Constituency Control of Legislators: Lessons from Nigeria
Published date | 01 March 2011 |
Author | Ajepe Taiwo Shehu |
DOI | 10.3366/ajicl.2011.0006 |
Date | 01 March 2011 |
Pages | 124-144 |
It has been argued that it is ‘rather curious’ to claim that societies without a modern system of government have no government: ‘It is a rather curious hypothesis to advance that because these societies lack modern government paraphernalia, they lack government of any kind.’
E. D. Ayisi,
In pre-colonial Nigeria there were the Sokoto Caliphate, Bornu Empire, Benin Empire, Oyo Empire, the Calabari and other societies. These territorial frameworks had their own systems of government, whether emirate or kingship, which were quite functional and satisfied the needs of their people, though there may have been a need for reforms. Some, if not all, of these empires, kingdoms and societies had their own constitutional arrangement, the executive, legislature, judiciary and system of control, whether political or constitutional. No matter by what name they were called and administered, the most important thing was that they had a system, which functioned well until the ‘protectors’, who wanted everything their own way, found otherwise. However, traditional African societies had their legislative process, which was identical in structure and form. Although the king, Oba or the chief was the traditional paramount ruler, he was usually assisted by the council of chiefs in decision-making. For example, it is recorded that the Oba of Benin met frequently with his council of chiefs to take decisions. These decisions were binding on all his subjects. According to Bradbury, while writing about the Kingdom of Benin:
… palace chiefs were not mere executives carrying out the Oba's instructions. They were his inner circle of advisers and had much influence over him, for he was largely dependent upon them for the exercise of his authority … Together with Town Chiefs, they formed a council of state which met frequently with the Oba himself to take decisions …
R. E. Bradbury,
Even, among the pre-Islamic Fulani of today's northern part of Nigeria there was noticeable government with identifiable divisions of functions, especially legislative and administrative. There was the village head, who was the administrative head but could not take decisions without the approval of his council of chiefs, membership of which was constituted by heads of families in the village. Both the village head and his council had a primary duty to conserve the customs of the village and they could be impeached for any behaviour unbecoming of their position.
C. K. Meek,
In the Fulani Empire of Sokoto, the system was based on the legal and constitutional dictates of Islamic law.
Although the Empire was theocratic, yet the council served as a decision-making body and the Governor could not take a decision that was contrary to the principle of Islamic law or not approved by the council.
Meek,
I. Chieka,
In all, there was system of checks and balances that ensured that leaders did not enjoy unlimited or absolute power. The systems were such that tenure was for life, yet assurance of tenure was subject to the will of the people. The royal majesties only remained so subject to the will of the people, who could dethrone, banish or force the king or chief to commit royal suicide. Certainly, representative government has been in the country for a long time, and there was never a time in the country when rulers had unquestionable power.
It is from this perspective that ‘recall’ under the 1989 and 1999 Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria should be understood: it is a form of control by the people over their elected leaders. While the executive and the judiciary are subject to impeachment by the legislature, the legislators themselves are subject to removal (recall) by the electorate. This is imperative constituency power of control over the legislators. It is interesting to note that recall as a check or control mechanism is not peculiar to Nigeria: about nine other counties of the world have it in their constitutions or statute laws.
V. Herman et al.,
This paper examines the efficacy of this control mechanism as a veritable instrument in the electorate–legislators relationship. It is argued that, as much as the doctrine has the potential to ensure that legislators are conscious of their responsibilities to their constituencies, there are many obstacles in its way and that unless these are removed, the chances of ‘recall’ achieving the desired objectives are very remote. The electorate have given their mandate to the legislator in the hope that the political contract between them and their political agent will be carried out to the letter. The electorate, in their apprehension that the contrary might be the result, invented the idea of recall so that they would not have to wait until another election before withdrawing their mandate. This paper argues further that the constitutional provisions for recall are not only inadequate, they are capable of turning the constituencies into dictators whose bidding the legislators must always do if they want to keep their seats in Parliament. A situation where the constituency could just wake up from sleep and pass a vote of no confidence on the legislator is not conducive to contemporary democracy; there must be reasonable grounds to warrant such a grave decision, and such grounds may partly be furnished by a performance evaluation of the legislators.
Modern legislative practice in Nigeria has its roots in the colonial past like most of the British-colonised territories. The majority of the territories had their own traditional systems before colonisation and eventual amalgamation. There could not have been a unified system of legislature in the territories which were not under a single kingship or emirate, though there were similarities in practice, not only with early British practice but also between their individual practices. Colonisation and the eventual amalgamation in 1914 brought together all the territories under the same government and with it the gradual importation of the British style of parliamentary practice and procedure.
The adoption of the British parliament system following independence could not have been a mere accident. It was obviously inevitable; the political leaders had acquired tutelage in British parliamentary practice through the various colonial constitutional arrangements in the country. The first legislative council, which had the semblance of a representative assembly, was established by the 1922 Constitution with 46 members, 27 of whom were official members.
C. O. Nwanko,
F. Adigwe,
The country had Regional and Federal Parliaments. At the Regional level were the House of Chiefs and Assembly, and at the Federal level was a bicameral Parliament.
Under the Independent Constitution of 1960, Dr Azikiwe became the Governor-General while the real executive powers were vested in the Queen of the United Kingdom, the constitutional monarch. The actual exercise of powers was again conferred on the ministers. The parliament was bicameral: the Senate, with 44 members, and the House of Representatives, with 305 elected members. Under the...
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