Clarifying relative plausibility: A rejoinder
| Author | Michael S Pardo,Ronald J Allen |
| DOI | 10.1177/1365712718816760 |
| Published date | 01 April 2019 |
| Date | 01 April 2019 |
Article
Clarifying relative plausibility:
A rejoinder
Ronald J Allen
Northwestern University, Evanston, USA
Michael S Pardo
University of Alabama School of Law, Tuscaloosa, USA
Abstract
This rejoinder replies to the twenty published commentaries on our article, “Relative Plausi-
bility and Its Critics.” Our response has four objectives: 1) presenting further details regarding
relative plausibility and the scope of our project in order to address some of our critics’ claims
of ambiguity; 2) examining some important methodological considerations; 3) clarifying the
significance of the conjunction problem and its role in the “probability debates”; and 4) noting
avenues for future research.
Keywords
evidence, proof, epistemology, probability, inference to the best explanation
We are extremelygrateful to Jonathan Doak and the International Journ al of Evidence & Proof for hosting
this symposiumand to all of the contributorsfor engaging so carefully,thoughtfully, and criticallywith our
work and the larger issues embedded within it. In our target article for this symposium, we asserted and
defended two related propositions:first, that a general shift toward explanationism as the bestexplanation
of juridical proofwas underway, and, second, that presently the best explanationof explanationism and the
legal systemis the relative plausibility theorythat has evolved over the last three decades(Allen and Pardo,
2019). In passing, we analysed three general critiques of relative plausibility, two of which (Kevin
Clermont and Dale Nance) offered opposing explanations of juridical proof and the third involved an
attempt to defuse the conjunction paradox while entertaining the possibility that relative plausibility may
be the best explanation of juridical proof in general (David Schwartz and Elliott Sober).
Is a general shift toward explanationism underway? Although some commentators remain sceptical,
1
and others question how best to characterise it as a conceptual matter,
2
this symposium in our opinion
Corresponding author:
Ronald J Allen, NU Law School, 357 East Chicago Ave., Chicago, IL, USA.
E-mail: rjallen@northwestern.edu
1. See Schauer(2019). We agree with Schauer’sassertion that whethera paradigm shift is occurringis an empirical,sociological claim;
Schauer arguesthat our conclusion regarding such a shift is prematureand that more consensus on particulardetails is needed.
2. See Amaya (2019) (discussing the shift toward explanationism in evidence law as a revolution in styles of reasoning and
inferential methods).
The International Journalof
Evidence & Proof
2019, Vol. 23(1-2) 205–217
ªThe Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/1365712718816760
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