Competition and Mergers among Nonprofits

DOI10.1093/joclec/nhq015
Date22 September 2010
Pages69-92
Year2010
Published ByOxford University Press
COMPETITION AND MERGERS AMONG
NONPROFITS
Jens Pru
¨fer
ABSTRACT
Should mergers among nonprofit organizations be assessed differently than
mergers among for-profit firms? A recent debate in law and economics,
boosted by apparently one-sided court decisions, has produced the result
that promoting competition is socially valuable regardless of the particular
objectives of producers. In this paper, I challenge the general validity of this
result by showing that it may indeed depend on the particular objectives of
producers whether a merger between two nonprofits is welfare-decreasing or
-increasing. This implies that it is impossible to assess the net effects of a
merger between two nonprofits without examining the objectives of the
owners involved.
JEL: L44; L31; L22; K21
I. INTRODUCTION
Should mergers among nonprofit organizations be regulated? If so, should
they be treated differently by antitrust law from mergers among for-profit
firms? According to Richman, U.S. courts seem to believe so.
1
Focusing
on the hospital market, he reports that antitrust enforcement agencies
have lost “each of the seven suits initiated since 1994 to challenge pro-
posed hospital mergers.”
2
A major reason for this defeat was that the
empirical evidence on pricing behavior of nonprofits when compared with
Assistant Professor of Economics, CentER Research Fellow, TILEC Senior Member, Tilburg
University, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands. E-mail: j.prufer@uvt.nl. I am
grateful to the editors, an anonymous referee, Ce
´dric Argenton, Norma Coe, Eric van
Damme, Lapo Filistrucchi, Patrick Herbst, Gregor Langus, Pierre Larouche, Ingrid Liedorp,
Scott Masten, Wieland Mu
¨ller, Patricia Pru
¨fer, Bert Willems, Dean Williamson, and to
participants of seminars in Lund, Tilburg, and at the Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa), at
the conferences of ISNIE (Reykjavik), EARIE (Valencia), and GEABA (Augsburg), and at
workshops at the Max Planck Institute (Bonn) and the ZEW (Mannheim). All errors are my
own.
1
Barak D. Richman, Antitrust and Nonprofit Hospital Mergers: A Return to Basics, 156 U. PA.
L. REV. 121 (2007).
2
Id. at 126.
Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 7(1), 69–92
doi:10.1093/joclec/nhq015
Advance Access publication 22 September 2010
#The Author (2010). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
for-profits is largely mixed and suffers from data problems.
3
Empirical evi-
dence on the effects of mergers between nonprofits is very limited. An
exception is a case study by Vita and Sacher.
4
Courts seemed to grant
merging hospitals the benefit of the doub t. According to Richman, this
was sometimes grounded on ideological reasons;
5
for instance, the case of
FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp. “lent support to those who argued that
judges have a deep-seated hostility to subjecting health care providers to
competition.”
6
This perceived view of the courts was countered recently. Philipson and
Posner have analyzed the questions raised above and concluded that
“[b]ecause promoting competition turns out to be socially valuable regard-
less of the particular objectives of producers, the fact that antitrust law does
not distinguish between the two sectors [nonprofit and for-profit] is
efficient.”
7
Although I do not object to the specific result found by Philipson and
Posner, which is based on modeling output decisions of a monopolistic non-
profit organization maximizing a combination of output and consumption, I
challenge the general validity mentioned in the above quotation. In this
paper, I show that it may indeed depend on the “par ticular objectives of pro-
ducers” whether a merger between two nonprofits is welfare-decreasing or
-increasing. This implies for antitrust law that it is impossible to assess the
net effects of a merger between two nonprofits without examining the
(likely) objectives of the owners involved.
8
My starting point is the idea that, although it is widely undisputed
that owners of for-profit firms maximize profits, it is not clear at all
what decision-makers in nonprofits optimize. An earlier draft of this
paper proposes a governance-based model of nonprofits, which posits
that there exist different types of nonprofit organizations that can be dis-
tinguished by the objective function of the pivotal owner, that is, the
3
For overviews, see Shin-Yi Chou, Asymmetric Information, Ownership and Quality of Care: An
Empirical Analysis of Nursing Homes,21J.H
EALTH ECON. 293 (2002); Anup Malani, Tomas
Philipson & Guy David, Theories of Firm Behavior in the Nonprofit Sector: A Synthesis and
Empirical Evaluation,in THE GOVERNANCE OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 181–215
(Univ. of Chicago Press 2003).
4
Michael G. Vita & Seth Sacher, The Competitive Effects of Not-for-Profit Hospital Mergers:
A Case Study,49J.I
NDUS.ECON. 63 (2001).
5
See Richman, supra note 1, at 125.
6
Id. at 134.
7
TomasJ. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the Not-for-Profit Sector,52J.L.&ECON.
1, 3 (2009) (emphasis added).
8
Here the term “owners” is used for the persons holding residual de facto control over an
organization, as is common in the property rights literature initiated by Sanford J. Grossman
& Oliver Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,
94 J. POL.ECON. 691 (1986), and Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature
of the Firm,98J.P
OL.ECON. 1119 (1990). In contrast, an owner can or cannot have rights to
residual income. In nonprofits, the nondistribution constraint explicitly waives income rights.
70 Journal of Competition Law & Economics

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