Scott and Davidson v Scottish Ministers (No 1)
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Judge | LORD MANCE,LORD HOPE OF CRAIGHEAD,LORD CARSWELL,LORD RODGER OF EARLSFERRY,LORD NICHOLLS OF BIRKENHEAD |
| Judgment Date | 15 December 2005 |
| Neutral Citation | [2005] UKHL 74 |
| Date | 15 December 2005 |
| Docket Number | No 1,No 2 |
| Court | House of Lords |
(Scotland)
[2005] UKHL 74
Appellate Committee
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead
Lord Hope of Craighead
Lord Rodger of Earlsferry
Lord Carswell
Lord Mance
HOUSE OF LORDS
Appellants:
Aidan O'Neill QC
Simon Collins
Jason Coppel
(Instructed by Balfour & Manson)
Respondents:
Neil Brailsford QC
Philip Sales
James Mure
(Instructed by Treasury Solicitor)
My Lords,
English courts have power to make coercive orders, prohibitory and mandatory, against ministers of the Crown. This was decided authoritatively by your Lordships' House in M v Home Office [1994] 1 AC 377. The question raised by this appeal is whether, in the context of judicial review proceedings, Scottish courts have similar jurisdiction in respect of Scottish Ministers, that is, members of the Scottish Executive.
It would be surprising if this were not so. But on this appeal the Scottish Ministers contend that the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 leads inescapably to the opposite conclusion.
The proceedings
The proceedings have an unusual history. For present purposes the essential facts are simple indeed. Scott Davidson spent 18 months in Barlinnie Prison, Glasgow, between April 2001 and August 2002. Initially he was there on remand and later as a convicted prisoner. While there he complained to the prison governor about prison conditions: gross overcrowding, inadequate sanitary facilities and poor regime activities. He said detention in these conditions was inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
On 24 October 2001 he presented a petition for judicial review in the Court of Session. He sought a declarator that he was being detained in conditions incompatible with article 3, an order ordaining the Scottish Ministers to secure his transfer to prison conditions compliant with article 3, and damages. The legal basis for these claims was that the general superintendence of prisons is vested in the Scottish Ministers under section 3(1) of the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1989. Accordingly, so the claim runs, Mr Davidson's detention in prison in Convention non-compliant conditions was unlawful conduct by the Scottish Ministers within the meaning of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Such conduct was also outside the power of the Scottish Ministers within the meaning of section 57(2) of the Scotland Act 1998.
On 26 October 2001 the Lord Ordinary (Johnston) refused an application for interim relief. He was bound by the decision of the Second Division of the Inner House in McDonald v Secretary of State for Scotland 1994 SC 234 to hold that an order of interdict against the Crown was prohibited by section 21 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 and no longer competent in Scotland even if it had been before the passing of the Act: 2002 SCLR 166, para 3. On 18 December 2001 an Extra Division dismissed Mr Davidson's appeal: 2002 SC 205.
The correctness of that decision is now in issue before your Lordships. The intervening vicissitudes which have beset these proceedings are recounted in the speeches in your Lordships' House reported at 2005 SC (HL) 7. Mr Davidson is no longer in prison but the issue raised by the decisions of the Lord Ordinary and the Extra Division in these proceedings is one of considerable public importance.
The Crown Proceedings Act: its effect in England
The question in the present case concerns the application of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 in Scotland. But the proper interpretation of this statute in relation to Scotland calls first for an understanding of the way the Act operates in England: what was its purpose, and what were the changes it made to English law. This is a necessary first step because the 1947 Act is drafted in a form primarily directed at the legal position obtaining in England at that time.
As is well known, in the 1940s English law relating to proceedings against the Crown was disfigured by two anachronistic relics. One concerned substantive law, the other was essentially procedural. The defect in substantive law was that proceedings in tort did not lie against the Crown. The procedural defect concerned claims against the Crown for breach of contract or in quasi-contract or for the recovery of land or property. The remedy in respect of these claims was by way of the antiquated and cumbersome procedure of petition of right. Proceedings required the Sovereign's fiat. A third defect, also procedural in character, was that the Crown could not be sued in the county court.
The existence of these defects had been obvious for some time. In 1921 the Earl of Birkenhead LC set up a committee to consider these matters under the chairmanship of Lord Hewart CJ: Crown Proceedings Committee Report (1927) (Cmd 2842). Eventually practical problems came to a head in 1946. Observations in your Lordships' House in Adams v Naylor [1946] AC 543, followed by the decision in Royster v Cavey [1947] 1 KB 204, exposed the inadequacies of the make-shift expedients currently adopted as a means of doing justice despite the immunity of the Crown in tort.
Part I of the Act made changes to the substantive law. Section 1 dealt with cases where before the Act a claimant had to obtain His Majesty's fiat when seeking to proceed with a petition of right. In future those claims could be enforced against the Crown as of right. Section 2 imposed liability on the Crown in respect of torts committed by its servants or agents. Sections 3 to 12 contained sundry ancillary provision on such diverse matters as intellectual property, contribution, contributory negligence, Crown ships, postal packets, members of the armed forces and so forth.
Part II of the Act dealt with jurisdiction and procedure. Section 13 provided that in future 'all civil proceedings' by or against the Crown in the High Court should be instituted in accordance with rules of court. The old forms of civil proceedings by or against the Crown, including petition of right, were abolished. Section 15 enabled civil proceedings to be instituted against the Crown in a county court, in accordance with county court rules.
Section 21 made provision for the remedies which in future were to be available in 'civil proceedings' by or against the Crown. Subject to the provisions of the Act, in future the court should have power to make 'all such orders as it has power to make in proceedings between subjects, and otherwise to give such appropriate relief as the case may require': subsection (1). This enabling provision was subject to two restrictive provisos in respect of proceedings against the Crown. Proviso (a) excluded the grant of an injunction or an order for specific performance where such relief might be granted in proceedings between subjects. In lieu the court might grant appropriate declaratory relief. Proviso (b) similarly excluded an order for the recovery of land or delivery of property. Here also a declaration was prescribed as the appropriate form of relief in proceedings against the Crown.
Section 21(2) contains a further restrictive provision. This concerned orders made against officers of the Crown, as distinct from orders made directly against the Crown. It is of Delphic opaqueness. Even contemporary writers of distinction were at a loss. Professor Glanville Williams, writing in 1948, described this as a 'somewhat obscure subsection': 'Crown Proceedings' (1948), page 150. The subsection reads:
"The court shall not in any civil proceedings grant any injunction or make any order against an officer of the Crown if the effect of granting the injunction or making the order would be to give any relief against the Crown which could not have been obtained in proceedings against the Crown."
'Officer of the Crown' includes a minister of the Crown and other servants of His Majesty: section 38(2). This expression now includes a member of the Scottish Executive: see the Scotland Act, section 125, and Schedule 8, para 7.
Some of the ramifications of these restrictive provisions in section 21 were considered by Lord Woolf in his learned discussion in M v Home Office [1994] 1 AC 377. In the present case it is unnecessary to explore these questions. The present appeal raises an anterior issue. The issue is whether a petition to the Court of Session by way of judicial review falls within section 21 at all. For this purpose what matters is the meaning of the phrase 'civil proceedings' in section 21. This phrase governs the scope of both section 21(1) and section 21(2).
In English law the phrase 'civil proceedings' is not a legal term of art having one set meaning. The meaning of the phrase depends upon the context. For instance, the phrase is often used when contrasting civil proceedings with criminal proceedings. So used, and subject always to the context, civil proceedings will readily be regarded as including proceedings for judicial review.
This usage was not intended in the 1947 Act. That is clear beyond doubt. Proceedings on the Crown side of the King's Bench Division were the predecessors to applications for judicial review, and the definition of 'civil proceedings' in section 38 of the Act states expressly that 'civil proceedings' does not include proceedings on the Crown side. Thus section 21 was not applicable to Crown side proceedings.
This is not surprising. Crown side proceedings were the subject of legislative attention and amendment in sections 7 to 10 of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1938. Orders of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari were substituted for the ancient writs correspondingly named. Informations in the nature of quo warranto were replaced by injunctions. Rules of court were to be made prescribing the procedure for...
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