Conflict on the Red River: Applying the institutional collective action framework to regional flood policy
| DOI | 10.1177/0952076717693296 |
| Published date | 01 July 2018 |
| Date | 01 July 2018 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Public Policy and Administration
2018, Vol. 33(3) 311–331
! The Author(s) 2017
Conflict on the Red
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River: Applying the
DOI: 10.1177/0952076717693296
journals.sagepub.com/home/ppa
institutional collective
action framework to
regional flood policy
Nicholas G Bauroth
Department of Criminal Justice and Political Science, North
Dakota State University, USA
Abstract
In reaction to major flooding, local governments in Minnesota and North Dakota
formed a cooperative network to construct a $1.2 billion flood diversion along the
Red River of the North. Threatened by this diversion, a second set of governments
formed their own network in opposition to flood policy. This study uses propositions
derived from the Institutional Collective Action framework to examine formal con-
tracts at the core of these cooperative networks, as well as the circumstances under
which the contracts were negotiated. It considers the ability of the framework to
understand interlocal cooperation where regional consensus is nonexistent. The
study finds that the two sets of governments faced very different transaction costs,
resulting in contrasting approaches to governance.
Keywords
Institutional Collective Action, interlocal cooperation, new regionalism, local govern-
ance, flood policy, regional organizations
Introduction
On 28 March 2009, the Red River of the North crested at more than 20 feet above
flood level, nearly overwhelming the city of Fargo, North Dakota (Nowatzki, 2009).
The flood caused an estimated $55 million in damages and displaced hundreds of
people from their homes and businesses (Kolpack and Suhr, 2010; National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, 2010). Unfortunately, only the scope of this flood
Corresponding author:
Nicholas G Bauroth, North Dakota State University, 120 CJPP Building, NDSU Dept. 2315 1616, 12th Avenue
N, PO Box 6050, Fargo, ND 58108-6050, USA.
Email: nicholas.bauroth@ndsu.edu
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Public Policy and Administration 33(3)
was unusual: the Red River had surpassed flood levels nearly every spring since
1993, forcing local governments to spend some $65 million each year on preparation
and clean-up (United States Army Corps of Engineers, 2009). Despite the ongoing
threat, much of the Fargo-Moorhead metropolitan area remained under the pro-
tection of an assortment of temporary and permanent dikes barely capable of
handling the annual stress. In response, local officials, working with the United
States Army Corps of Engineers, called for the construction of an extensive set of
flood-control infrastructure using funds from federal, state, and local sources. The
centerpiece would be a 36-mile diversion around Fargo for an estimated cost of $1.2
billion (Kolpack, 2010). In 2011, the city of Fargo signed a Joint Powers Agreement
(JPA) with other local governments, thereby creating a public entity to oversee the
planning and implementation of flood policy.
While local actors were initially united on flood-fighting, the consensus soon
wavered. Many smaller communities rebelled as it became clear that this policy
required storing excess water on thousands of acres south of Fargo during a major
flood (Reuer, 2010). Most notably, a collection of business owners, farmers, and
residents formed the MnDak Upstream Coalition in opposition to the diversion.
The Coalition proved remarkably effective at putting together its own cooperative
network, cumulating with a JPA between Richland County, North Dakota and
Wilkin County, Minnesota in 2012.
This study considers the evolving circumstances of Red River flood policy,
which initially seemed like an example of ‘New Regionalism’ in action (Bauroth,
2013). It uses the Institutional Collective Action (ICA) framework (Feiock, 2013)
to better understand the behavior of supporters and opponents of a Red River
diversion. Specifically, the study examines the JPAs to discern the ICA dilemmas at
work during the post-flood period and how solutions to these dilemmas varied by
policy goal. In addition, the study recognizes the zero-sum nature of Red River
flood policy and considers how it impacted efforts at regional cooperation.
Literature review
Traditionally, urban scholars could be divided into those who believed regional
matters were best dealt with by a single entity and those who preferred a more
fragmented approach. Progressive reformers claimed that the patchwork
collections of municipalities, school districts, and special districts found within
metropolitan areas were inherently corrupt and needed to be replaced by metro-
politan-wide government (Hawley and Zimmer, 1961; Jones, 1942). Conversely,
public choice scholars argued that a plethora of local governments provide citizens
with more service options, thereby creating competition and efficiency (Hirsch,
1964; Tiebout, 1956). The consolidation-public choice debate dates to an era in
which local entities generally focused upon local matters while state governments
handled more regional concerns. In the twenty-first century, though, fragmentation
has not only become a permanent feature of the metropolitan area, but spread to
the suburbs and countryside (Savitch and Vogel, 2000). In addition, states have
Bauroth
313
grown leery of taking the lead on regional matters (Collins, 2006). Consequently,
local governments seeking regional policy must engage with other governments
across the metropolitan area (Kraus, 2012).
A scholarly movement known as ‘New Regionalism’ attempts to not only under-
stand the various manifestations of local cooperation, but prescribe ways of
making such cooperation more effective and sustainable (Parks and Oakerson,
2000). The movement is based upon a distinction between ‘government’ and ‘gov-
ernance.’ ‘‘The classic idea of government entailed formal institutions and elections
and established decision-making processes and administrative structures’’ (Savitch
and Vogel, 2000: 161). This approach typically produces a hierarchy of political
authority with some entities, such as consolidated governments, granted broad
powers over a wide range of services, and other entities, such as small special
districts, confined to narrowly defined missions (Koch, 2013). The state implements
regional policy by placing additional administrative layers across a metropolitan
area in the form of a public authority or empowered county government.
In contrast, the idea of ‘governance’ holds that cooperation between local gov-
ernments, nonprofits, and private corporations can be an effective way of under-
writing regional services (Savitch and Vogel, 2000) and spreading the associated
risks across multiple entities (Steinacker, 2010). Such cooperation manifests itself
through contracts, memoranda of understanding, and other such arrangements.
The governance perspective asserts that routine interactions between local entities
can lead to the formation of cooperative networks (Bae and Feiock, 2012).
Regional policy does not have imposed from above to be successful.
Despite the seemingly obvious benefits of New Regional ‘governance,’ many
local governments have limited experience with interlocal cooperation. Indeed,
officials report feelings of unease and distrust towards neighboring jurisdictions
(Collins, 2006). Thus, even seemingly well-managed entities had difficulties in
developing intra-jurisdictional networks. New Regionalism has also been criticized
for its emphasis on efficiency over democracy (Gjertsen, 2014). The local electorate
is often treated as just another obstacle for cooperating governments to overcome.
The ICA framework provides a means for understanding the growth in inter-
local cooperation as well as the factors hindering further cooperation (Feiock and
Scholz, 2010). Drawing upon the collective action literature, the framework starts
with the premise that cooperation is inherently difficult in a fragmented environ-
ment due to the innate tendency by local actors to pursue short-term interests with
little regard for neighboring jurisdictions. Most entities are reluctant to change
their behavior unless some mechanism is put into place that incentivizes coordin-
ation. This is not easily done since the process of negotiations itself creates obs-
tacles to cooperation in the form of transaction costs (Feiock, 2013).
Transaction costs are those costs associated with planning, adapting, and moni-
toring policy (Williamson, 1981). They arise from incomplete information, uncer-
tainty about the motives of other actors, worries about autonomy, the likelihood of
legal conflict, and other such matters (Brown and Potoski, 2005). These costs can
make the risks associated with an agreement appear even greater than the benefits,
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thereby precluding cooperation. In addition, transaction costs vary by policy. For
example, large capital projects are dependent upon long-term financial support by
multiple partners. Defection by just a single partner can leave a project politically
and financially vulnerable (Feiock, 2009). Consequently, the possibility of defection
is a central component of negotiations. Such fears are less prevalent for policies
involving smaller commitments, such as coordination of traffic lights between jur-
isdictions or information sharing between police departments (Feiock and Scholz,
2010). However, even these arrangements have transaction costs.
The ICA framework is used to recognize and surmount transaction costs asso-
ciated with interlocal cooperation...
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