Davy v Leeds Corporation
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Viscount Dilhorne,Lord Cohen,Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest,Lord Guest,Lord Donovan |
| Judgment Date | 24 February 1965 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1965] UKHL J0224-1 |
| Date | 24 February 1965 |
| Court | House of Lords |
[1965] UKHL J0224-1
House of Lords
Viscount Dilhorne
Lord Cohen
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest
Lord Guest
Lord Donovan
Upon Report from the Appellate Committee, to whom was referred the Cause Davy and others against Corporation of City of Leeds, that the Committee had heard Counsel, as well on Monday the 18th, as on Tuesday the 19th, Wednesday the 20th and Thursday the 21st, days of January last, upon the Petition and Appeal of Richard Davy, of 2 Spen Road, in the City of Leeds, and Central Freehold Estates (Leeds) Limited, whose registered office is situate at 66 Albion Street, in the City of Leeds, praying, That the matter of the Order set forth in the Schedule thereto, namely, an Order of Her Majesty's Court of Appeal of the 29th of June 1964, might be reviewed before Her Majesty the Queen, in Her Court of Parliament, and that the said Order might be reversed, varied or altered, or that the Petitioners might have such other relief in the premises as to Her Majesty the Queen, in Her Court of Parliament, might seem meet; as also upon the Case of the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Citizens of the City of Leeds, lodged in answer to the said Appeal; and due consideration had this day of what was offered on either side in this Cause:
It is Ordered and Adjudged, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in the Court of Parliament of Her Majesty the Queen assembled, That the said Order of Her Majesty's Court of Appeal, of the 29th day of June 1964, complained of in the said Appeal, be, and the same is hereby. Affirmed, and that the said Petition and Appeal be, and the same is hereby, dismissed this House: And it is further Ordered, That the Appellants do pay, or cause to be paid, to the said Respondents the Costs incurred by them in respect of the said Appeal, the amount thereof to be certified by the Clerk of the Parliaments.
My Lords,
The Appellants in these two appeals were the owners of houses in the Albert Grove district of Leeds. In each appeal the same question arises for decision.
On the 6th November, 1957, the Respondents acting in pursuance of the powers given to them by section 42 of the Housing Act, 1957, declared the area in which the Appellants' houses were to be a clearance area. Other areas in the immediate neighbourhood were also declared to be clearance areas.
On the 4th December, 1957, the Respondents, by resolution, decided to seek to acquire compulsorily the land in the clearance areas, which numbered thirteen in all and, in addition, other land in the exercise of the power given by section 43 of the Housing Act, 1957, to acquire any land which is surrounded by a clearance area and the acquisition of which is reasonably necessary for the purpose of securing a cleared area of convenient shape and dimensions and any adjoining land the acquisition of which is reasonably necessary for the satisfactory development or use of the clearance area.
On the 30th July, 1958, the Respondents made a compulsory purchase order for the acquisition of the thirteen clearance areas and the land which they wished to acquire in the exercise of their powers under section 43 of the Housing Act. This order was confirmed by the Minister of Housing and Local Government on the 27th July, 1959.
The houses the property of the Appellants were included in the clearance area as they were unfit for human habitation. The compensation to be paid in respect of land compulsorily acquired has to be assessed in accordance with the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919, and by subsection (2) of section 59 of the Housing Act, 1957, the compensation to be paid for land comprised in a clearance area is to be "the value at the time the valuation is made of the land as a site cleared of buildings and available for development in accordance with the requirements of the building byelaws for the time being in force in the district". The proviso to this subsection does not apply in this case.
The Appellants were not, therefore, entitled to receive any compensation for the value of their houses which were unfit for human habitation. The area in which their houses were was zoned for residential development. They were entitled to receive in compensation the value of their land as sites cleared of buildings and available for development in accordance with the building byelaws in an area zoned for residential development.
On the 2nd November, 1959, the Respondents served Notices to Treat on the Appellants. The value of the Appellants' land on the basis I have stated had to be assessed as at that date.
As the parties were unable to reach agreement on the values, the matter came before the Lands Tribunal. Shortly stated, the Appellants' contention was that, in valuing their land as sites cleared of buildings and available for development, regard should be had to the fact that all other buildings in the clearance areas would be cleared away, and they maintained that if regard was had to this, the value to be attached to their land would be increased. The fact that clearance areas had been declared was something, they said, that a willing purchaser would take into account. Instead of buying a site with houses in a bad condition around it, he would be buying a site in an area which was bound to be cleared and available for development. The Respondents, on the other hand, contended that no regard should be had, in assessing the amount to be paid in compensation to the Appellants, to the fact that they had declared clearance areas and that the land within those areas would be cleared of buildings.
The Lands Tribunal found in favour of the Appellants and, on the basis contended for by them, assessed the compensation payable to Mr. Davy at £830 plus a surveyor's fee and to the Central Freehold Estates (Leeds) Ltd. at £500 plus a surveyor's fee. On the basis contended for by the Respondents, they assessed the compensation payable to Mr. Davy at £625 plus a surveyor's fee of £31 10s. 0d. and to the Central Freehold Estates at £330 plus a surveyor's fee of £23 2s. 0d.
The Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeal who unanimously reversed the decision of the Lands Tribunal and substituted their alternative award. The Appellants now appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal.
The Town and Country Planning Act, 1959, which changed the basis of valuation from "existing use value" to "market value", by section 9 modified the rules for the assessment of compensation.
Section 9 (2) requires to be carefully considered. The relevant parts of it read as follows:
"In each of the cases mentioned in the first column of the following table, no account shall be taken of any increase or diminution of the value of the relevant interest [i.e., the interest acquired in pursuance of a notice to treat on compulsory acquisition, (section 57 (2))] which is attributable—
( a) to the carrying out of any such development as is mentioned in relation thereto in the second column of that table, or
( b) to the prospect that any such development will or may be carried out,
in so far as any such development (whether actual or prospective) is or would be development arising from the circumstances of that case.
Table
| Case | Development |
| 1. In the case of every acquisition for purposes involving development of any of the land authorised to be acquired. | Development of any of the land authorised to be acquired, other than the relevant land, being development for any of the purposes for which any part of the first-mentioned land (including any part of the relevant land) is to be acquired. |
| ……………………… | ……………………" |
The Lands Tribunal accepted the contention advanced by Mr. Bridge that this section was irrelevant since, they said, "'demolition' which is all that a clearance area declaration requires, is not 'development' for the purposes of the Act", Mr. Layfield, for the Respondents, had argued that demolition with a view to development should be regarded as development. Unfortunately neither Counsel noticed, and the Tribunal did not notice, that at the end of subsection (8) of section 9 it is enacted that "any reference to development of any land shall be construed as including a reference to the clearing of that land".
This provision applied to section 9(2) secures that, in the case of every acquisition involving the clearing of the land, no account is to be taken of any increase or diminution of the value of the relevant land which is attributable to any clearing of any of the land authorised to be acquired other than the relevant land or of the prospect that any such clearing will or may be carried out insofar as the clearing (whether actual or prospective) is or would be clearing arising from the circumstances of the case.
Section 42(1) of the Housing Act, 1957, imposes a duty on a local authority to cause a clearance area to be defined on a map and to pass "a resolution declaring the area so defined to be a clearance area, that is to say, an area to be cleared of all buildings in accordance with the subsequent provisions of this Part of this Act". Section 43 of this Act prescribes two methods for securing the clearing of the land, ( a) by making clearance orders, directing the owners of buildings to demolish them and ( b) "by purchasing the land comprised in the area and themselves undertaking, or otherwise securing, the demolition of the buildings on that land".
Referring again to section 9(2) of the 1959 Act, it is clear that the acquisition in pursuance of the compulsory purchase order involved the clearing of the land and also that the clearing would be clearing arising from the circumstances of the case; and, as Mr. Bridge very frankly admitted, section 9(2) would, in view of the definition of "development" in section 9(8) if it stood alone, prevent the Appellants'...
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