Conspiracy And Intimidation: An Anti‐Metaphysical Approach
| Author | J. T. Cameron |
| Published date | 01 July 1965 |
| Date | 01 July 1965 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1965.tb01088.x |
CONSPIltACY AND INTIMIDATION
:
AN
ANTI-METAPHYSICAL
APPROACH
THE
dust raised by the decision in
Rookes
v.
Barnard
shows no
sign of settling. On the contrary,
Stratford
c!+
Sons
v.
Lindley
a
has added its own quota to the atmosphere, and the various com-
ments which have appeared merely seem
to
turn up more and more
branches of the law where the immediate
or
remote effects of
Roolces
V.
Barnard
are likely to
be
contrary to principle, obscure, uncertain
or
plain silly.
Rookes
v.
Barnard
is likely to be a short-lived
precedent,
at
least in its application to trade unions. In this,
however, there is a danger, for the Trade Disputes Bill is an attempt
to protect unions by amending the Trade Disputes Act
so
as to cover
liability for intimidation
as
well as for conspiracy. The danger, which
is
a general one as well as one for the unions themselves, is that the
common law contained in the incomprehensible series of cases from
Mogul
Steamship
Co.
v.
Mucgregor,
GOW
&,-
CO.~
onwards will be
left untouched. Experience has already shown that conspiracy is a
hydra perfectly capable of growing two heads to replace an
amputated one, and the authorities contain material which could
be used to impose liability in very wide and varied circumstances.
It
is time, therefore, to consider what form legislation
should
take,
and to urge that the proper answer is to remove the tort of
conspiracy from the law altogether, and with it the
Rookes
v.
Barnard
version of intimidation, and to put in its place
a
different
basis of liability.
It
needs little argument that the cases on conspiracy are
confused, conflicting and unsatisfactory. Very much ink has been
vainly spent on trying to reconcile
Quinn
v.
I,eathcm4
with
Allen
v.
and the reports are full of the complaints of judges at
the impossibility of the task set them by their predecessors. More
fundamentally, the passage of time has not clarified the most basic
of all questions in this field, namely, why
a
course
of
action which
might lawfully be pursued by one man should become tortious
when pursued by two
or
more in combination. Faced with this,
some judges have valiantly, if unconvincingly, rationalised about
the greater strength of combinations as opposed to individuals
(an irrelevant platitude) while others have taken refuge from
1
[1964]
1
All
E.R.
367.
2
[I9641
3
All
E.R.
10'2.
3
[I8921
A.C.
25.
4
[1901]
A.C.
495.
5
[1898]
A.C.
1.
448
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