Cooperation and polarization in a Presidential Congress: Policy networks in the Chilean Lower House 2006–2017

DOI10.1177/0263395719862478
Published date01 May 2020
Date01 May 2020
AuthorCarmen Le Foulon Morán
Subject MatterArticles
https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395719862478
Politics
2020, Vol. 40(2) 227 –244
© The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0263395719862478
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Cooperation and polarization
in a Presidential Congress:
Policy networks in the Chilean
Lower House 2006–2017
Carmen Le Foulon Morán
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Chile
Abstract
The joint initiation of legislation is one of the most important forms of collaboration within
Congress, and the nature of such relations may affect its responsiveness. Through social network
analysis, this article analyses the evolution of cohesion and polarization of policy networks for the
Chilean Lower House from 2006 until 2017, comparing those derived from all bills from those
that emerge when considering only successful ones. Although scholars consider that initiation of
legislation is mostly free of party discipline or policy gatekeeping, networks recovered from all bills
despite being highly cohesive replicate the roll-call divisions during all years under analysis. Among
networks derived from successful bills – those able to overcome policy gatekeeping, collaboration
crosses the ideological divide. These results imply that agenda setting plays a different role on
policy collaboration than on voting and emphasize the relevance of the partisan dimension in
agenda setting influence presented by Tsebelis and Aleman. Whereas the institutional prerogatives
in the Lower House did not change after 2006, the partisan configuration did, which might explain
the different degree of polarization among networks of successful bills found before 2006 by other
studies.
Keywords
Chile, legislative politics, policy networks
Received: 20th December 2018; Revised version received: 10th May 2019; Accepted: 18th June 2019
Introduction
In most Latin American democracies, President’s coalitions rarely hold the majority in
Congress (Calvo, 2014). Hence, the success of policy proposals depends critically on col-
laboration across partisan divides. Furthermore, cross-partisan relationships may counter
polarizing trends (Barnes, 2016; Caldeira and Patterson, 1987) and probably facilitate
minority and plurality parties’ adaptation of their strategies, which has been shown to
help them overcome potential gridlock and Presidents’ dominance (Calvo, 2014). Indeed,
Corresponding author:
Carmen Le Foulon Morán, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Av. Vicuña
Mackenna 4860, Santiago 782-0436, Chile.
Email: carmen.lefoulon@gmail.com
862478POL0010.1177/0263395719862478PoliticsLe Foulon Morán
research-article2019
Article
228 Politics 40(2)
Kirkland (2011: 897) argues that legislatures with more bridging ties are more responsive
than balkanized ones. This is particularly important for societies such as Latin Americans
ones, which face rapid socioeconomic change as polarization-induced gridlock prevents
the adjustment of public policy and thus jeopardize their ability to respond in timely man-
ner (Binder, 1999; Sinclair, 2008). Furthermore, considering the current threats to democ-
racy in the region, the potential effect of gridlock (Barber and McCarthy, 2015) poses
further threats to democratic quality.
Cross-cutting associations between legislators are then of paramount importance, and
scholars have long recognized cooperation across political divides as favourable to
democracy (e.g. Putnam, 1993). Among the different activities in which legislators
engage with each other, the joint initiation of legislation is one the most important forms
of collaboration. Legislative scholars have argued that party leaders rarely – if at all –
exert influence on behalf of party unity on the joint initiation of bills. Hence, ideological
positions derived from co-sponsorship reflect their position more accurately than roll-call
measures, which are subject to party discipline and agenda setting (Barnes, 2016; Talbert
and Potoski, 2002). By the same token, networks of co-sponsorship should provide a bet-
ter reflection of the underlying networks among legislators expressing the mutual rela-
tions of trust as well as their common policy goals. Their analysis therefore enables the
researcher to unravel the degree of cohesion and cooperation within Congress and thus is
central to our understanding of legislative work.
Given its focus on social structure and the explicit incorporation of interdependence of
individuals, social network analysis (SNA) permits to characterize and evaluate the nature
of these policy networks (Siegel, 2011; Ward et al., 2011). Previous work has character-
ized networks derived from co-sponsorship (Fowler, 2006a) and analysed their evolution
over time both in the United States and Latin America (Aleman, 2009; Barnes, 2012,
2016; Kirkland and Gross, 2014; Lee et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2008). Scholars have also
analysed whether policy networks exhibit properties of small-world networks (Watts and
Strogatz, 1998) and have found that variations in those characteristics influence legisla-
tive productivity (Tam Cho and Fowler, 2010). SNA has also been applied to understand
the position of legislators within a network, and the relation between that position and
legislative outcomes, such as legislative success (Fowler, 2006b; Kirkland, 2011), legisla-
tive voting (Ringe et al., 2012) or reelection (Magallanes, 2016). Other scholars have
analysed the determinants of policy collaboration both in the United States (Bratton and
Rouse, 2011; Fowler et al., 2011; Koger, 2003) and in Latin America, in which electoral
consideration as well as ideological proximity play a role (Aleman and Calvo, 2013;
Crisp et al., 2004).
Through the analysis of networks derived from co-sponsorship, this article evaluates
the patterns of policy cooperation within the Chilean Lower House over 12 years, from
March 2006 until November 2017. Furthermore, as Chile’s multiparty democracy is fac-
ing emerging challenges, it is important to understand the evolution of patterns of coop-
eration as the capacity to adjust policy is a necessary condition for a responsive legislature.
In other words, has policy cooperation occurred across or mostly within ideological
divides? Previous research looking at 2002–2006 legislative term and earlier has found
that Chilean policy networks are cohesive, but cooperation occurs mostly within coali-
tions (Aleman, 2009; Aleman and Calvo, 2013). Does the same pattern hold during the
following terms?
Recent research also has distinguished between networks derived from all bills and
those that are able to overcome Congress veto points and get scheduled for a vote in the

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