Changing the rules of the game: Determinants of successful electoral system change in Central and Eastern Europe

Published date01 September 2013
Date01 September 2013
DOI10.1177/0192512112457195
International Political Science Review
34(4) 427 –443
© The Author(s) 2013
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DOI: 10.1177/0192512112457195
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Changing the rules of the game:
Determinants of successful
electoral system change in
Central and Eastern Europe
Philipp Harfst
Abstract
This article explores the conditions of successful electoral system change. It develops four hypotheses on
the conditions of the successful implementation of proposals to modify electoral laws. The first hypothesis
reflects partisan self-interest and assumes that larger parties are better able to impose their preferred
electoral institutions. The second and third hypotheses presume that electoral system design is motivated
by instrumental considerations that can either reflect consensual or majoritarian visions of democracy. A
fourth hypothesis draws on the timing of reforms and states that successful reform is possible only in relative
temporal proximity to extraordinary historical circumstances. A macro, quantitative comparative analysis
shows that both the control of larger seat shares and high levels of fragmentation in conjunction explain
the successful implementation of electoral laws in 11 new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. This
result is corroborated by four case studies.
Keywords
electoral institutions, electoral system change, Central and Eastern Europe, logit regression
1. Introduction
Electoral laws in Central and Eastern Europe have been subject to relatively frequent changes.
What circumstances lead to the successful modification of electoral institutions? This is the
research question to be answered in this article. First, the article presents an overview of electoral
system changes in Central and Eastern Europe in the period from 1990 until the end of 2003.
Second, it explores the conditions for successful electoral law amendments in the region.
I develop four hypotheses explaining the successful implementation of new electoral institu-
tions. The first hypothesis reflects the conditions of parliamentary lawmaking. It assumes that
self-interested parties which control a sufficient number of seats in parliament implement new
Corresponding author:
Philipp Harfst, University of Greifswald, Department of Political and Communication Science, Baderstr. 6–7, D–17489
Greifswald, Germany.
Email: pharfst@uni-greifswald.de
457195IPS34410.1177/0192512112457195International Political Science ReviewHarfst
2013
Article
428 International Political Science Review 34(4)
electoral institutions. In this view, large parties should be better able successfully to impose elec-
toral system changes than smaller ones. The second and third hypotheses assume that successful
electoral system design is driven by the observed consequences of the electoral system already in
place and its capacity to balance governability and representation. Finally, the fourth hypothesis
posits that electoral system changes are viable only in extraordinary historical circumstances.
Following an overview of successful and unsuccessful electoral law amendments, these hypothe-
ses are tested by means of macro, quantitative comparative analyses on the basis of 39 proposed
electoral law amendments in Central and Eastern Europe. I demonstrate that control of larger seat
shares combined with violations of the principles of a majoritarian vision of democracy explain the
successful implementation of electoral laws.
2. Electoral systems: causes, consequences, and change
Electoral systems research is characterized by an ongoing debate about the endogeneity of elec-
toral institutions. Duverger’s propositions (1973), often referred to as Duverger’s law and
hypothesis (Riker, 1982), posit that electoral laws have a considerable influence on the structure
of partisan competition. Other authors emphasize that the configuration of a party system has an
effect on the electoral institutions which are chosen. Thus, the causal direction in electoral sys-
tems research is fiercely debated. The two positions in this debate will be briefly reviewed in the
following section. The conclusion of this review is that despite empirical support for both
approaches, much is already known about the effects of electoral systems, while we know rela-
tively little about the conditions for successful electoral law change. This is the research gap the
present article seeks to bridge.
2.1. Consequences and stability of electoral laws
The basic political consequences of electoral laws were well known long before Duverger (1973)
engaged in the task of systematically investigating their effects and testing theoretical expectations
with empirical evidence: electoral laws based on the majority principle tend to produce two-party
configurations, while proportional representation (PR) usually leads to multiple parties (Ashworth
and Ashworth, 1901; Finer, 1935; Hermens, 1941; Rustow, 1950). Duverger’s path-breaking con-
tribution to electoral systems research was through formulating the causal mechanisms which elu-
cidate the political consequences of electoral laws: their psychological and mechanical effects. The
publication of Duverger’s work has stimulated a vast number of scholars to add evidence to the
validity of Duverger’s law and hypothesis and to qualify them (Clark and Golder, 2006; Lijphart,
1994, 1999; Rae, 1967; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989) – a process that Riker (1982) labels an
archetypical example of progress in (political) science.
If party systems are structured by electoral systems, electoral systems themselves should remain
relatively stable over time. The reason why the fundamentals of electoral institutions should remain
unchanged in established democracies lies in the self-interest of political parties: since electoral
reform in most cases requires the support of a parliamentary majority, and since this majority is able
to win under the established rules, it will resist attempts to alter the rules of the game it is winning
(Nohlen, 1984). Empirical evidence from western democracies seemed, for a long time, to support
this stability paradigm. Electoral institutions in these countries have been relatively stable since the
1950s. Lijphart (1994: 52) observes that ‘one of the best-known generalizations about electoral
systems is that they tend to be very stable and resist change.’ Nohlen (1984: 218) sees some room
for large-scale changes in electoral laws only in ‘extraordinary historical circumstances.’

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