Christian Evans v Gennaro Pucci

Hearing dates: 30 June, 1 July, 15, 17 September 2025

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 13 October 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

HH JUDGE Klein

This is my decision following the hearing of 2 applications; namely:

i) an application by the defendants, Gennaro Pucci and PVE Capital Ltd (together “the defendants”), by notice dated 19 July 2024, for reverse summary judgment or for the striking out of the Particulars of Claim (“POC”) (“the defendants' application”). Formally, the defendants' application notice also sought the setting aside of the permission, given by order of Master Brightwell on 13 March 2024, to Christian Evans (“the claimant”) to serve the defendants out of the jurisdiction. That further application was not addressed at all at the hearing, and I assume that it has been abandoned, presumably because the defendants take the view that, having actively and substantively participated in the claim, they have submitted to jurisdiction;

ii) an informal cross-application, permitted by Master Brightwell by his order made on 21 October 2024, by the claimant for permission to amend the POC in the form of draft Amended Particulars of Claim (“APOC”) that have since been circulated in accordance with the Master's order.

The claimant was represented at the hearing by Ms Daria Gleyze of counsel and the defendants were represented by Mr Sebastian Kokelaar of counsel. I am grateful to counsel for their assistance.

The POC run to twenty four pages. The APOC run to thirty nine pages, comprising of one hundred and eight paragraphs (made up of multiple sub-paragraphs in many instances), apparently introduce, for the first time, claims against non-parties and seek to revive claims against former parties (see, e.g. para.72.5 of the APOC), and include a prayer which effectively extends over three sides of A4 paper. I am doubtful that either statement of case, the APOC in particular, fully complies with Ch.4 of the Chancery Guide (see paras.4.2–4.7 in particular). That alone calls into question whether the claim should be permitted to proceed on the basis of either statement of case, although that is not substantively the way the parties contested the applications. Nevertheless, the form of the statements of case (about which I comment further below) has meant that a critical eye has had to be cast over them and, more immediately for present purposes, a pragmatic solution has needed to be found to deal with the applications, otherwise they ran the risk of taking as long as a trial. The pragmatic approach counsel adopted has been to deal with the statements of case thematically, rather than objected-to paragraph after objected-to paragraph, without any particular focus, save to a limited extent, on the precise wording of the statements of case. That is the approach I therefore adopt in this judgment, setting out my decision on those thematic points and giving the reasons for those decisions. Although, I therefore do not address every submission made by counsel in this judgment, I considered all their submissions carefully before determining the applications.

Despite counsel's approach to the applications, the hearing took more than three full court days.

The thematic approach is different to the approach taken in the statements of case, which largely (but not wholly) take a chronological course. Counsel's adoption of the thematic approach has also meant that it has only belatedly become clear that, in fact, the precise wording of the statements of case has mattered in some instances (and has further meant that it has not always been easy to distinguish between matters already pleaded and proposed amendments). Indeed, on occasion during the hearing, when the precise wording of the APOC was being considered, Ms Gleyze acknowledged that further “clarification” of the claimant's case is required.

Because of what I have said, because also the chronological course of the statements of case (the APOC in particular) is interspersed, in some instances, with pleas of causes of action which are, sometimes at least, disconnected from later pleas of the relief sought by the claimant, and because too there are many internal cross-references in the APOC in particular, I am doubtful that the claim, as formulated particularly in the APOC, can be efficiently managed (even recognising, as I do, that the APOC take the form they do not only because the claimant now wishes to advance a multiplicity of claims but also because the POC (not drafted by Ms Gleyze) have, understandably, where possible been used as the framework for the proposed amendments, even though the proposed amendments are substantial in length and substantive in nature). There is force in the submission which Mr Kokelaar made that all this alone might justify the striking out of the POC and the refusal of permission to amend – although I do not believe that a proportionate response would, on this ground, be to then dismiss the claim – but I prefer not to determine the applications on this basis.

My approach to the determination of the applications

Before setting out the background to the applications and then turning substantively to the applications themselves, I need to set out what I regard to be the correct approach to their determination, in the circumstances of this case and as the applications have been presented.

In the case of each of the reverse summary judgment, strike out and amendment applications, ultimately the same question needs to be answered; namely, whether the claimant's pleaded allegations have a real prospect of success. It is true that the burden of proving, or disproving, that may fluctuate and may be different depending on the particular application being considered, and it is true too that I may only give reverse summary judgment if I am satisfied that there is no compelling reason why the claim should proceed to trial (albeit that no-one has suggested that there is a compelling reason for the claim to proceed to trial if the claimant's allegations do not have a real prospect of success). Nevertheless, as I have just said, the principal question I need to answer, on each application, is whether the claimant's pleaded allegations have a real prospect of success.

In the context of an amendment application, Popplewell LJ explained what a “real prospect of success” amounts to in Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. James Kemball Ltd [2021] 3 All ER 978, at [16]–[18], thus:

“It was common ground that on an application to serve a claim on a defendant out of the jurisdiction, a claimant needs to establish a serious issue to be tried, which means a case which has a real as opposed to fanciful prospect of success, the same test as applies to applications for summary judgment…

The Court will apply the same test when considering an application to amend a statement of case, and will also refuse permission to amend to raise a case which does not have a real prospect of success.

In both these contexts:

(1) It is not enough that the claim is merely arguable; it must carry some degree of conviction…

(2) The pleading must be coherent and properly particularised…

(3) The pleading must be supported by evidence which establishes a factual basis which meets the merits test; it is not sufficient simply to plead allegations which if true would establish a claim; there must be evidential material which establishes a sufficiently arguable case that the allegations are correct…”

Also on the question of necessary strength of the claimant's case and the nature of their evidence in response to a reverse summary judgment application, Lewison J explained in Easyair Ltd v. Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 Ch at [15], to similar effect:

“(i) A “realistic” claim is one that carries some degree of conviction. This means a claim that is more than merely arguable: ED & F Man Liquid Products v. Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472 at [8]

…

(v) …in reaching its conclusion the court must take into account not only the evidence actually placed before it on the application for summary judgment, but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial: Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v. Hammond (No 5) [2001] EWCA Civ 550…

(vi) …the court should hesitate about making a final decision without a trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, where reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to a trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case: Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd v Bolton Pharmaceutical Co 100 Ltd [2007] FSR 63…” (emphasis added).

Two further inter-related principles apply, in particular, to the determination of each of the applications. As Lewison J also summarised in Easyair Ltd at [15]:

“(iii) In reaching its conclusion the court must not conduct a “mini-trial”…

…

(vii) …it is not uncommon for an application under Part 24 to give rise to a short point of law or construction and, if the court is satisfied that it has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument, it...