Citizen involvement in public policy: Does it matter how much is at stake?
| Published date | 01 September 2023 |
| Author | Ramon van der Does |
| Date | 01 September 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12846 |
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Citizen involvement in public policy: Does it
matter how much is at stake?
Ramon van der Does
Institute of Political Science Louvain-Europe
(ISPOLE), UCLouvain, Louvain-la-Neuve,
Belgium
Correspondence
Ramon van der Does, Institute of Political
Science Louvain-Europe (ISPOLE), UCLouvain,
Place Montesquieu 1/L2.08.07, Louvain-la-
Neuve 1348, Belgium.
Email: ramon.vanderdoes@uclouvain.be
Funding information
Fonds De La Recherche Scientifique - FNRS,
Grant/Award Number: FC27855; Université
Catholique de Louvain, Grant/Award Number:
ADi/DB/10256.2018
Abstract
Public administrations increasingly try to find new ways to
involve citizens in policy-making. However, many democratic
innovations draw in only a fraction of the public. Why? I
hypothesize that we observe such low participation rates
because there is often not enough at stake for citizens. I test
this with a preregistered survey experiment on citizens'
intentions to participate in participatory budgets in the
Netherlands. Ifielded the experiment among a sample of citi-
zens that had just experienced a participatory budget
(N=225) and among a population-basedsample (N=1369).
I operationalized the stakes as the amount of public money
about which citizens can decide. The results show that more
money generally does not increase citizens' intention to par-
ticipate. Supplementary analyses confirm the experimental
findings and provide reasons how and why the stakes
involved (do not) matter for citizens' involvement.
Overheden proberen steeds vaker nieuwe manieren te
vinden om burgers bij beleidsvorming te betrekken. Des-
alniettemin nemen doorgaans maar weinig burgers deel aan
deze innovatieve manieren van participatie. W aarom? Ik ver-
onderstel dat participatie veelal uitblijft omdat er voor bur-
gers niet genoeg op het spel staat. Ik test dit met een vooraf
geregistreerdsurvey-experiment over de intentie van burgers
om deel te nemen aan wijkbudgetten in Nederland. Het
experiment vondplaats onder burgers die net een wijkbudget
hadden ervaren (N=225) en onder een steekproef van de
Nederlandse bevolking (N=1369). “Wat er op het spel
staat”operationaliseerde ik als de hoeveelheid publiek geld
Received: 5 August 2021 Revised: 7 March 2022 Accepted: 12 March 2022
DOI: 10.1111/padm.12846
772 © 2022 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Public Admin. 2023;101:772–787.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/padm
waarover burgers kunnen beslissen. De resultaten tonen aan
dat meer geld in het algemeen de intentie om te participeren
niet verhoogt. Aanvullende analyses bevestigen dit en geven
aan hoe en waarom wat er op het spel staat voor burgers
(niet) van belang is voorhun betrokkenheid.
1|INTRODUCTION
In response to growing democratic discontent among citizens, the past decades have witnessed a strong push for
public administrations in Western democracies to find new ways to involve citizens in policy-making (Geissel &
Newton, 2012; Hendriks, 2021). By now, governments have experimented extensively with a variety of innovations
to involve more citizens more deeply in public policy development, ranging from citizens' assemblies to citizens'
juries and participatory budgets (PBs; Fung, 2006; Smith, 2009). However, democratic innovations (DIs) do not
always succeed in broadening participation in policy-making. In fact, many such innovations draw in only a fraction
of the public (e.g., Caluwaerts & Reuchamps, 2018; Coleman & Cardoso Sampaio, 2017; van der Does &
Bos, 2021). Why?
Prior research has focused mostly on the procedural design features of DIs, ranging from the type of recruitment
strategy to the chosen duration of the event and, for example, the way in which decisions are reached (Fung, 2006;
Neblo et al., 2010; Ryfe, 2002). Yet, studies show that even innovations that use very similar designs can display
markedly different participation rates (Mitozo & Marques, 2019). In this article, I therefore examine an alternative
explanation for low participation rates: it is because there is often not enough at stake for citizens. While some DIs
deal with what one might consider high-stake policy issues, such as constitutional change or electoral reform (Farrell
et al., 2019; Fournier et al., 2011), most either deal with minor policy issues or lack the authority to translate citizens'
input directly into policy output (e.g., Font et al., 2018; Grönlund et al., 2014; Schneider & Busse, 2019). Some have
suggested in this respect that if public authorities were to raise the stakes, “participants [would] invest more of their
psychic energy and resources into the process”(Fung, 2007, p. 165). Similarly, I hypothesize that higher stakes will
lead to higher participation rates.
Theoretically, this follows a rational choice logic: under equal costs of participation, higher potential benefits
should convince more people to participate. Empirically, it resonates with evidence on voter turnout: when the
stakes in an election are higher (lower), turnout tends to be higher (lower) too (e.g., Andersen et al., 2014; Lefevere &
Van Aelst, 2014). For DIs, we still lack systematic empirical evidence to verify the relationship between the stakes
involved and citizens' propensity to participate. Whereas prior research shows that instrumental motivations matter
for citizens' considerations to participate in DIs or not (Aitamurto et al., 2017; Gustafson & Hertting, 2017;
Jacquet, 2019; Mazeaud & Talpin, 2010), we do not know to what degree such considerations are contingent upon
what is at stake (cf., Font et al., 2021, p. 236).
I seek to address this gap in the literature by means of an empirical study of participatory budgeting. Participa-
tory budgeting is one of the most widely implemented DIs (Ryan, 2021). It refers to a subclass of innovations that
allows “citizens [to] participate in deciding the allocation of public expenditure”(Elstub & Escobar, 2019, p. 26). The
“stakes”in participatory budgeting, then, revolve for a large part around money, that is, the amount of money made
available for the execution of projects selected or prioritized by citizens (e.g., Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014). This is why I
expect that PBs that allow citizens to decide about more (less) public money will lead to more (less) participation.
The existing evidence of the e ffect of money on partici pation in participat ory budgeting remains mixe d, per-
tains almost exclusive ly to voting, and is largely anecdotal (e .g., Allegretti, 2013, p. 220; Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014,
p. 45; Gilman & Wampler, 2019, pp. 20–21; Goldfrank & Schne ider, 2006, pp. 3–4). I address these limitations by
van der DOES 773
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