Chapter 1: Defining motive, purpose and intention

LibraryTax Avoidance and the Law
Pages6-34
AuthorSelina Keesoony

The jurisprudence on tax avoidance widely uses the terms “motive”, “intention” and “purpose”, often interchangeably. However, there has been no real attempt at providing definitions for these terms. The lack of clear definitions is problematic given that the terms have important connotations in tax avoidance, particularly when ascertaining whether a transaction was not executed merely for tax avoidance reasons. Consequently, it is imperative to provide clear definitions for these terms to provide greater precision in the use of language and to ensure that they are applied in the correct manner.

The terms “motive”, “intention” and “purpose” have also been used widely in an array of other disciplines and are often used in different contexts to denote different meanings. Therefore, an exploration into how these terms are used in criminal law, psychology and philosophy will be made. These areas have been chosen as they regularly examine motives, intentions and purposes. Consequently, analysing how these selected areas have used the terms “motive”, “intention” and “purpose” will provide a deeper understanding of how these terms should be defined. Moreover, the way in which motive, intention and purpose are used in trading, expenditure, accountancy and dividend stripping will be examined in order to identify possible convergences in the usages of the terms. Definitions of these terms will then be created in order to provide clarity as to what is precisely meant by “motive”, “intention” and “purpose” in tax avoidance and what is not. These definitions will be provided at the conclusion of this chapter. Emphasis on these terms accordingly rejects actions explained by the general “doctrine of instincts” 1 as this unscientific approach “ends our search and drives us into the unknown”. 2

1.1: Criminal law perspective

Criminal law places significant weight on the mind of the defendant to determine criminal liability; therefore, it is surprising that the terms “motive”, “intention” and “purpose” have not been defined or differentiated in this field. The subjective perception of a defendant is central as defendants are usually “held criminally liable only for events or consequences which they intended or knowingly risked”. 3 The defendant’s intention and motive are significant when the defendant’s mens rea is sought in order to establish fault.

There are some areas of criminal law which place much weight on the subjective intentions of defendants and others which do not: for example, driving offences, which are strict liability offences. Consequently, motives are irrelevant in these cases, and the person charged with the offence can thenceforth be “convicted without proof of intention, knowledge, recklessness or negligence”. 4 Although strict liability offences eliminate the risk of a motive being attributed to the defendant, they diminish the defendant’s “ability to explain, excuse or justify the conduct”. 5 This can be distinguished from a more objective form of mens rea, as discussed later in this chapter.

Constructive liability specifically examines the defendant’s intention. “Constructive crimes” 6 are a category of crimes in which the defendant sought to commit a less serious crime but is convicted of a crime with a heavier penalty. By analogy, in the tax avoidance field, in which the avoidance of tax is not the aim but, nevertheless, the result, a tax avoidance intention may be attributed to the taxpayer, as demonstrated in Five Oaks Properties Ltd. v HMRC. 7 In criminal law, the argument which defends imposing constructive liability rests upon an assumption that people should be liable “for what they intended or foresaw and for what lay within their control”. 8 Intention, therefore, includes what the defendant fore-saw in terms of the consequences of the defendant’s actions to indicate a realistic possibility of the prohibited act materialising and excludes remote possibilities. Foreseeability is highly subjective, although the control requirement contributes an objective dimension to the concept of intention to curtail liability according to what lay within the defendant’s control, irrespective of what the defendant desired. 9 Moreover, foresight is an important element of intention as “consequences intended are necessarily foreseen, but not all consequences foreseen are necessarily intended”. 10 Therefore, if the defendant foresaw a result, he or she is taken to have intended that result. Foreseeability is thus a less certain measure of future events occurring than intentions. This is because what is foreseen may not materialise or may materialise differently to a person’s original intention.

The subjectivity of the mens rea requirement is reinforced in “the belief principle”, 11 which relates to “what defendants believed they were doing or risking, not on actual facts which were not known to them at the time”. 12 The belief principle strongly values the subjective beliefs of the defendant and disregards what he or she ought to have known, thereby discounting the need for an ascribed secondary intention. Implicit in the mens rea requirement is the need for an element of choice on the part of the defendant. 13 Therefore, choice can help form the definition of “intention”. Requiring that the defendant made a conscious choice also implies that the defendant is aware of the consequences of his or her actions but has nevertheless knowingly chosen to embark on a particular course of action. Proving that the defendant has made a conscious choice is essential in valuing the defendant’s autonomy. 14

Whilst an intention can relate to what the defendant believed and the likelihood of it occurring according to what lay within the defendant’s control, a motive can be relevant when examining “rationale-based defences, such as self-defence and duress”. 15 Where a defendant seeks to rely on “rationale-based defences”, 16 the defendant both does the prohibited act and intends to commit the act. However, the motive behind committing such offences is what diminishes liability as there are ulterior reasons for carrying out the prohibited act. Therefore, examining motive scrutinises the defendant’s mind further than an intention by examining the reasons for embarking on the chosen act.

Although discussing tax law, Millet sought to discuss the meanings of the terms “motive”, “intention” and “purpose”. The discussion is relevant under criminal law due to the nature of the example he gives to illustrate how the various definitions work in practice. Millet has asserted that “‘motive’ is the reason why; ‘purpose’ is the aim, or object, or end in view”. 17 The aforementioned terms are all considerations which are deliberated upon before the execution of an act. The term “aim” can be interpreted as meaning the same as “object”. 18 “Purpose” denotes “object [or] thing intended”. 19 Therefore, Millet argues, an intention can correspond with the eventual purpose. Motive relates to “that which induces a person to act” 20 and can also connote “the purpose behind a course of action”. 21 Therefore, motive and purpose can have the same meaning. To reinforce the connection between the two terms, “intention” is the “thing intended [or] purpose”. 22 Therefore, Millet’s example demonstrates how the terms “motive”, “purpose” and “intention” can be conflated.

Millet’s example shows a clear distinction between motives and purposes. He gives the example of a murderer’s intent to kill to illustrate his argument. Millet claims that in carrying out the attack, the murderer’s “motive may be greed, or jealousy, or revenge; his purpose is to kill”. 23 The example excellently illustrates how motives are elusive and can be numerous. In Millet’s murder example, as well as the many different possible motives, the murderer’s purpose may not be to kill but to injure or to frighten. Moreover, the effect – or, in Millet’s example, the death of the victim – may not be the true intended effect, which is why intentions are an unreliable measure. In addition to this, Millet’s murder example illustrates how a person’s motive reveals nothing about his or her purpose.

It is clear that motive and intention have distinct connotations in the criminal law sphere. Whilst “intention” refers to what the defendant foresaw as the probable consequences of his or her actions, “motive” refers to the defendant’s innate “emotion leading to action”, 24 such as envy, hatred or both. Moreover, in R v Mohan, 25 it was held that intention includes the desire to act. Therefore, a defendant’s intentions do not require any emotional involvement in acting. 26 It is also material to assess the process by which to establish the particular intention which gave rise to criminal liability since people generally “do things with more than one intention in mind”. 27 In criminal law, the material issue is “whether one particular intention was present when the act was committed” 28 and not “with what intentions D committed the act” in general. 29 The latter question would involve digressing from ascertaining whether the defendant had the precise intention for the particular crime as prescribed by legislation. Tax law tends to ask the latter question as demonstrated in Ramsay, in which the judge examined “why the taxpayer had purchased the scheme”. 30 If tax avoidance aligns with criminal law in examining intentions, it will bring tax avoidance into the sphere of deciding cases based on constructive liability.

The terms “motive” and “intention” are therefore treated as distinct in criminal law, although there are some definitional and practical overlaps. For example, occasionally, the finding of a justifiable motive can mitigate the original intention. As both influences guide behaviour, motives and intentions may sometimes be blurred because the two mind-frames will have the same effect by producing the same act. Motives and intentions can co-exist, but it...

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