Cooperation under autonomy: Building and analyzing the Informal Intergovernmental Organizations 2.0 dataset

AuthorDuncan Snidal,Felicity Vabulas
DOI10.1177/0022343320943920
Published date01 July 2021
Date01 July 2021
Cooperation under autonomy: Building and
analyzing the Informal Intergovernmental
Organizations 2.0 dataset
Felicity Vabulas
International Studies, Pepperdine University
Duncan Snidal
Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford
Abstract
Informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and G20 increasingly
play a central role in governing international relations. IIGOs are based on recurrent meetings among high-level state
representatives but are not legalized through a treaty and have no permanent secretariat. They allow states to organize
internationally without sacrificing autonomy to a supranational entity. We present the IIGO 2.0 dataset, the most
comprehensive compilation of these institutions to date, and illustrate the significance of IIGOs through several key
empirical findings. First, while the creation of formal IGOs (FIGOs) has plateaued, states are increasingly creating
IIGOs to address critical global issues. Second, states disproportionately use IIGOs for high politics issue areas
including peace, security, and political agenda-setting which challenges conventional wisdom that IGOs (intergo-
vernmental organizations) are less relevant in the security realm. Third, IIGOs are remarkably durable. Although
states could readily formalize or abandon IIGOs, they generally organize cooperation informally for long periods.
Finally, IIGOs are typically smaller than FIGOs and this design choice is increasingly used by states of all levels of
development, power, and region. The availability of the IIGO 2.0 dataset will promote further analysis on the
growing diversity of international institutions.
Keywords
informal governance, intergovernmental organizations, security cooperation
Introduction
In response to growing challenges posed by the prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the United
States launched the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
in 2003. Like other informal intergovernmental organi-
zations (IIGOs), the PSI has no legal status, no secretar-
iat, and no headquarters. Indeed, ‘nations are willing to
support the PSI in part because their support does not
bind them to any decisions: There is no larger body
making judgments on behalf of the supporters, and
nations decide on a case-by-case basis whether they will
participate in an exercise’ (Kaplan, 2006). Nevertheless,
since 2003, PSI membership has expanded sevenfold,
and the program has organized significant seizure s of
WMD shipments.
How common is it for states to create IIGOs and
what are the characteristics of the broader set of such
cases? Since they organized the first identified IIGO –
the Concert of Europe in 1815 – to manage the after-
math of the Napoleonic Wars, states have created over
140 IIGOs to address significant international problems.
Previous scholars have provided theoretical conceptuali-
zation and conjectures as to when and why states use
Corresponding author:
felicity.vabulas@pepperdine.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2021, Vol. 58(4) 859–869
ªThe Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0022343320943920
journals.sagepub.com/home/jpr

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