Desired vis‐à‐vis required interim disclosures

Published date01 February 2000
Pages170-179
Date01 February 2000
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1108/eb025041
AuthorHannu J. Schadewitz,Antti J. Kanto,Hannu A. Kahra,Dallas R. Blevins
Subject MatterAccounting & finance
Journal
of
Financial Regulation
and
Compliance
Volume
8
Number
2
Desired vis-à-vis required interim
disclosures
Hannu J. Schadewitz,* Antti J. Kanto, Hannu A. Kahra and
Dallas R. Blevins
Received: 7th
July,
1998
*University of Tampere, P.O. Box 607, 33101 Tampere, Finland, tel: 358-3-215-6618;
fax: 358-3-215-7214.
Hannu J. Schadewitz is an assistant pro-
fessor at the Tampere School of Econom-
ics and Business Administration, Tampere,
Finland. He is active in the European
Accounting Association. His research spe-
cialty is firm-to-else communication, espe-
cially interim reporting. Before his
academic
career,
he gained professional
experience as an internal auditor with the
Finnair Group, a Finnish listed firm.
Antti J. Kanto is professor of quantitative
method in business at the Helsinki School
of Economics and Business Administra-
tion. His main interests are time-series
analysis, non-linear and non-gaussian
models.
Hannu A. Kahra is Professor of Economics
at the University of Oulu, Finland. He tea-
ches macroeconomics and time-series
econometrics. His research interest is in
the field of nonlinear econometric model-
ling with applications to monetary and
financial data.
Dallas R. Blevins is a professor of finance
at the University of Montevallo, Monte-
vallo, Alabama. He received his doctoral
degree in finance from the Florida State
University in 1976. He was a 1981 Ayres
Fellow to the Stonier Graduate School of
Banking, a 1983 Mellon Fellow to the
Mathematical Applications to Economic
Problems Program, the 1983-84 University
Scholar at the University of Montevallo. He
has over 120 publications.
ABSTRACT
This study compares those interim disclosures
that managers desire to make with those they
are required to make. Managers and regulators
agree on the optimal degree of disclosure on
growth potential and size. It appears that the
less managers voluntarily disclose, the greater
the firm's growth potential. This may be
because
managers feel that other
evidence
signals
the good future prospects or the information
indicating positive growth is too proprietary to
reveal to competitors. Some differences are
observed. Managers would pay more attention
to the specific needs of
their governance
groups.
Regulations would require more disclosure of
variables indicating: business
risk;
capital struc-
ture; and growth. These
differences
in perceived
need
for disclosure highlight the importance of
continued study of the optimal scope and scale
of disclosure.
INTRODUCTION
Managers have access to more information,
faster, than do the investors, whom they
represent. Myers and Majluf suggest that
managers know more about the firm's
Journal of Financial Regulation
and Compliance, Vol. 8, No. 2,
2000,
pp. 170-179
© Henry Stewart Publications,
1358-1988
Page
170

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