Cotham School v Bristol City Council

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
CourtChancery Division
JudgePaul Matthews
Judgment Date15 July 2025
Neutral Citation[2025] EWHC 1804 (Ch)
Docket NumberCase No: PT-2024-BRS-000009
Between:
Cotham School
Claimant
and
(1) Bristol City Council
(2) Katharine Welham
Defendants
Before:

HHJ Paul Matthews

(sitting as a Judge of the High Court)

Case No: PT-2024-BRS-000009

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS IN BRISTOL

PROPERTY TRUSTS AND PROBATE LIST (ChD)

Bristol Civil Justice Centre

2 Redcliff Street, Bristol, BS1 6GR

Ashley Bowes (instructed by Goodenough Ring) for the Claimant

Douglas Edwards KC (instructed by Bristol City Council Legal Department) for the First Defendant

Andrew Sharland KC (instructed by Direct Access) for the Second Defendant

Consequential matters dealt with on paper

This judgment was handed down remotely at 2:30 pm on 15 July 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archive

Paul Matthews HHJ

Introduction

1

On 10 June 2025 I handed down my reserved judgment in this claim: see [2025] EWHC 1382 (Ch). By my order of the same date, I invited written submissions on consequential matters. I have now received and considered these. The issues raised were costs and permission to appeal. This ruling sets out my decisions on these issues, and the reasons for them.

Costs

2

The claimant (“Cotham”) seeks an order for its costs of the claim on the standard basis, apportioned as to 10% against the first defendant (“BCC”) and as to 90% as against the second defendant (“Ms Welham”). BCC accepts that in principle that it is liable to pay at least some part of Cotham's costs, but leaves the proportion to the court's judgment. But BCC reminds the court that Cotham and BCC entered into an agreement that the costs liability of each toward the other is limited to £20,000. Ms Welham submits that BCC should pay all Cotham's costs.

3

There is also a discrete costs issue relating to a contempt application that was launched by Cotham against Ms Welham, but subsequently not proceeded with. Ms Welham seeks an order that Cotham pay her costs of this application, and on the indemnity basis. BCC is not concerned in this issue.

Permission to appeal

4

Ms Welham seeks permission to appeal against my order, on five grounds, corresponding to issues 1–3, 5 and 6 at the trial. BCC makes no similar application, and is neutral in relation to Ms Welham's application. However, it reserves its position as to its involvement if an appeal does take place. Cotham opposes Ms Welham's application.

5

I will deal with each of these three matters in turn.

Costs of the claim

6

First, I consider the question of the costs of the claim. I can summarise the general rules about costs for present purposes in this way. Costs are in the discretion of the court ( CPR rule 44.2(1)), but, if the court decides to make an order, the general rule is that the losing party, the unsuccessful party, will pay the costs of the successful ( CPR rule 44.2(2)(a)). However, that is subject to the proviso that the court may make a different order ( CPR rule 44.2(2)(b)). So, the operation of the general rule usually requires the court to establish which is the successful and which the unsuccessful party. But in exercising its discretion the court will take into account the parties' conduct, their relative success and any admissible offer to settle ( CPR rule 44.2(4)).

7

This was significant litigation about an important issue, which has obviously cost a great deal of money. I think I should make a costs order. The successful party was Cotham, and the unsuccessful parties were BCC and Ms Welham, who both resisted the claim. There is no reason that I can see not to apply the general rule. The real question is whether I should order them both to pay the costs jointly and severally, and whether I should apportion the costs between them, and if so, in what proportions.

8

Cotham does not ask for a joint and several order, but does ask for a 10:90 apportionment as between BCC and Ms Welham. It points out that Ms Welham pleaded and fought a wide range of points, all of which failed. She called five witnesses of fact, and cross-examined at some length each of Cotham's witnesses, including on aspects of litigation conduct. Her counsel prepared a very long skeleton argument, at the extreme of what is normally permissible for the heaviest cases (of which this was not one), and his written closing submissions ran to 114 pages, twice the length of Cotham's (which included appendices), and eight times the length of BCC's.

9

By contrast, BCC made (legal) submissions on only four out of the six grounds advanced by Cotham. It made no submissions on grounds 2 and 3, the most fact-based, and which were by themselves sufficient for Cotham to succeed. It called no witnesses, and cross-examined none. Had it adopted a neutral role, I would almost certainly have made no order for costs against it: cf R (Davies) v Birmingham Deputy Coroner [2004] 1 WLR 2739, CA. BCC was not neutral, but it played a far more limited role than Ms Welham.

10

Ms Welham says that I should order BCC to pay all “or the vast majority” of Cotham's costs of the claim, because it made the decision which was challenged, and BCC defended it, and because Ms Welham is a litigant in person seeking to protect valuable green space for local inhabitants … acting in the public interest”.

11

I reject this submission on behalf of Ms Welham. Being a litigant in person makes no difference: the same rules apply to both represented and unrepresented parties: Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] 1 WLR 1119, SC. Ms Welham is not a public authority. She was the successful applicant for registration of the land as a TVG, and was seeking, as she was entitled to, to defend what she had obtained. She was acting, perfectly properly, in the interests of local inhabitants (of which she is one) and against the interests of Cotham and its staff and students. Essentially, this was a dispute between two different interest groups as to which should take priority in relation to the use of certain public land. She fought hard for one side against the other, but lost.

12

Ms Welham led the defence to Cotham's claim. She challenged every part of the claim that she could. She (and her supporters) contributed far more than BCC in terms of effort and research. BCC was at best a junior partner in the enterprise. It would not fairly reflect the degrees of participation in the litigation for me even to order both defendants to pay Cotham's costs jointly and severally, much less to order BCC to pay all of them. Instead, I will accede to Cotham's suggestion that BCC should pay 10% of Cotham's costs and Ms Welham 90%, to be subject to detailed assessment if not agreed.

13

That means that, unless there is a good reason not to do so, I must also order the defendant to pay the claimant “a reasonable sum” on account of such costs: CPR rule 44.2(8). In a case where there is an approved costs budget, the court will have more confidence as to what the costs once assessed may be. In Thomas Pink Ltd v Victoria's Secret UK Ltd [2014] EWHC 3258 (Ch), the judge made an order for a payment on account equal to 90% of the approved budget.

14

In this case I can see no good reason not to order a payment on account of a “reasonable sum”. The issue is thus quantification. Ms Welham takes points on the size of Cotham's costs budget, arguing that some contingent costs were not incurred and that the wrong guideline rates were applied. I am not here trying summarily to assess the costs. They are for detailed assessment. So, I decline to get involved in the detail of these arguments. But because of them I must build in a bigger margin for reduction than I might otherwise do. Cotham asks for a payment on account of 60% of its approved costs budget (leaving a contingent cost not actually incurred out of account). I consider that 40% is a sufficient margin. So, I shall award 60% of the budget: BCC must pay £9,467, and Ms Welham £85,203.

The contempt application

15

The second point relates to an application by Cotham to commit Ms Welham for contempt of court. The application was made by notice issued and served on 24 January 2025, which was the last working day before the trial of this claim. It concerned an alleged breach of CPR rule 32.12(2), in that Ms Welham was said to have used a witness statement made by Ms Butler on behalf of Cotham for a collateral purpose, namely, making a complaint about Ms Butler to Ofsted.

16

Ms Butler's witness statement referred to the fact that she was also a schools inspector for Ofsted, and Ms Welham had written to Ofsted to raise a concern as to whether Ms Butler should have done that. After investigating the matter, Ofsted concluded that there had been no breach of the relevant code of conduct. The matter escalated thereafter, but in February 2025 (after the trial was over) the application was withdrawn.

17

The timeline of relevant events is as follows:

(1) On 2 September 2024, Ofsted emailed Ms Butler informing her of a complaint (undated) about the use of her title as an Ofsted inspector;

(2) On 13 November 2024, Ofsted concluded there had been no breach of the code of conduct by Ms Butler;

(3) On 3 December 2024, Cotham's solicitors wrote to Ms Welham, saying that it appeared that Ms Butler's witness statement had been shared by her with someone else who then went on to make a complaint to Ofsted;

(4) On 5 December 2024, Ms Welham informed Cotham solicitors that it was she herself who had made contact with Ofsted in order “to seek certain confirmations for the purpose of these proceedings. I did not make a complaint or share Ms Butler's witness statement with Ofsted … “;

(5) On 11 December 2024, asked Ms Welham to explain what she meant by “certain confirmations”, but no response was received;

(6) Accordingly, on 13 December 2024, Cotham's counsel emailed Ms Welham's counsel about the fact that a complaint had been made by Ms Welham about Ms Butler, based on her witness...

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