Challenge of Jurors and the Presumption of Innocence
| Date | 01 October 1948 |
| Published date | 01 October 1948 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002201834801200410 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Challenge of Jurors and the Presumption
of Innocence
IN October, 1944, one Lehman was convicted of murder,
but,
on
the
ground
that
questions,
put
to him in cross-
examination relating to his alleged desertion from
the
American Army, were irrelevant
and
tended
to
prejudice
his trial,
the
conviction was quashed in December, 1944,
by
the
Court of Criminal Appeal, which ordered his
re-trial:
The People (A.-G.) o. Lehman (No.1) (1947,
I.R.
133). At
the
second trial in January, 1945, his counsel requested
the
Judge's permission to ask each juror, before he was
sworn, whether he
had
read anewspaper account of
the
earlier proceedings and, in particular, areference to
the
objectionable questions relating
to
the
prisoner's alleged
desertion from
the
American army. This
the
learned
Judge
refused, and, upon Lehman's being convicted again,
an application for leave to appeal was made on
the
ground
that
the
Judge
had
misdirected himself in law, in refusing
to
permit counsel for
the
accused
thus
to question
the
jury,
for
the
purpose of discovering whether they,
or
any
of them,
could be challenged for cause shown. The Court of
Criminal Appeal held, however,
that
"the
learned Judge
was right in refusing to allow counsel for
the
accused
to
question
the
jurors with
the
object
that
he
stated",
for
Hitis well settled
that
counsel for an accused is
not
entitled
to
question ajuror with a view to ascertaining whether a
right of challenge should be exercised"
and
Hit is equally
well settled
that
even expressions of opinion by a juror are
not
aground of challenge unless
they
are corrupt as pro-
ceeding from ill-will, and
that
jurors
if
challenged cannot
be questioned about such expressions, which must be
proved aliunde": The People (A.-G.)
u.
Lehman
(No.2)
(1947,
I.R.
141).
It
must
now be regarded as beyond dispute
that
the
Courts have accepted two important principles
:-
first,
the
substantive rule
that
ajuror's opinion, or expression of
opinion, of
the
prisoner's guilt is not, in
the
absence of
malice, a ground of challenge; and, secondly, a procedural
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