Compliance with Resistance: How Asia Can Adapt to the Upov 1991 Model of Plant Breeders’ Rights
| DOI | 10.1093/jiplp/jpaa179 |
| Date | 22 November 2020 |
| Pages | 1012-1020 |
| Year | 2020 |
| Published By | Oxford University Press |
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Dr David Jefferson is a Research Fellow with the ‘Harnessing Intellectual Property to Build Food Security’ ARC Laureate Project at the University of Queensland School of Law. His research centres on the intersection of IP and related legal regimes on agricultural and food systems.
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This article describes how, in recent years, countries across Asia have begun to harmonize their national laws for the protection of plants as IP by increasingly adopting the 1991 Act of the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (‘UPOV 1991’).
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Several ‘hard’ influences have driven this process, embodied especially in the different kinds of bi- and multilateral commercial agreements that Asian governments have joined with countries located outside of the region. Simultaneously, numerous ‘soft’ influences have promoted the domestic adoption of the UPOV 1991 plant breeders’ rights model in Asian countries, as represented through lobbying activities spearheaded by multinational agricultural firms and ‘capacity building’ activities coordinated by international non-governmental organizations.
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The article argues that, although these myriad hard and soft influences make adherence to the UPOV standard inevitable for many Asian states, countries should consider following a strategy of ‘compliance with resistance’ when implementing national laws to protect plants as IP. This could be done, for instance, by exploring experimental legislative and regulatory strategies that would support locally relevant alternatives to the global industrial capitalist form of agriculture for which UPOV 1991 is designed.
Over the past two decades or so, the legal landscape of IP for plants has changed dramatically in Asia. The overarching trend has been the increasing harmonization of domestic laws across the region with the 1991 Act of the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (‘UPOV 1991’) and its system of ‘plant breeders’ rights’. Supporters of the UPOV framework have long extolled its benefits, relying on the implicit assumption that the particular agroeconomic model that the Convention advances will provide universal benefits, irrespective of the diversity of farming and other plant cultivation systems that exist across different world regions.1 This article challenges this assumption and argues that the logic—understood here as a set of conventions that characterize a given area of law—underpinning the UPOV framework constrains how people think about the role of legal systems in governing human uses of plants, especially in agriculture and food production.
The UPOV 1991 framework of plant breeders’ rights only grants IP for plant varieties that meet the criteria of novelty, distinctness, and genetic uniformity and stability,2 and the regime only recognizes the IP rights of breeders, defined as people who breed or discover and develop a new plant variety.3 This means that a broad range of people and plants fall outside of the scope of UPOV 1991, including individuals who interact with plants in ways that do not meet the threshold of ‘breeding’, such as many farmers, gardeners and curators; likewise, plant varieties that are not sufficiently phenotypically distinct from existing varieties or that are genetically heterogeneous do not meet the standard for protection. Because UPOV 1991 is effectively a narrow law, in theory governments could adopt the UPOV model while simultaneously setting the terms for other kinds of human interactions with plants outside of the ambit of plant breeders’ rights. However, in practice, the adoption of UPOV 1991 tends to limit these alternative imaginaries for lawmaking, which is especially inappropriate in places where common forms of plant cultivation diverge from the global industrial capitalist agroeconomic model.4
The expansion of the plant breeders’ rights model of IP for plants across Asia has not occurred in isolation. Instead, the tendency of Asian countries to join the UPOV Convention is representative of broader trends towards the liberalization of commerce through the execution of bilateral, regional and trans-regional free trade agreements—termed ‘hard influences’ in this article—and the culmination of decades of privatization of different links in the agrifood value chain. Correspondingly, the ‘soft influences’ that increasingly consolidated, multinational agricultural corporations exercise on policy formation in Asia constitute another factor that explains the shift towards adoption of the UPOV 1991 model in the region. In this context, it appears inevitable that many Asian countries will soon join the UPOV Convention and reform their national IP laws to meet the UPOV 1991 standard. Nevertheless, governments in Asia should consider following a strategy of ‘compliance with resistance’ as they increasingly adopt UPOV 1991. Doing so would enable countries to uphold their international obligations, while simultaneously generating alternative, local approaches to agroeconomic governance.
For years, scholars from an array of disciplines have joined civil society advocates for Indigenous and local peoples to criticize UPOV 1991 as the default international IP paradigm for plants.5 One of the most significant critiques of the Convention contends that UPOV 1991 promotes the expansion of a homogenized form of neoliberal capitalism into spaces where ancestral forms of agriculture that are inextricably linked to local ecosystems and cultures have been and continue to be practised. Traditional agriculture often relies on non-proprietary and frequently non-commercial practices such as the widespread saving, exchange and local sale of seeds by farmers.6 These kinds of farming systems remain common in many Asian subregions, including but not limited to Central, South and Southeast Asia.
Of the estimated 570 million farms in the world, nearly three quarters are located in Asia, with China and India alone, respectively, accounting for 35 per cent and 24 per cent of the total number of farms worldwide.7 Smallholder producers cultivating fewer than 10 hectares of land manage approximately 80 per cent of the farmland across the Asian region.8 Many of these farmers obtain their planting materials locally, by saving seeds from previous harvests or by leveraging other sources that are often classified as ‘informal’, such as exchanges or bartering among friends, neighbours and relatives, and purchases from local grain markets.9 Significantly, and unlike the non-UPOV,
The UPOV 1991 system of plant breeders’ rights has been extensively analysed and critiqued by previous authors, with many arguing that this model is particularly incompatible with how agriculture is generally practised in Asia.12 The purpose of the article is not to recapitulate debates about the merits and limitations of the UPOV Convention
In this context, it is critical for governmental officials and civil society actors to transcend dichotomous thinking, which assumes that a country can either have an IP law that supports smallholder farmers, or be a member of UPOV, but not both. This article contends that new models for agroeconomic governance must be imagined in Asia, which would acknowledge formal obligations to comply with the UPOV Convention but also institute alternative legal regimes to safeguard and promote customary agrifood systems. The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Sections II and III describe the different hard and soft factors that have helped to propagate the UPOV 1991 model in the Asian region, respectively. Section IV concludes the article with recommendations for how policymakers in Asia can follow a strategy of compliance with resistance to transcend the stalemate that characterizes conventional thinking about IP for plants worldwide.
Until recently, lawmakers in countries throughout Asia have avoided questions about how to comply with the UPOV 1991 system of plant breeders’ rights by resisting the formal adoption of this model and instead creating
This is now changing because numerous Asian countries have taken steps to enact or adapt national laws that would align with the UPOV 1991 standard. This shift may be partially explained by the existence of hard influences, which are exemplified by the various bilateral, regional and trans-regional agreements that many Asian countries have negotiated and executed with other states, which frequently contain terms...
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