Constitution, Choice and Change: Problems with the `Logic of Appropriateness' and its Use in Constructivist Theory
| DOI | 10.1177/1354066102008004001 |
| Date | 01 December 2002 |
| Published date | 01 December 2002 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Constitution, Choice and Change:
Problems with the ‘Logic of
Appropriateness’ and its Use in
Constructivist Theory
OLE JACOB SENDING
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
The debate between a moderate version of constructivist theory and
rationalist theory centres primarily on the rationality of individual
action. The article consists of an in-depth analysis of the ‘logic of
appropriateness’ (LoA) invoked in constructivist theory. The analysis
reveals that the LoA is a structural explanation and understanding of
individual action. As such, it is untenable as a theory of individual
action. The implications of this structural bias are discussed in relation
to three core claims of constructivist theory. Moderate constructivist
theory claims, first, that norms are constitutive for actors’ identities.
Second, it claims that agents and structures are mutually constitutive.
Third, it claims that changes in ideational structures do occur and lead
to changes in political practice. I conclude that the LoA is able to
account for the first of these claims, but that by virtue of being able to
account for this claim, it is, at the level of a theory of individual action,
inconsistent with the second, and unable to effectively account for the
third.
K
EY
W
ORDS
♦choice ♦constructivism ♦identity ♦‘logic of
appropriateness’ ♦‘logic of consequences’ ♦norms ♦rationalism ♦
theory of individual action
Introduction
There is currently a significant debate in International Relations theory
between a specific moderate version of constructivist theory and rationalist
theory that centres on the issue of what logic of action best accounts for
European Journal of International Relations Copyright © 2002
SAGE Publications and ECPR, Vol. 8(4): 443–470
(1354–0661 [200212] 8:4; 443–470; 029173)
international political processes (see Checkel, 1999, 2001; Finnemore and
Sikkink, 1998; Kahler, 1998; Schimmelfennig, 2000, 2001).1Indeed, in a
recent article Risse (2000) suggests that the central dividing line between
rationalist and constructivist or sociological theories is exactly that they
bring to bear different conceptions of the rationality of action (p. 3).
In this debate about the explanatory power and empirical scope of
different logics of action, constructivist theorists typically invoke the ‘logic
of appropriateness’ (LoA) developed by March and Olsen (1989, 1995)
(see, for example, Checkel, 1998; Finnemore, 1996; Finnemore and
Sikkink, 1998; Katzenstein, 1996).2Rationalist theory, by contrast, is based
on rational choice, or what March and Olsen call a ‘logic of consequences’
(see Cortell and Davis, 1996; Keohane, 1988; Moravcsik, 1998, 1999;
Schimmelfennig, 2001). It is indicative of the prominence of the LoA in
constructivist theory that when Risse (2000) seeks to show that another
logic of action is also consistent with constructivism, he does so by asserting
that his Habermas-based ‘logic of arguing’ operates within the framework of
the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (LoA). Noting that the LoA is central to
constructivist theory since it accounts for the normative rationality of action
(2000: 4–5), Risse asserts that within the LoA, actors must determine what
kinds of rules and norms must be followed to act appropriately. He then
asks: ‘But how do actors adjudicate which norm applies? They argue. I
suggest, therefore, that social constructivism encompasses not only the logic
of appropriateness but also what we could call a “logic of truth seeking or
arguing” . . .’ (2000: 6; emphasis added).
This debate between rationalist and constructivist theory about the
rationality of individual action rests on certain epistemological and onto-
logical assumptions that are subject to criticism from other versions of
constructivist theory.3These are arguably more genuinely constructivist in
orientation as they address epistemological issues that are not in focus in this
debate about different logics of action. Nevertheless, the debate about the
rationality of individual action represents an important and constructive
dialogue between two different theoretical perspectives that seem to
constitute a central vehicle by which new theoretical and empirical insights
about international politics can be produced. In this article, I shall accept the
terms of this debate for the purpose of analysing in more detail the
theoretical constructs and assumptions that are contained in the LoA.
Rational choice theory has been subject to much discussion, both in IR
theory and in the social sciences in general (see Elster, 1989; Hollis, 1987;
Hollis and Smith, 1990). This has not been done in the case of the LoA.
This seems important, as most constructivist theorists in this debate have
accepted the validity of the LoA as their action-theoretical foundation
without an in-depth exploration of its core theoretical building blocks.
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