Case Law on Corruption and Bribery in the Bahamas
| Date | 01 January 1997 |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/eb025794 |
| Pages | 269-271 |
| Published date | 01 January 1997 |
| Author | Peter D. Maynard |
| Subject Matter | Accounting & finance |
Journal of Financial Crime — Vol. 4 No. 3 — International
Case Law on Corruption and Bribery in the
Bahamas
Peter D. Maynard
In the 1980s, the abuse of drugs had a serious
impact on the Bahamas as on other societies. Drug
trafficking had profound social, economic and
political impact. Corruption and bribery, drug-
related and otherwise, resulted in a number of
commissions of inquiry.
The principal laws on corruption and bribery of
public officials in the Bahamas are: the Prevention
of Bribery Act (Ch. 81), the Tracing and For-
feiture of Proceeds of Drug Trafficking Act (Ch.
86),
the Dangerous Drugs Act (Ch. 223), the
Public Disclosure Act (Ch. 9), the Penal Code
(Ch. 77) and, most recently, the Money Launder-
ing (Proceeds of Crime) Act (No. 8 of 1996).
This article focuses on the first aforementioned
law: the Prevention of Bribery Act (Ch. 81) ('the
Act').
The single primary case arising under the
Act is
Wilbert Moss
v C Ο Ρ Appeal No. 74 of 1989.
The facts were that Wilbert Moss, a Member of
Parliament, was charged with offering an advan-
tage,
to wit $10,000, to a stipendiary and circuit
magistrate as an inducement to her to acquit one
or two men appearing before her to answer char-
ges for offences against the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Mr Moss went to the magistrate's office and told
her that the man's father would pay that sum to
secure the man's release.
At first instance, a magistrate found Mr Moss
guilty of offering an advantage to a public servant
contrary to s. 3(l)(a) and 10(b) of the Act. On
appeal to the Supreme Court, the appeal was dis-
missed.
Section 3(1) of the Act states:
'(1) Any person, who without lawful authority
or reasonable excuse, offers any advantage to a
public servant as an inducement to or reward for
or otherwise on account of that public servant's:
(a) performing or abstaining from performing,
or having performed or abstained from per-
forming any act in his capacity as a public
servant...
shall be guilty of
an
offence.'
The appellant advanced two arguments. First, it
was argued that only the principal could be
charged and not the agent. The appellent relied on
a definition contained in s. 2(2)(a) of the Act,
which states:
'(2) (a)
a person offers an advantage if he, or any
other person acting on his
behalf,
directly or
indirectly gives, affords or holds out, any advan-
tage to or in trust for any other person.'
The appellant contended that the person such as
Mr Moss actually making the offer on behalf of
the principal, that is, the 'other person acting on
his behalf in the above sub-paragraph of section 2,
did not on the language fall within the definition
of an offeror. In response, the Commissioner of
Police submitted that s. 2(2)(a) enlarged the scope
of
s.
3(1) and did not restrict it. The Court accep-
ted this submission and found that s. 2(2)(a) made
it clear that the principal who did not plainly fall
within the terms of s. 3(l)(a) but, for example,
acted through an intermediary, such as Mr Moss,
was also covered.
The Court also held that the agent falls clearly
within the terms of
s.
3(l)(a). Commenting on the
difficulties of proof in bribery offences, Georges,
CJ said:
'This accords both with the language and with
common sense. It could not have been intended
that the emissary who actually makes the offer
should not be the principal but merely an abet-
Page 269
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