Cinnamond v British Airports Authority
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE SHAW,THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS |
| Judgment Date | 22 February 1980 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1980] EWCA Civ J0222-3 |
| Date | 22 February 1980 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
[1980] EWCA Civ J0222-3
The Master of The Rolls
(Lord Denning)
Lord Justice Shaw
Lord Justice Brandon
In The Supreme Court of Judicature
Court of Appeal
On Appeal from The High Court of Justice
Queen's Bench Division
(Mr. Justice Forbes)
MR. J. R. MacDONALD, Q. C., and MR. M. BATCHELOR (instructed by Messrs. Somers & Leyne) appeared on behalf of the Plaintiffs (Appellants).
MR. R. FERNYHOUGH (instructed by the Solicitor for the British Airports Authority) appeared on behalf of the Defendant (Respondent).
Many years ago Lord Coke had a case about six carpenters. Now we have a case about six care-hire drivers. They have their own cars. They often go to the airport at London Heathrow. On average they go twice a day. They are in touch with hotels in Central London. When a passenger wants a car to take him to the airport, the hotel telephone one of these car-hire drivers and he takes the passenger to the airport.
Now comes the point. These six car-hire drivers, it is said, hang about the airport and seek to get incoming passengers to hire them for the drive back to London. They thus get ahead of the licensed taxi drivers who are in the feeder parks waiting to be hired. What is worse, it is said that these six car-hire drivers are known to charge the passengers far too much. Whereas the taxi drivers charge the regular fare of about £8, these six car-hire drivers are known to charge £20, £40 or even £100 for the trip to London.
Naturally enough, the licensed taxi drivers are incensed because their legitimate business is being "creamed off" in this way. It often happens also that these six car-hire drivers have no legitimate reason to go to the airport. A driver may get up to such a trick as this: He may make out a slip of paper, as if he were engaged to meet an incoming passenger. Such as "Mr. Smith, arriving on Plight B. A.791 due at 11.15 a. m." That slip would be a fake. There would be no Mr. Smith arriving by that flight or any flight. The car-hire driver will not have been employed at all. But the slip of paper serves its turn. By means of it he gets into the airport, and hangs about to "tout" incoming passengers for the trip to London.
An instance is given in our papers. On the 17th March, 1979 an overseas visitor came from Nigeria at the instance of the British Council. He had on the lapel of his coat a label with "British Council" on it - so as to be able to be picked out by the British Council representative. A car-hire driver came up to him and said, "Hello, British Council. Come with me. I will take you to the Victoria Air Terminal where they are expecting you". At the Victoria Air Terminal he was set down at the entrance. The driver said, "That's £40". When the passenger demurred a little, the car-hire driver said, "It's the recognised fee from the airport".
Other instances are given. Some passengers pay up because they do not know the value of English currency. Others because they are frightened. Others pay up because the driver has the luggage in the boot and will not allow the passenger to have his luggage until the payment is made.
The airport authority have for years been trying to stop these car-hire drivers from doing this. They have prosecuted them for offences under two byelaws. One byelaw is No. 5(23): "No person shall loiter, frequent or remain on the aerodrome or any part thereof without reasonable cause" - that is the loitering one. The other byelaw is No. 5(55): "No person shall, without the permission of the Authority, sell or distribute anything, offer anything for sale or hire or make any offer of services" - that is the "offering of services" offence: in other words, "touting".
The maximum penalty for breach of any of those byelaws is £100. The airport authority have prosecuted these six car-hire drivers scores and scores of times. We have the details given to us in the papers: Every few weeks or so they have beenprosecuted, convicted and fined. They do not pay the fine. They appeal to the Crown Court. That takes 18 months or so. The appeal is dismissed. Still they do not pay the fine. The cases are so numerous that the Crown Court has had to set a limit to the number of cases they can take. The machinery of collecting fines is so time-consuming and so fruitless that the car-hire drivers can ignore them with impunity. We have here the amounts of the fines, and the totals unpaid. The first driver has £1,715 outstanding: the next one, £2,155: the next one, £2,020: the next one £2,156: another £840: and another £1,476. All outstanding. Even if he paid them, the car-hire driver would regard them as an expense incurred in the course of his business - to be set off against his profits.
THE PROHIBITION
Seeing that the summonses have proved so useless, the airport authority have taken a step which has raised the question in this action. They go to another byelaw, No. 5(59). "No person shall enter the aerodrome, except as a bona fide airline passenger, whilst having been prohibited from entering by an authorised officer of the Authority". Having turned up that byelaw, which they had not used before, on the 23rd November, 1978 they wrote this letter to each of the six car-hire drivers in this case:
Dear Sir, The British Airports Authority hereby give you notice that as from the date of this letter, and until further notice, you are prohibited from entering Heathrow Airport for any purpose other than as a bona fide airline passenger.
"If, in future, you are found on Heathrow Airport, except as a bona fide airline passenger, action will be taken by theBritish Airports Authority under Byelaw 5(59) of the Heathrow Airport - London Byelaws 1972, and in addition, the Authority will consider taking injunction proceedings.
"A copy of the Heathrow Airport - London Byelaws 1972 is enclosed".
The six car-hire drivers took immediate action. Within seven days they issued a writ, on the 1st December, 1978, against the airport authority claiming that the notice was invalid and of no effect: and that the byelaw does not empower the authority to ban them from the airport.
That raised a very important question for all concerned. Mr. Justice Mocatta made an order for a preliminary issue. But when it came up before Mr. Justice Forbes on the 11th April, 1979, all parties agreed that he should deal with the case as if it were the trial of the action.
Three main points were argued before us. The first was the power of the authority to prohibit entry to the airport - apart altogether from the byelaw. The second was the effect of Byelaw 5(59). The third was the requirements of natural justice.
THE POWER OF THE AUTHORITY APART FROM THE BYELAWS
Mr. Fernyhough submitted that the airport authority was in the same position as a private landlord: and, if it wished, it could prohibit anyone from entering the airport. The only restriction upon the airport was its own self-interest - to let people in when it suited them because of their trade. For this proposition he relied on two cases about the railway companies in the last century. One was the case of Barker v. The Midland Railway Company (1856) 18 Common Bench Reports 46, where an omnibus proprietor wanted to carry passengers andtheir luggage for hire to and from a railway station. When the company refused to allow him to drive his omnibus into the station yard, the court held that the company could stop him. He had no right to come in. The other case was Perth General Station Committee v. Ross (1897) Appeal Cases 479. The railway had its own hotel in Perth next to the station. Some hotel porters from other hotels in Perth wanted to come into the railway station to collect passengers and their luggage. They wanted to wear their own special hotel livery. The railway company said "No", because they had their own hotel there and did not want the others to compete with them. The House of Lords seems to have held that the railway company had power, like a private land-owner, to prohibit anyone they wanted to from coming into the station premises. The only restriction on it was their own self-interest.
To my mind those cases have no application whatever to the statutory corporation here - the airport authority. It is of a different character altogether from the railway companies of the last century. The rights of individuals coming to it are to be found by reference to the words of the statute itself: and for this purpose I would rely upon the more recent case of British Trawlers Federation Ltd. v. London and North Eastern Railway Company (1933) 2 King's Bench 14, particularly to the passages of Lord Justice Scrutton at pages 35 and 36 and Lord Justice Lawrence at pages 46 and 47.
So I will turn to the statute itself. Section 2(1) of the Airports Authority Act 1975 provides:
"It shall be the duty of the Authority to provide at its aerodromes such services and facilities as are in its opinion necessary or desirable for their operation".
Those words "in its opinion" no doubt give the authority a discretion as to the extent of the services and facilities it provides. But once they are provided, it seems to me that there is a right in the travelling public to take advantage of those services and facilities. If a bona fide airline passenger comes to the airport, they cannot turn him back - at their own discretion without rhyme or reason - as a private landowner can. Nor can they turn back the driver of the car. Nor the friends who come to help him with the luggage. Nor the relatives who come to see him off. Save for an exception which is implicit in section 2(3). It says:
"The Authority shall have power to do anything which...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Barnes and Barnes v the Minister of the Environment 1991 Civil Jur No 45 1991 Civil Jur No. 280
...v Secretary of State for Health ex parte US Tobacco International IncUNK [1992] 1 All ER 212 Cinnamond v British Airports AuthorityUNK [1980] 2 All ER 368 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte RuddockUNK [1987] 2 All ER 518 Findlay v Secretary of State for the Home Departm......
- Wong Yuen Hock v Syarikat Hong Leong Assurance Sdn Bhd
-
Brooks (Carlton) v The Jamaica Racing Commission
...to the person by whom the legislation was framed an intention to make ultra vires provision." Indeed, in Cinnamond and others v British Airports Authority []980] 2 All ER 368 Lord Denning observed (at p.373) that the approach nowadays should be for the courts to endeavour to interpret modem......
- Marks v Minister of Home Affairs
-
Shopping in the Public Realm: A Law of Place
...Property and Protection: Essays inHonour of Brian Harvey,eds. F. Meisel and P. Cook (2000) 31; Cinnamond v.British Airports Authority [1980] 1 W.L.R. 582, 591; R. v. Brent LBC, ex parteAssegai (1987) 151 LGR 891; Leicester CC v. Wheeler [1985] AC 1054, 1065;Wandsworth LBC v. A[2000] 1 W.L.R......