Decentralization as a strategy of regime maintenance: The case of Yemen
Published date | 01 May 2020 |
Author | Maria‐Louise Clausen |
Date | 01 May 2020 |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1002/pad.1880 |
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Decentralization as a strategy of regime maintenance: The case
of Yemen
Maria-Louise Clausen
Danish Institute for International Studies
(DIIS), Copenhagen, Denmark
Correspondence
Maria-Louise Clausen, Danish Institute for
International Studies (DIIS), Østbanegade
117, 2100 Copenhagen, Denmark.
Email: mlcl@diis.dk
Summary
Proponents of decentralization often argue that decentralization makes governments
more accountable and responsive to the governed. This is perhaps why the decen-
tralization literature tends to overlook Middle Eastern regimes as these are among
the most authoritarian and most centralized regimes in the world. However, many of
these regimes have included decentralization in their legal framework. This article
shows how a weak regime can use decentralization as a regime maintenance strategy
when formal decentralization reforms strengthens external and internal legitimacy.
The articles main argument builds on the literature on decentralization and elite cap-
ture to show how weak regimes can use formal decentralization reform to undermine
local autonomy. The article uses the case of Yemen to make this argument. Yemen
has a long tradition for local bottom-up initiatives and there is widespread internal
support for decentralization. Simultaneously, donors have seen decentralization as a
way of strengthening the Yemeni state, leading to international support to the formu-
lation of the Local Authority Law of 2000, Law 4/2000, an extensive legal decentrali-
zation framework.
KEYWORDS
decentralization, recentralization, regime, weak states, Yemen
1|INTRODUCTION
Since the 1980s, decentralization reforms have been among the most
widely used tools to strengthen state institutions in the developing
world (Eaton, 2001; Faguet, 2014, p. 2; Rodden, 2006, pp. 1–2;
Smoke, 2015). This is undergirded by a school of thought that views
decentralization as retaining great pro-poor potential as it is seen as
increasinglocal accountability, improving politicalparticipation, and cre-
ating more effective and responsive state institutions (Crook, 2003;
Jackson, 2016, p. 750; Jütting, Corsi, Kauffmann, & McDonnell, 2005,
p. 627). However, as noted by James A. Wunsch, there is a substantial
literaturethat shows that decentralization has not enhanced local initia-
tive or responsiveness nor served to improve service delivery as
envisioned, particularly in weak states (See also Hyden, 2007;
Lewis, 2014, p. 574; Treisman, 2007; Wunsch, 2013, p. 221). This has
been explained by a variety of factors, most notable capacity problems
at local levelor capture by local “big men”or“informal”indigenoussoci-
etal organizations (Boege, Brown,& Clements, 2009; Brinkerhoff,2005;
Eng, 2016; Faguet,2014; Lister & Wilder, 2005, 2007;Smoke, 2015).
Decentralization entails redistributing power from the central
level to lower tiers of government. This makes it an inherently political
process but also one that has been described as paradoxical as politi-
cal actors rarely give up power, resources, or authority voluntarily
(Dickovick, 2014, p. 199; Rees & Hossain, 2010, p. 582). The response
has typically been that central governments support decentralization
because of a need to improve overall collective welfare or to incorpo-
rate additional actors into the political system to diffuse conflict. In
other words, decentralization happens when politicians are forced to
accept a short term cessation of power to secure their long term polit-
ical survival (Eaton, 2001, p. 104). The Middle East has received com-
paratively little attention in the decentralization literature, which is
likely linked to a tendency to view the Middle East and North Africa
Received: 17 November 2017 Revised: 12 February 2020 Accepted: 21 March 2020
DOI: 10.1002/pad.1880
Public Admin Dev. 2020;40:119–128. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pad © 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd 119
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