties.

Documents, Evidence, and Submissions

6. A main bundle of written documents (“the Bundle”), running to 173 pages, had been prepared and provided for us to consider at the Hearing. The Bundle included, among other things: (1) the formal appeal application form, along with a covering email setting out some further information and submissions; (2) the formal response form, along with a more detailed response document attached to it; (3) two case management orders; (4) a witness statement for the Appellant (with exhibits and a covering email); (5) three witness statements for the Respondent (with exhibits); and (6) a relevant extract from the Act.

7. The witness statement for the Appellant was from Andrew Williams. It was not signed or dated. Mr Williams is the nominated individual and a director of the Appellant.

8. The witness statements for the Respondent were Steven James, Amie Pearson, and Mark Woodbridge. They were signed (electronically) and dated. Mr James carried out and led relevant inspections of the Appellant. Ms Pearson attended and supported Mr James in relation to the most recent of those inspections. Mr Woodbridge is a manager and the person who, in essence, made the Decision.

9. In addition to documents in the Bundle, we had regard to the Respondent’s skeleton argument, along with two documents attached to it: (1) The Supported Accommodation (England) Regulations 2023 (“the Regs”); and (2) the Guide to the Supported Accommodation Regulations including Quality Standards (published by the Department for Education in March 2023) (“the Guide”).

Restricted Reporting Orders

10. While no restricted reporting orders were expressly applied for, we considered whether we ought to make any such orders. Principally, we considered the position in relation to the children being accommodated by (or otherwise under the care of) the Appellant at material times. We concluded that, in all the circumstances, we should make an order, under rules 14(1)(a) and (b) of the rules governing the Tribunal and these proceedings, prohibiting the disclosure or publication of any document or matter likely to lead members of the public to identify those children, so as to adequately protect their private/family lives.

Legal Framework and Principles

11. Section 22B of the Act is the key statutory provision. It provides (as far as is relevant):

22B Notice restricting accommodation at certain establishments

1. The [registration authority] may serve a notice on a person who is registered in respect of an establishment to which this section applies imposing on that person the requirement in subsection (2) in relation to that establishment.

2. The requirement is to ensure that no child is accommodated at the establishment unless the child –

1. was accommodated there when the notice was served; and

2. has continued to be accommodated there since the notice was served.

12. Section 22B does not expressly impose, or otherwise set out, explicit conditions regarding when a notice restricting accommodation may be served. The Respondent’s evidence is that it will only serve such a notice where it considers children may be exposed to a risk of harm.

13. “Harm” is a term defined in section 31(9) of the Children Act 1989 as: “ill-treatment or the impairment of health or development including, for example, impairment suffered from seeing or hearing the ill-treatment of another.”

14. In our judgment, the correct approach for the Tribunal to take to the consideration of the Appeal is as follows. First, we must ask ourselves whether, at the date of the Hearing (rather than, for example, at the date of that the Decision was taken by the Respondent), we are satisfied that we have reasonable cause to believe that any child will or may be exposed to a material risk of harm. The burden of proof is on the Respondent. The standard of proof (“reasonable cause to believe”) falls somewhere between “the balance of probabilities” and the lower threshold of “reasonable cause to suspect”. The relevant belief is to be judged by whether a reasonable person, assumed to know the relevant law and be in possession of the relevant information, would believe that a child may be put at a material risk of harm. The threshold, therefore, is relatively low. The Tribunal does not need, for example, to be satisfied that there has been any actual harm, or that harm is likely in the future. That said, as we consider was made sufficiently clear by the Upper Tribunal (see paragraph 20) in Ofsted v GM [2009] UKUT 89 (ACC), the contemplated risk must be one of “significant” harm. As the Tribunal is focused on assessing current/future risk, we do not need to make conclusive findings of fact (or resolve any associated disputes of fact).

15. Second, if satisfied that the test/threshold relating to risk is met, we then need to consider whether, objectively viewed, the relevant regulatory intervention (i.e. the Restriction) is proportionate in all the relevant circumstances. The Respondent, in our view, bears a persuasive burden in relation to that issue.

16. We have had careful regard to the principles set out above, and the evidence before us (limited though it is), and approached this matter with an open mind.

Chronology

17. Given the broad principle that our role is primarily to assess risk (and then to consider the overall proportionality of the intervention being appealed), rather than to resolve factual disputes, nothing in this section (or anywhere else in this document) ought to be taken as any conclusive finding of fact. However, it is nonetheless important that we set out what appears to us to be the most relevant context. What follows is taken from our reading of the documents before us.

18. The basic chronology appears likely to be as follows:

1. On 1 February 2024, the Appellant registered, with the Respondent, in relation to the relevant service.

2. On 27-31 January 2025, the Respondent undertook a full inspection of the Appellant’s service (“the First Inspection”), forming a view that there were a number of significant concerns. At the time of the First Inspection, the Appellant was accommodating seven looked-after children aged 16-17.

3. On 7 February 2025, the Respondent served the Appellant two compliance notices following and as a result of the First Inspection, providing the Appellant with time to demonstrate compliance.

4. On 25 March 2025, the Respondent carried out a monitoring visit (“the Monitoring Visit”) of the Appellant, following which (on 27 March 2025) it took a view that the Appellant had made significant improvements and taken steps designed to meet the compliance notices served on 7 February 2025. At the time of the visit, the Appellant was still accommodating seven look-after children aged 16-17.

5. On 7-11 July 2025, however, the Respondent undertook a further full inspection of the Appellant’s service (“the Second Inspection”), once again forming a view that there were a number of significant relevant concerns.

6. On 11 July 2025, the Respondent made the Decision and served the Notice.

7. On 16 July 2025, the Respondent also served the Appellant with two further compliance notices following and as a result of the Second Inspection, providing the Appellant with time (i.e. until 9 September 2025) to demonstrate compliance.

8. On 5 August 2025, the Appellant lodged the Appeal against the Notice. The Restriction, therefore, is our principal focus.

Summary of Parties’ Positions

19. In very broad summary, the Respondent’s position is that the test in relation to risk is readily...