A CONSIDERATION OF ‘CUSTOM AND PRACTICE’*
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.1972.tb01057.x |
| Author | William Brown |
| Date | 01 March 1972 |
| Published date | 01 March 1972 |
A
CONSIDERATION
OF
‘CUSTOM AND PRACTICE’*
‘CUSTOM and practice’ has become
a
commonplace phrase in workplace
industrial relations. This paper attempts to clarify the use of the term and
to cast light on the forces that lie behind it.
There can be no doubt as to the importance of ‘custom and practice’
(C&P) in contemporary British industrial relations. The industry-wide
agreements that exist to govern terms of employment and job regulation
tend to be too remote and too vague for application by themselves. It was
a
central thesis of the Donovan Commission that this inadequacy has forced
a
great growth of informal rules. Often these informal rules are specifically
referred to as
‘C&P’
and the term can be used as a generic one. One
of
the
purposes of this paper is to discuss the area of informal rules which the term
covers.
In much of industry, and especially in those areas with powerful work
forces, C&P dominates both substantive and procedural rules of job-
regulation. Even formalized plant agreements are often no more than
‘consolidation’ agreements; they merely place a seal of approval upon
rules already well-established under C&P. The development of
C&P
often
appears to be erratic and this can be
a
major source of strife. Since C&P
rules of job regulation also play
a
critical role in plant level wage deter-
mination and manpower utilization there can be no doubt that the
phenomenon is long overdue for study.
This paper starts with
a
consideration of existing academic discussion
of the subject. It then analyses
C&P
in broad terms. Further progress
demands more careful definition of terms and an analysis
of
the sources of
legitimacy. With the presentation of empirical evidence it
is
then possible
to disentangle the key features of C&P and the forces that bring it into
being. The paper ends with
a
brief discussion
of
the factors that give rise
to the development of C&P.
CURRENT DISCUSSION
OF C&P
C&P. Flanders describes C&P
i18
The existing literature contains surprisingly few attempts to define
*
The paper
owes
a great deal
to
discussion with colleagues
in
the
Industrial Relations
Research Umt and the
School
of Industrial and Business Studies at Warwick University. In
articular, it ariaes from fruitful collaboration with Malcolm Rimmer. The author would also
Eke
to
thank
Dr
F.
J,
Bayb,
Mr
A.
P.
B
erry,
Dr
W.
E.
J.
McCarthy and
Mr
R. O’Brien for their
helpful comments.
t
Research Fellow, Industrial Relations Research Unit
of
the
Social Science Research
Council
at Warwick University.
42
A
CONSIDERATION
OF
‘CUSTOM
AND
PRACTICE’
43
all manner of unwritten rules regulating work and employment. Some
of
them may be officially upheld by trade unions but most are enforced on the
shop
floor
by work
or
union groups. Shop stewards, not full-time officials,
are the principal guardians of
C&P
in British industry.
These informal
rules
which management has no say in making but
tacitly has to accept, range over many subjects. In earlier times they were
mainly
the trade practices
of
craftsmen who protected their job territory
from invasion by limiting entry and upholding demarcation. Today they
are the means by which many workers who are not craftsmen protect their
earnings and their bargaining power, but equally their security, their
status and their values. Direct regulation
of
output
or
stint, the allocation
of
overtime,
of
manning scales, of work sharing,
of
job demarcations of
ail
kinds are well known examples. The effect of full-employment on work-
place relations is not confined to the upsurge in intraplant
collectwe
bargain-
ing;
it has also resulted in
a
growth of
unilateral regulation
by workers on the
shop
floor
which is expressed in employment
or
working practices acquiring
the force
of
instituti0ns.l
Foxa
appears to have the same definition in mind: ‘If the (worker)
collectivity is powerful and management complaisant enough, the col-
lectivity may be able unilaterally to establish norms of its own either in the
form of explicit rules
or
in the form of
C&P’.
And again
When employee aspirations are high but management aspirations low,
(there is likely to be)
.
. .
a rapid rate
of
change as work groups mould the
normative system to their liking, not seriously challenged by management.
Acquiescence and tacit acceptance
of
work group
‘C&P’
becomes the
normal managerial stance. The work group is changing norms in the light
of
its
own
aspirations with a considerable measure
of
management com-
plai~ance.~
Here, then, is an understanding of
C&P
which sees it as unilaterally
worker regulated and, by strong implication, worker initiated. Further, it
is developed with fairly clear intention and purpose. Neither of these
authors is primarily concerned with the definition of
C&P
and it would be
pedantic to hold them precisely to such implications; the interest in them
here
is
the starting place they offer for
a
closer look at the subject.
A
far more detailed discussion of the question is given by Clegg as part
of
a
wider consideration
of
‘domestic bargaining’. He observes how almost
anything can count as an agreement in some establishments; they have
‘a
mixture of written agreements, written understandings, unwritten under-
standings, informal arrangements and customs and practices (some
of
which might not be accepted as binding by the management)’.‘ In
discussing the matter further he raises several points that would not fit into
the definition implied by Flanders and Fox:
A.
Flanders,
Colbctive
Burgmning:
Presm‘ption
for
Change,
Faber and Faber, 1967,
pp.
69-70
’
A.
Fox,
A
Sociology
of
Work
in
Zndruhy,
Collier-Macmillan, 1971,
p.
136.
a
A.
Fox,
op.
cit.,
p.
171
H.
A.
Clegg,
17rs
System
of
Idrutrial
Relations
in
Great
Britain,
Bail
Blackwell, 1970,
p.
250
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