Democratic peace: Does ethnic inclusiveness reduce interstate conflict?

AuthorHenry Noll,Seung-Whan Choi
Date01 March 2021
Published date01 March 2021
DOI10.1177/0192512119884738
Subject MatterArticles
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512119884738
International Political Science Review
2021, Vol. 42(2) 179 –196
© The Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/0192512119884738
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Democratic peace: Does ethnic
inclusiveness reduce interstate
conflict?
Seung-Whan Choi
University of Illinois at Chicago, USA
Henry Noll
Independent Researcher, USA
Abstract
In this study, we argue that ethnic inclusiveness is an important democratic norm that fosters interstate
peace. When two states are socialized into the notion of ethnic tolerance, they acquire the ability to reach
cooperative arrangements in time of crisis. Based on cross-national time-series data analysis covering the
period 1950–2001, we illustrate how two states that are inclusive of their politically relevant ethnic groups
are less likely to experience interstate disputes than states that remain exclusive. This finding was robust,
regardless of sample size, intensity of the dispute, model specification, or estimation method. Therefore,
we believe in the existence of ethnic peace: ethnic inclusiveness represents an unambiguous force for
democratic peace.
Keywords
Democratic peace, ethnic inclusiveness, interstate conflict, democratic norms, ethnic peace
Introduction
Since the advent of modern democracy, its proponents have suggested that democracy might serve
as a force for peace in a turbulent world. In the 18th century, Thomas Paine and Immanuel Kant
both mused that the propagation of representative governments may result in greater peace. Nearly
two centuries later, empirical social science began to support this argument (Babst, 1972), leading
to a number of related empirical findings about democratic peace that still hold true today despite
continuing criticism (e.g., James et al., 1999). For example, scholars have found that democracies
Corresponding author:
Seung-Whan Choi, Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Chicago, 1007 W Harrison St (MC 276),
Chicago, IL, 60607-7137, USA.
Email: whanchoi@uic.edu
884738IPS0010.1177/0192512119884738International Political Science ReviewChoi with Noll
research-article2019
Article
180 International Political Science Review 42(2)
are only more peaceful with each other, meaning the likelihood of interstate war is slim to none;
however, democracies are not necessarily more peaceful in their relations with all countries (see
Choi, 2016; Oneal and Russett, 2005; Park, 2013).
When scholars broadened their analytical focus from interstate wars to militarized interstate
disputes (MIDs) that did not involve full-scale war (e.g., when one state threatens, displays, or uses
force against another), they found that the democratic peace phenomenon held true. Since scholars
have reached similar findings when analyzing interstate wars and MIDs, our theory section refers
to them as international conflict, for the purposes of analytical simplicity; however, our empirical
section distinguishes three distinctive measures: MIDs, fatal MIDs, and interstate wars. By and
large, the empirical findings point toward Paine’s (1776/1997) and Kant’s (1795/2010) democratic
peace, yet a theoretical consensus on how pairs of democracies actually create peace through non-
violent, democratic norms has eluded scholars.1
In this study, we contribute to the democratic peace literature through a special focus on ethnic
inclusiveness as an important democratic norm. We define ethnic inclusiveness at the country level
based on whether politically relevant ethnic groups have access to executive-level power by way
of their representatives. The definition of ethnicity includes ethnolinguistic, ethnosomatic (or
racial), and ethnoreligious groups. Although it is true that historically religious conflict has tended
to be far more frequent and violent than ethnic conflict, our definition of ethnicity does not differ-
entiate them since it embraces ethnoreligious groups as a conceptual component. Thus, we use the
two terms, ethnic conflict and religious conflict, interchangeably in this study.
Ethnic groups become politically relevant as soon as there is a minimal degree of political mobi-
lization or intentional political discrimination due to their ethnic backgrounds. Executive-level
power is referred to as the political executive, such as presidential and government cabinet and
executive offices, as well as the top ranks of national militaries and bureaucracies. The definition
of ethnic inclusiveness does not necessarily mean equal treatment of all ethnic communities
because it is limited to those groups that are politically significant in national politics. Once politi-
cally active, some groups may have more access to central-level state power via representatives
than others. Put differently, ethnically inclusive governments are not dominated or monopolized by
a single ethnic group, they do not discriminate against other minority groups, and they often have
laws and institutions in place to help enforce and reinforce these important characteristics.
Consequently, in ethnically inclusive countries, politically relevant ethnic groups have consistent
access to the highest levels of state power. In contrast, ethnic exclusion occurs when an ethnic
group’s members are excluded from service or representation in the executive branch of govern-
ment (see Wimmer et al., 2009).
It should be noted that ethnic inclusiveness is largely hindered when ethnic groups are subjected
to active, intentional, and targeted discrimination with the intent of excluding them from execu-
tive-level power and representation. Examples include African Americans until the civil rights
movement and Guatemaltecan Indians until the end of the civil war. Power sharing is a good way
to increase ethnic inclusiveness, as it is an arrangement that divides executive power among lead-
ers who claim to represent particular ethnic groups. Power sharing can be either formal (e.g.,
Lebanon) or informal (Switzerland).2 However, some form of inclusiveness may be achieved by
accident. In states with a large number of ethnic groups, inclusiveness in the legislature may be
achieved without explicit intentionality, but simply as a byproduct of election results (e.g., Sri
Lanka and Papua New Guinea). Demography may matter in another way. Countries tend to deny
ethnic groups that have transnational ethnic kin risk, on the grounds that their loyalty is questioned
(Cederman et al., 2018; Weiner, 1971). In particular, countries are likely to exclude and possibly
even discriminate against groups that are ethnically linked to states with which the host country has
ongoing rivalries (Mylonas, 2012).

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