Courts of Summary Jurisdiction
| Published date | 01 April 1947 |
| Date | 01 April 1947 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002201834701100201 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
The
Journal
of
Criminal
Law
VOL.
XI.
No.2.
APRIL-JUNE,
1947
Courts of Summary Jurisdiction
'IN
CHARGE'
OF A MOTOR
VEHICLE
COMMENT has frequently been made upon
the
diffi-
culties facing courts of
summary
jurisdiction owing
to
the
absence of guidance from
the
High
Court on
the
question of
what
degree of control over amotor-car is
necessary to
justify
aconviction under section 15 of
the
Road Traffic Act, 1930, where a defendant is charged with
"being
in charge of a motor vehicle on a road whilst
under
the
influence of drink to such
an
extent
as to be incapable
of having proper control
of
the
vehicle". Certainly
the
following case
heard
in a Metropolitan Magistrates' Court,
in which aplea of guilty was tendered on
the
advice of
the
defendant's counsel
and
accepted
by
the
court,
must
be
near
the
limit
at
which
an
individual ceases to be in charge
of a
car
for
the
purpose of this section.
The
facts of this case were
that
the
defendant entered
a police
station
late
in
the
evening in
an
obviously
drunken
condition
and
there made a scene, saying he
wanted
to be
separated from his wife with whom he
had
just
quarrelled.
It
seems
that
he
had
left
her
in
their
flat, which was a few
hundred
yards
away,
and
had
come to
the
police
station
by
taxi. He was ejected from
the
police
station
but
refused to go away
and
assaulted apolice officer who
tried to remove him.
He
was arrested for this offence
and
then
asked
what
was going to
happen
to his car, which he
had
left
outside his flat.
Inquiry
revealed
that
his
car
was
parked
in
the
road outside his flat,
and
thereupon
the
H113
114
THE
JOURNAL
OF
CRIMINAL LAW
further
charge under section 15 was preferred against him.
As
the
car was his property
and
was left
by
him
outside
his place of residence, which was only ashort distance
away,
it
would have been difficult for
the
defendant to
maintain
that
he was
not
in
charge of
it
although he did
not
exercise or
attempt
to exercise
any
control over
it
in
any
way which would have been to
the
prejudice of
the
public. Indeed,
it
seems
that
he was sensible enough
to realise he was unfit
to
drive. On
the
other hand, little
reliance can be placed on a drunken
man's
good intentions,
and
the
defendant's conduct does seem to be within
the
mischief aimed
at
by
the
Act.
A CLAIM
FOR
REINSTATEMENT
Coldbreath v.
Turney
GCo.
(M
ayjair) Ltd.
Strong criticism of
the
Reinstatement in Civil
Employment
Act, 1944, as containing
the
worst drafts-
manship of
any
Act he
had
ever been called on to interpret,
was made
by
Mr.
Frank
Powell
at
Bow Street Metropolitan
Magistrates' Court
at
the
hearing of a summons against
a
West
End
firm of butchers,
Turner
&
Co.
(Mayfair) Ltd.,
taken
out
under
sl
l of
that
Act for refusing to re-employ
aformer employee. The provisions of
this
Act which are
relevant to this case
may
be summarised as follows
:-
Section 1imposes an obligation upon employers to
reinstate former employees who have been in
the
Armed
Forces on similar terms
and
conditions to those which
were formerly enjoyed, providing
the
employee wishes to
be so
reinstated;
sA
imposes upon an employer
an
oblig-
ation
to
continue
to
employ
an
employee who is
taken
back
into
employment for a period of 26 or 52 weeks
depending upon
the
length of his previous service;
the
employee
may
apply to
the
Reinstatement Committee
under
s.9
if
he is of
the
opinion
that
his rights under
the
Act are denied him
and
the
Committee
may
order
the
employer to reinstate
the
employee on specified terms
and/or
to
pay
compensation;
by
s.10 either side
may
appeal from adecision of
the
Reinstatement Committee
to
the
umpire or
deputy
umpire whose order shall be
final;
lastly, s.Ll
(1)
provides
that
"where
an
order has been
made
by
aReinstatement Committee or
by
the
umpire
COURTS
OF
SUMMARY
JURISDIcTION
no
or
a
deputy
umpire
that
employment shall be made avail-
able to a person on a specified
day
and
employment is
not
made available to
him
on
that
day
in
accordance with
the
order,
the
person against whom
the
order was made shall
be liable
to
a fine of £100
and
to
pay
compensation".
In
this case
the
defendant company was a "one-man
company" owned
by
a Mr. Smith.
The
complainant,
Coldbreath, was employed as manager of
the
shop
at
£6
per
week plus 50.% of
the
profits until he was called
into
the
Armed Forces in 1941. During his absence a
Mr. Gedge was
taken
on as manager
at
£6
per
week plus
25% of
the
profits. When Coldbreath returned from
the
Forces he applied
to
be reinstated as manager,
but
Smith
offered
him
only apost as shopman under Gedge.
Coldbreath appealed to
the
Reinstatement Committee
and
then
to
the
umpire, whose order was
that
the
employer
should make employment available to
the
applicant on
the
28th
October, 1946, as manager on
the
former financial
terms.
It
had
been alleged
at
the
hearings before
the
Reinstatement Committee
and
the
umpire
that
there
would be staff difficulties if Coldbreath returned,
and
on
the
25th October ameeting was held attended by Smith
and
his solicitor
and
Coldbreath
and
his solicitor to discuss
this problem.
At
this
meeting
the
possibility of
Coldbreath's purchasing
the
business arose,
and
it
was
finally agreed between all parties to adjourn
the
operation
of
the
umpire's order so far as Coldbreath's reinstatement
was concerned for one week, without prejudice
to
the
rights
of either side,
and
that
if
terms
for
the
purchase were
not
agreed within
the
week Coldbreath's salary
and
share of
profits were to
date
from
the
28th October.
(It
is some
indication of Smith's
attitude
that
before this agreement
was reached he
had
said he would transfer shares to Gedge
and
make him
the
managing director of
the
company).
In
accordance with
this
agreement Coldbreath
did
not
present himself for work on
the
28th,
but
as no
further
offer of sale was made
by
Smith during
the
week he
attended
for work on the
4th
November; Thereupon
Smith
told
him
that
as he
had
committed abreach of
the
umpire's
terms
by
absenting himself from work on
the
28th October
he
had
lost his right to reinstatement.
For
the
complainant
it
was urged
that
the
whole
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