CENTRAL REGULATION OF ENGLISH LOCAL AUTHORITIES: AN EXAMPLE OF META‐GOVERNANCE?
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2006.00604.x |
| Date | 01 August 2006 |
| Author | JOSIE KELLY |
| Published date | 01 August 2006 |
Public Administration Vol. 84, No. 3, 2006 (603–621)
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street,
Malden, MA 02148, USA.
CENTRAL REGULATION OF ENGLISH
LOCAL AUTHORITIES: AN EXAMPLE OF
META-GOVERNANCE?
JOSIE KELLY
This paper discusses how the UK government has reconfi gured its regulation of
English local authorities by moving from direct oversight to using an indirect
independent agency as a vehicle of meta-governance. This theme is discussed through
two strands: fi rst, by examining how several factors eroded central government ’ s
capacity to directly regulate councils. The second strand examines the strategies used
by the Audit Commission, an independent agency, to assert its authority over councils
and how its hegemony is sustained by facilitating and participating in horizontal and
vertical networks across government, specialist policy and stakeholders ’ communities.
INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses the reconfi guration of the mode by which the UK
central government regulates English local authorities, moving from a
system of direct to indirect regulation. Departing from previous modes of
formal methods of regulation, typically by legality and probity audits, the
government has delegated responsibility to an independent agency, the
Audit Commission (AC), which has adopted a more persuasive approach
towards local government practitioners in order to convince them to accept
central government ’ s policy objectives. This is accomplished by simultane-
ously facilitating and participating in horizontal and vertical networks and
partner ships across government specialist policy communities and stake-
holders ’ communities. In other words, the shift from direct to indirect regu-
lation has resulted in the AC becoming a vehicle of meta-governance, acting
on the government ’ s behalf to regulate elected local authorities.
The AC not only shapes opinions in local government communities on the
management of these bodies, it creates its own perspective on what is a suc-
cessful local authority. Therefore, although the authority of the AC is derived
from its regulatory powers and legitimacy from its close ties to the Offi ce of
the Department for Communities and Local Government (the government
department responsible for local government), these are used only rarely.
Instead, the AC exercises its hegemony though its narratives of what consti-
tutes a ‘ well-run ’ council, which local government practitioners are advised
to adapt to local circumstances ( Kelly 2003 ). The AC ’ s model of a ‘ well-run ’
local authority is never static but constantly evolves, shifting over time to
Josie Kelly is a Lecturer in Public Management at Aston Business School, Aston University.
604 JOSIE KELLY
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006 Public Administration Vol. 84, No. 3, 2006 (603–621)
refl ect government priorities and dealing with new issues as they arise. In
addition, the AC ’ s model of ‘ best practice ’ is informed by the interpretative
judgements made by its staff when inspecting and reporting on the perfor-
mance of councils ( Humphreys 2001 ). Lastly, the creation of the AC in 1984
coincided with the emergence of the reforms, derived from business man-
agement practice, described as ‘ new public management ’ (NPM) ( Foster and
Plowden 1996 ). Because of the authority of the AC, it was uniquely placed
to become a powerful advocate for the application of its own interpretation
of NPM.
A corollary of the shift from a direct to an indirect mode is the reconfi gu-
ration of the enforcement of regulation. Penalties such as the surcharge and
disqualifi cation of errant councillors were abolished in 2000, signalling that
the legality of councils ’ actions were no longer a primary concern to central
government, and replaced by a new emphasis on the performance of coun-
cils. Thus, those councils that are judged to be failing because of poor gov-
ernance arrangements or performance are subject to direct intervention by
central government and the threat of the removal of functions to other orga-
nizations ( AC 2002a, b, c ). Such extreme actions, however, affect very few
local authorities. Most local government practitioners experience the author-
ity of the AC through periodic inspections and audits. AC publications also
report on fi ndings and judgements from inspecting and auditing local
authorities and are subsequently used to inform councils ’ policy-making and
implementation strategies.
These developments are explored through two interrelated themes. First,
at the macro-level of analysis, the meta-governance approach offers insights
into how central government, in shifting from direct to indirect regulation,
retains central steering by the state. In other words, despite claims to the
contrary, the state has retained its authority and exercises central steering
mechanisms. This appears to differ from the governance approach, which
centres on the ‘ hollowing out of the state ’ and the development of arrange-
ments such as the growth of networks and partnerships and the declin ing
infl uence of the capacity of the state to direct social action. The meta-
governance approach addresses a fundamental conundrum within gover-
nance; in an era of apparent diminishing state power, how can central
steering and regulation by the state be explained? Moreover, why is it the
case that despite the emergence of governance arrangements, formal institu-
tions of government persist, even in some circumstances taking on central
steering on behalf of the state in the localities?
The second theme, at the meso-level of analysis, examines the develop-
ment of the AC ’ s role at the centre of the current policy and regulatory
regime for local authorities as a manifestation of the reconfi guration and
modernization of the state. In other words, rather than direct regulation
through government departments and the law, the state now relies on a third
party agency to ensure that the management and government of the locali-
ties is appropriate to the purpose assigned to them by central government.
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