China as a peacekeeper—Past, present, and future
| Published date | 01 June 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0020702020933647 |
| Date | 01 June 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Scholarly Essay |
Scholarly Essay
International Journal
China as a peacekeeper—
2020, Vol. 75(2) 123–143
! The Author(s) 2020
Past, present, and future
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DOI: 10.1177/0020702020933647
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Christoph Zu¨rcher
University of Ottawa, Canada
Abstract
Over the last 30 years, the People’s Republic of China (China) has evolved from a
skeptic to a champion of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping. During that same period,
UN peacekeeping has greatly changed. This paper traces how China has reacted to the
various practical and doctrinal innovations of UN peacekeeping, such as the turn to
more robust peacekeeping, the protection of civilians, the responsibility to protect, the
call for better force protection as outlined in the Cruz report, and, finally, the Action
for Peacekeeping initiative. The paper then discusses possible future developments of
China’s role in UN peacekeeping. Given the increasing weight of China within the UN, it
is likely that China will gradually become more involved in shaping peacekeeping
concepts. Early signs can be seen in its approach to the role of human rights in peace-
keeping and in its emerging conceptual understanding of peacebuilding.
Keywords
China, peacekeeping, United Nations, human rights, peacebuilding
In November 1989, the People’s Republic of China (China) deployed, for the first
time, civilian observers to a United Nations (UN) mission, and, one month later,
its first military contingent, both to the UN Transitions Assistance Group in
Corresponding author:
Christoph Zu¨rcher, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, 120 University
Private, Ottawa, Ontario, K1N 6N5, Canada.
Email: christoph.zuercher@uottawa.ca
124
International Journal 75(2)
Namibia.1 These events mark the beginning of China’s role in UN peacekeeping.
Thirty years later, by the end of 2019, China was participating in nine peacekeep-
ing operations, including the “big five” (Mali, Sudan, Congo, Central African
Republic, and Darfur). It had 2517 peacekeepers in the field (almost twice as
many as the other four permanent members of the UN Security Council
(UNSC) combined), and it contributed 10.25% to the UN peacekeeping budget,
making it the second largest contributor of all member states. It also completed the
registration of a stand-by peacekeeping force of 8000, built up training centres for
police and military peacekeepers, committed US$100 million to the African Union
(AU) to support the building of an African Standby Force, and pledged US$200
million to a UN Peace and Development Trust Fund.
This evolution is surprising. China, when it became a member of the UN in
1971, had strictly opposed UN peacekeeping, which it saw as a thinly veiled dis-
guise for the great powers’ imperialism.2 But over the years, China incrementally
adapted its stance, and in the early 2000s, when the UN demand for more peace-
keepers surged, China was ready to increase its contributions. China sent
peacekeepers to MONUSCO (UN Organization Stabilization Mission) in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN Mission in Liberia, MINUSTAH
(UN Stabilization Mission) in Haiti, UN Operation in Coˆte d’Ivoire, UN
Mission in the Sudan, UN Mission in South Sudan, UN–AU Mission in Darfur
and, finally, in 2013 to UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
in Mali.
Interestingly, and contrary to an often-heard argument, China’s peacekeeping
engagement is not a tool to support its larger overseas interests. While it is true
that China has growing economic interests overseas, there is a broad agreement
among scholars that China’s deployment of peacekeepers is not influenced by the
location of its economic interests, but it is very much in line with the overall
regional need of UN peacekeepers.3 But being a good citizen of the UN was
obviously not the only motivation for China to become an important peacekeeper.
1.
Masayuki Masuda. “China’s peacekeeping diplomacy and troop dispatch: A new avenue for
engagement with the international community.” NIDS Journal of Defense and Security 12 (2011):
3–25.
2.
Chin-Hao Huang, “Principles and praxis of China’s peacekeeping,” International Peacekeeping 18,
no. 3 (June 2011): 257–70; M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s attitude toward U.N. peacekeeping oper-
ations since 1989,” Asian Survey 36, no. 11 (1996): 1102–1121.
3.
Courtney J. Fung, “What explains China’s deployment to UN peacekeeping operations?”
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 16, no. 3 (1 September 2016): 409–441; Courtney J. Fung,
“China’s troop contributions to U.N. peacekeeping,” United States Institute of Peace, 4 May 2018
https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/07/chinas-troop-contributions-un-peacekeeping
(accessed
12 May 2020); Songying Fang, Xiaojun Li and Fanglu Sun, “Changing motivations in China’s
UN peacekeeping,” International Journal 73 no. 3 (3 February 2018): 464–473; Courtney
Richardson, “The Chinese Mirror Has Two Faces? Understanding China’s United Nations
Peacekeeping Participation,” ProQuest Dissertations Publishing (2012), http://search.proquest.
com/docview/1095711485/?pq-origsite=primo (accessed 12 May 2020); Meicen Sun, “A bigger
bang for a bigger buck: What China’s changing attitude toward UN peacekeeping says about its
evolving approach to international institutions,” Foreign Policy Analysis 13, no. 2 (2017): 338–360;
Marisa Mori, China’s New Absence from UN Peacekeeping: Economic Interests and Prestige in Mali
Zu¨rcher
125
An increased engagement in peacekeeping also reflected China’s growing confi-
dence to be and be seen as a responsible great power, and was one way to earn a
reputation as a peer to other great powers.4 Supporting peacekeeping was also seen
as a way to strengthen multilateralism and the UN system in general.
Multilateralism has been a regular part of China’s foreign policy lexicon since
the mid-1990s and was seen as necessary in order to counter the perceived US
unilateralism.5 Finally, an engagement in peacekeeping, an activity that takes place
predominantly in developing countries, also helped to foster China’s self-
understanding as a leader of the developing world—a role that China traditionally
aspires to.
The remarkable ascent of China from a skeptic to an indispensable UN peace-
keeper raises interesting questions about the future of UN peacekeeping and
China’s role in it. What impact will China’s growing weight in the UN and its
increased importance as a peacekeeper have on future evolutions of UN peace-
keeping? More specifically—has China been socialized into UN peacekeeping
norms and practices, or will it use its newly acquired financial and political
weight to shape UN peacekeeping norms and practices, and, if so, in what direc-
tion is China likely to steer UN peacekeeping?
In
order
to
gain
some
traction
on
these
unavoidably
speculative
questions, I propose to look at how China, over the last three decades,
reacted to the doctrinal and practical innovations of UN peacekeeping. It is
clear that past behaviour does not necessarily predict future behaviour, but we
can harness patterns of past behaviours in order to gauge the probability of future
behaviour.
This paper argues that China has, until now, in practice adapted to all major
changes in UN peacekeeping and has been a “good citizen” in the field of UN
peacekeeping. Interestingly, while China has consistently advocated for a cautious,
non-intrusive approach to peacekeeping, which prioritizes political solution and
respects the sovereignty of the host county, it has, in practice, supported even the
most robust and intrusive UN peacekeeping missions. The last three decades are
thus indeed the story of how China has been socialized into the practice of UN
peacebuilding, despite the fact that it sees much of it as informed by Western
norms and assumptions. However, there are some early signs that China, with
its growing weight in the UN and in global affairs, may cautiously move towards
shaping peacekeeping norms rather than merely adapting to them. Examples of
such norm-shaping are the role of human rights in peacekeeping, and a conceptual
and the Central African Republic. Master’s thesis (2018), https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/
1887/58491 (accessed 12 May 2020).
4.
Bates Gill, and Chin-Hao Huang, “The People’s Republic of China,” in Paul Williams and Alex
Bellamy, eds., Providing Peacekeeping: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of UN Peacekeeping
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 139–158.
5.
International Crisis Group, “China’s growing role in UN peacekeeping,” Asia Report, 166 (17 April
2009). Guoguang Wu and Helen Lansdowne, China Turns to Multilateralism: Foreign Policy and
Regional Security (London/New York: Routledge, 2008).
126
International Journal 75(2)
understanding of peace, which is, in some key aspects, different from the Western
paradigm of “liberal peace.”
This paper builds on the relatively small but excellent academic literature on
Chinese peacekeeping, which emerged around the 2000s. In addition, I also use
insights from extensive, semi-structured, face-to-face interviews. Between 9 and
16 June 2018, I conducted nine interviews in Beijing, with Chinese and Western
academics and practitioners. Between 22 and 26 October 2018, I conducted
twelve interviews at the UN in New York. I also conducted seven interviews by
telephone, Skype, or Facetime with subject experts, both practitioners and aca-
demics. In New York, respondents included: members of three permanent missions
to the UN; members of the Force...
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