Crisis bargaining, domestic opposition, and tragic wars
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629813516689 |
| Published date | 01 January 2015 |
| Author | Philip Arena |
| Date | 01 January 2015 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Crisis bargaining, domestic
opposition, and tragic wars
Journal of Theoretical Politics
2015, Vol. 27(1) 108–131
©The Author(s) 2014
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0951629813516689
jtp.sagepub.com
Philip Arena
University at Buffalo (SUNY), New York, USA
Abstract
Why do democracies sometimes fight long, politically divisive wars that end poorly? I argue that
electoral accountability, induced by party competition, can sometimes promote this and other
tragic outcomes. To demonstrate this, I analyze a bargaining model in which one state is conceived
of as a unitary actor while the other consists of a government and an opposition that is motivated
both by electoral ambition and concern for the national interest. Perhaps surprisingly, it is the
opposition’s concern for the national interest that causes the most tragic outcomes, as they may
choose not to advocate peace when doing so would prevent war so as to avoid undercutting the
government’s bargaining position. I close with a discussion of why the United States appears to be
particularly prone to such tragic outcomes, treating the Vietnam War as an illustrative example.
Keywords
Crisis bargaining; democracy; domestic opposition; signaling; war
1. Introduction
Why has the United States so frequently involved itself in wars that drag on and on,
prove unpopular, draw legislative opposition, and fail to produce clear victory? On aver-
age, democratic states tend to fight wars that are shorter and more likely to end in victory
than the wars fought by non-democracies.1Since 1945, the median duration of an inter-
state war that involved a democracy other than the United States was approximately 1.5
months. The majority of such wars also ended in clear victory.2Yetthe United States has
fought five interstate wars in that time, and only one produced a quick victory.3
Leaders of democracies are thought to be held accountable for policy outcomes to
a greater degree than are leaders of other regime types, and it is this accountability that
supposedly explains the tendency for democracies to abstain from wars they cannot win
quickly and easily (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999, 2003; Reiter and Stam, 1998, 2002).4
Yet if the reason that the United States defies the overall trend is a lack of accountability,
Corresponding author:
Philip Arena, Department of Political Science University at Buffalo (SUNY) 520 Park Hall Buffalo, NY 14260,
USA.
Email: parena@buffalo.edu
Arena 109
it is difficult to explain why the Korean War brought an end to Truman’s presidency and
the Vietnam War Johnson’s. Indeed, as I’ll argue later, one of the primary reasons John-
son escalated US involvement in the Vietnam War appears to be his fear of being held
accountable for the decision not to do so. Thus, whatever makes the United States dif-
ferent from other democracies, it almost certainly is not that US presidents are insulated
from the pressures of domestic politics. In fact, in this article, I argue that tragic outcomes
are likely to occur as a result of electoral accountability that would not otherwise occur.
It is striking that the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan each began with
widespread support in Congress.5This stands in contrast to the expectations of extant
claims about the relationship between domestic politics and decisions overwar and peace.
Specifically, it raises the question of why clear Congressional support for war failed to
facilitate a peaceful resolution to the precipitating crises.6
Of course, one might argue that legislative support was not compelling in these
particular cases because the domestic consensus was not seen as stable. This would
not be unreasonable, since all but one of these wars later saw Congressional calls for
withdrawal.7
However, this only raises the question of why wars that prove so difficult to win often
attract widespread support early on, with opposition emerging later.
In short, electoral politics are intimately caught up with the dynamics of the wars
fought by the United States, but domestic political forces do not seem to be allowing the
US to avoid unnecessary wars even when the nation is relatively unified in support of
war. Nor do domestic political factors appear to be promoting quick, easy victories for
the US.8
I argue that one of the very defining features of democratic governance, namely the
regular and open competition for higher office among established political parties before
a partially attentive audience, may itself be sufficient to ensure that elites will, under
certain conditions, adopt behaviors that they know full wellwill produce tragic outcomes.
Specifically, I analyze a bargaining model and discuss three key results where, due to
electorally induced concerns for credit-taking or blame-shifting, the government and the
opposition both behave in such a wayas to promote tragic outcomes, by which I mean the
occurrence of wars that would not otherwise occur or at least would not otherwise last
as long. These results collectively explain both how signals from the opposition might
lack credibility and why democracies might fight prolonged wars they have little hope of
winning.
First, while I find that the opposition’s signal can indeed sometimes be informative,
the model indicates that this is only the case when the course of fighting, should war
occur, would favorthe democratic state. Opposition signaling does not appear to prevent
wars that would favor the foreign adversary.
This may strike the reader as counter-intuitive. After all, these are the very wars we
might most expect electorally induced concerns for accountability to prevent. The key
to this result lies in the effect opposition behavior has not only on the likelihood that
the government and the foreign adversary would reach an agreement, but also the effect
opposition behavior has on the terms thereof. When the course of fighting is expected to
favor the foreign adversary, should the opposition advocate peace, they leave the govern-
ment with very little incentive to fight. To do so would only result in a war that would
fast become a huge political liability. Thus, advocating peace ensures that the foreign
To continue reading
Request your trial