CSR Participation Committees, Wildcat Strikes and the Sourcing Squeeze in Global Supply Chains

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12275
Published date01 March 2018
Date01 March 2018
British Journal of Industrial Relations doi: 10.1111/bjir.12275
56:1 March 2018 0007–1080 pp. 75–98
CSR Participation Committees, Wildcat
Strikes and the Sourcing Squeeze
in Global Supply Chains
Mark Anner
Abstract
Lead firms in apparel global supply chains are increasingly using social
compliance programmes that require worker-management participation
committees in their supplier factories. These committees are designed to ensure
respect for internationally recognized labour standards, to empower workers,
and to reduce labour unrest. However, these committees have remained weak,
and in countries such as Vietnam worker unrest remains common. This article
argues that this is because lead firms in these CSR programmes are imposing
a ‘sourcing squeeze’ on supplier factors by reducing the prices and production
times they allot to their suppliers, which undermines eorts by committees to
address cost-sensitive issues and overtime violations. At the same time, the
sourcing squeeze increases strike leverage, providing workers with a much more
eective source of worker voice.
1. Introduction
Despite well over two decades of activist campaigns, media expos´
es and
institutional pressure, corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmes
continue to display considerable deficiencies in their attempts to enforce
freedom of association (FoA) rights, particularly in low-cost manufacturing
sectors in developing countries (Anner 2012, 2017; Koc¸er and Fransen 2009;
Locke et al. 2009). The problem is not the result of a lack of understanding
of what constitutes FoA rights. Indeed, since the late 1940s, the International
Labour Organization (ILO) has clearly defined what constitutes FoA rights,
and most CSR programmes explicitly reference ILO standards in their
codes and guidelines (Anner 2012). Rather, research has found that the
persistent violation of workers’rights in CSR-monitored global supply chains
Mark Anner is at The Pennsylvania StateUniversity.
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2017 John Wiley& Sons Ltd.
76 British Journal of Industrial Relations
is associated with poor programme design, a proclivity for union-avoidance
among many multinational enterprises (MNEs), and regulatory voids in host
countries (Anner 2012; Distelhorst et al. 2015; Locke et al. 2009; Seidman
2007). This article argues that the failure of CSR in the area of FoA rights is
also the result of lead firm sourcing practices that undermine workers’ rights.
MNEs often face a dilemma: many of the countries that provide production
services at low costs with the largest production volume (such as China,
Bangladesh and Vietnam) are among the worst violators of FoA rights in
the world today.1For MNEs, avoiding production in these countries is not
an option given their sourcing dependency on these locations (production
in these countries account for close to 50 per cent of all apparel exports
in the world).2Yet, expos´
es of labour rights abuses in these countries
carry reputational risks. Scholars suggest that that CSR programmes could
protect countries from reputationaldamage by filling regulatory voids in host
countries with worker rights guidelines and enforcement mechanisms that are
otherwise lacking (Rathert 2016). CSR programmes thus may substitute for
national worker protection policies in host countries with weak regulatory
regimes (Jackson and Apostolakou 2010; Jackson and Rathert 2016).
The capacity of CSR programmes to provide a substitute to national
regulatory regimes is more limited in one-party states, because the state plays
such a strong role in shaping labour relations (Distelhorst et al. 2015). Yet,
most MNEs’ CSR programmes do not consider leaving such countries as an
option. Instead, they have continued to search for ways to fill the FoA void.
Many CSR programmes have turned to solutions that include mandates to
form worker-managementcommittees in supplier factories. These committees
are seen to provideworker voice in a context wherenational regulatory regimes
do not ensure such representation.Thus, by mandating such committees, CSR
programmes in labour repressive regimes claim to take steps to address the
FoA rights. But do these committees work?
The literature on worker-management committees suggests reason for
caution, most especially when such committees are implemented where
independent trade unions are absent (Kidger 1992). Hence, there would be
an abundant reason for caution in states where independent unionism is
prevented by law, such as Vietnam and China. This article argues that the
power imbalance of modern-day global supply chains based on supplier-
networks in developing countries also creates a bullwhip eect that further
undermines such committees. In the apparel sector, this dynamic manifests
itself in a ‘sourcing squeeze’ that occurs when lead firms are continuouslyable
to pressure their suppliers to produce for low prices and with accelerating
turn-around times. The sourcing squeeze puts pressure on management to
keep wages low and working hours long. As a result, the sourcing squeeze
undermine worker-management participation committees and their goal of
providing workers with an eective voice mechanism. Yet, the sourcing
squeeze also creates new opportunities for labour. Short lead times increase
workers’strike leverage and thus,this article argues, inadvertently oer a much
more powerfuland thus eective form of worker voice.This is because workers
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2017 John Wiley& Sons Ltd.

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