Chapter 5: Cartels: Deterrence, Leniency and Criminalisation

LibraryCompetition Law and Policy in the EU and UK
Pages186-221
AuthorBarry J. Rodger,Angus MacCulloch
Overview
  • Cartels, often price-fixing conspiracies between ‘competitors’, which were once common across Europe, are now considered to be the most serious form of competition law violation, as there is rarely any economic justification for their existence.

  • Contemporary cartel regulation is based on the principle of optimal deterrence. Cartel activity is to be discouraged by having in place suitable and adequate enforcement and penalties to remove any perceived gain from cartel activity.

  • Deterrence is achieved by combining increased penalties through corporate fines, individual sanctions and compensation payments, with enforcement enhancing tools like leniency and settlement programmes.

Introduction

The cartel is generally recognised as the most serious violation of competition law. A classic cartel is an agreement between horizontally related producers of a particular product across an industry. By being members of the cartel, the producers no longer compete against each other and, effectively, gain the advantages of market power through agreement. They will normally exploit that market power by fixing prices, reducing output or sharing customers or markets. All of those activities will increase costs for customers, compared to the costs that would have been faced in a competitive market, and increase the profit levels for the cartel members. One of the reasons that cartels are seen as being so damaging is that there is very little economic justification for their existence; they are always detrimental and offer little or no redeeming benefit.

Not all horizontal agreements between competitors are cartels. There are some circumstances in which some horizontal agreements may be allowed to go ahead, usually through Art 101(3) TFEU or the analogous UK provisions. One such example would be a research and development (R&D) agreement. Under such an agreement, two competing undertakings would agree to co-operate in a research project with a view to creating a new product development. That agreement would be beneficial, as it would encourage the parties to invest in expensive, and potentially risky, research activities. The new products developed would be of benefit to their customers who would get access to new technology much more quickly than would have been possible without the agreement. The competition authorities must be alert to the possibility that the undertakings who jointly undertook the research would have decreased incentives to compete with each other on the market created by the joint activity. In the Block Exemption Regulation, which deals with R&D agreements, 1 there is tension between the desire to encourage research and the concern that horizontal co-operation could lead to cartel activity. Art 5 of the Regulation sets out the agreements that are not covered by the block exemption; these include the limitation of output or sales or the fixing of prices when selling the contract product to third parties.

A useful general description of a cartel is set out by Harding and Joshua:

an organisation of independent enterprises from the same or similar area of economic activity, formed for the purpose of promoting common economic interests by controlling competition between them. 2

The contemporary shorthand definition as adopted by the European Commission is as follows

What is a cartel?

It is an illegal secret agreement concluded between competitors to fix prices, restrict supply and/or divide up markets. The agreement may take a wide variety of forms but often relates to sales prices or increases in such prices, restrictions on sales or production capacities, sharing out of product or geographic markets or customers, and collusion on the other commercial conditions for the sale of products or services. 3

It is therefore clear that the type of horizontal agreement that generally falls within the definition of a cartel is one that seeks to set prices, either directly or by manipulating output; share customers by allocating them between suppliers directly or by allocating each supplier control over customers in a specific geographical area; or agree to co-ordinate other terms and conditions of sale over which customers might expect sellers to compete. One practice, which would clearly fall within the concept of a cartel, but is usually known by a more specific name, is bid-rigging. This is where a contract is to be allocated through a bidding or tendering process, which is specifically designed to ensure competing suppliers go head-to-head to win a contract, and that process is subverted by the potential suppliers communicating in advance of making their bids to decide upon a collective strategy and thereby ‘rig’ the bidding process. Essentially, this is simply a strategy of co-operation in order to share customers among the bidding cartel members The History of European Cartels

The history of the European cartel in the twentieth century is a particularly interesting one. 4 At the beginning of the century, the cartel was a normal feature of industry. They were so prevalent in Germany that it became known as the ‘Land of Cartels’, 5 with 400 operating in 1905. 6 The reasons for this high level of cartelisation are complex, but in many regards it mirrors the reasons that cartels form in contemporary industries. The impact of the industrial revolution, alongside the political impact of the building of the German State, had resulted in volatile markets. Many of the cartels were originally defensive in nature, in that smaller businesses grouped together for protection, but as they grew in size and industry coverage, they became more powerful and were able to exert greater influence. The growth of cartels was generally positively received as they were perceived as bringing stability and order to markets. Systemic co-operation was also closely aligned with the corporatist tradition within German society. 7 The ability of customers to access lower prices was seen as being less important than the stability of the State economy, as reflected in the health of its industrial base. Cartel-type arrangements were found in other European economies in the early part of the century, but in economies like the UK they were less formal, and businesses tended to be somewhat more independent and entrepreneurial. This began to change in the inter-war period when multinational cartels began to form, often in industries where a national cartel had been successful. The wary toleration of cartels can be seen in the 1927 Geneva Declaration on Cartels:

The Conference has recognized that the phenomenon of such agreements, arising from economic necessities, does not constitute a matter upon which any conclusion of principle be reached, but a development considered as good or bad according to the spirit which rules the constitution and the operation of the agreements, and in particular according to the measure in which those directing them are actuated by a sense of the general interest. 8

The political turmoil in Europe which led to the 1939–1945 war brought this period of development to an end. The tentative control methods first seen in the mid-1920s were overtaken by events.

The immediate post-war period saw a change in attitude towards the cartel. Part of that attitude shift probably relates back to the use of cartels by the totalitarian governments in Germany, Italy and Japan in the lead-up to the 1939–1945 war. That association, and the influence of the US in European politics, 9 led to increased suspicion of previously accepted organisations. Notwithstanding that change in attitude there was no rush to follow the US prohibition model. The first European level control was seen in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. It is interesting to note that the ECSC regime did not challenge cartels per se – it promoted the public use of cartel-like organisations in industry, but certainly challenged the operation of private cartels. It did have a prohibition, in Art 65, of anti-competitive cartel practices, but also had a system of exemptions decided by the High Authority. The new model was a blend of European and American experience.

Most of this chapter will focus on the EU enforcement model, as it was followed in the UK by the Competition Act 1998, but the UK has gone further than the EU in cartel control. It has adopted a stronger set of individual enforcement tools to complement the EU model of corporate enforcement. Before we move on, it is interesting to spend a few moments looking at the UK’s relationship with cartels before the UK joined the EEC in 1973. The changing relationship is indicative of the wider European view. The common law always had a tolerant attitude towards cartel arrangements. 10 In Jones v North in 1875, a no-doubt secret, bid-rigging arrangement was described as ‘perfectly lawful’. 11 In later cases, such as North Western Salt Co v Electrolytic Alkali Co Ltd 12 and Rawlings v General Trading Co, 13 attitudes had hardened somewhat, but cartel agreements were still not unlawful, unless there were aggravating features such as fraud, misrepresentation or intimidation, although they may have been considered to be a restraint on trade and held to be void and unenforceable. The first statutory controls in the UK, The Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act 1948, allowed the Secretary of State to refer cartels to the Monopolies Commission to establish whether they operated contrary to the public interest. The next legislative attempt to control cartel activity was the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956. It introduced compulsory registration of cartel agreements on the basis of a rebuttable presumption that such agreements were contrary to the public interest. Parties could seek to justify their agreements before the Restrictive Practices Court. It therefore appeared that the UK had a relatively strong control regime; however...

Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI

Get Started for Free

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex