Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank Plc

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
CourtHouse of Lords
Judgment Date25 Oct 2001
Neutral Citation[2001] UKHL 52

[2001] UKHL 52


Lord Bingham of Cornhill

Lord Steyn

Lord Hope of Craighead

Lord Millett

Lord Rodger of Earlsferry

The Director General of Fair Trading
(Original Respondent and Cross-Appellant)
First National Bank PLC
(Original Appellants and Cross-Respondents)

My Lords,


First National Bank plc ("the bank") is licensed to carry on consumer credit business. It is a major lender in the market and has lent large sums to borrowers under credit agreements regulated under the Consumer Credit Act 1974. Such agreements are made on its printed form which contains a number of standard terms. The Director General of Fair Trading ("the Director"), in exercising powers conferred on him by regulation 8 of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994 (SI 1994/3159) ("the regulations"), sought an injunction to restrain use of or reliance on one such standard term on the ground that it was unfair. The bank resisted the Director's application on two grounds. The first, rejected by Evans-Lombe J at first instance ( [2000] 1 WLR 98) and the Court of Appeal (Peter Gibson, Waller and Buxton L JJ) ( [2000] QB 672), was that the fairness provisions of the regulations did not apply to the term in question. The second, accepted by the judge but partially rejected by the Court of Appeal, was that the term in question was not unfair. In this appeal to the House the bank again relies on both these arguments. The Director seeks to uphold the decision of the Court of Appeal but contends that the term was more fundamentally unfair than the Court of Appeal held it to be. Thus there are two broad questions before the House:

  • (1) Do the fairness provisions of the regulations apply to the term in question?

  • (2) If so, is the term unfair and, if it is, on what ground?


By its standard form of regulated credit agreement the bank agrees to make a sum of money available to the borrower for a specified period in consideration of the borrower's agreement to repay that sum by specified instalments on specified dates with interest at a specified rate. Condition 4 of the bank's standard form provided that:

"The rate of interest will be charged on a day to day basis on the outstanding balance and will be debited to the Customer's account monthly in arrears …"

and provided that the rate of interest might be varied. Condition 8 of the agreement was in these terms:

"Time is of the essence for making all repayments to FNB as they fall due. If any repayment instalment is unpaid for more than 7 days after it became due, FNB may serve a notice on the Customer requiring payment before a specified date not less than 7 days later. If the repayment instalment is not paid in full by that date, FNB will be entitled to demand payment of the balance on the Customer's account and interest then outstanding together with all reasonable legal and other costs charges and expenses claimed or incurred by FNB in trying to obtain the repayment of the unpaid instalment of such balance and interest. Interest on the amount which becomes payable shall be charged in accordance with Condition 4, at the rate stated in paragraph D overleaf (subject to variation) until payment after as well as before any judgement (such obligation to be independent of and not to merge with the judgement)."

Emphasis has been added to the last sentence of this condition, since it is to that sentence alone that the Director's objection relates. I shall refer to this sentence as "the term".


The bank's stipulation that interest shall be charged until payment after as well as before any judgment, such obligation to be independent of and not to merge with the judgment, is readily explicable. At any rate since In re Sneyd; Ex p Fewings (1883) 25 Ch D 338, not challenged but accepted without demur by the House of Lords in Economic Life Assurance Society v Usborne [1902] AC 147, the understanding of lawyers in England has been as accurately summarised by the Court of Appeal at p 682 of the judgment under appeal:

"It is trite law in England that once a judgment is obtained under a loan agreement for a principal sum and judgment is entered, the contract merges in the judgment and the principal becomes owed under the judgment and not under the contract. If under the contract interest on any principal sum is due, absent special provisions the contract is considered ancillary to the covenant to pay the principal, with the result that if judgment is obtained for the principal, the covenant to pay interest merges in the judgment. Parties to a contract may agree that a covenant to pay interest will not merge in any judgment for the principal sum due, and in that event interest may be charged under the contract on the principal sum due even after judgment for that sum."


To ensure that they were able to recover not only the full sum of principal outstanding but also any interest accruing on that sum after judgment as well as before, it became the practice for lenders to include in their credit agreements a term to the effect of the term here in issue. If such a provision had not been included, a lender seeking to enforce a loan agreement against a borrower in the High Court would suffer prejudice only to the extent that the statutory rate of interest on judgment debts at the material time is lower than the contractual interest rate, because the High Court has, since 1838, had power to award statutory interest on a judgment debt until payment.


But a lender seeking to enforce a regulated credit agreement is in a different position. He is obliged by section 141 of the 1974 Act to sue in the county court. Until the Lord Chancellor, exercising his power under section 74 of the County Courts Act 1984, made the County Courts (Interest on Judgment Debts) Order 1991 (SI 1991/1184), the county court lacked power to award statutory interest on any judgment debt and, when such a general power was conferred by the order, judgments given in proceedings to recover money due under agreements regulated by the 1974 Act were expressly excluded from its scope. It was further provided in the order:

"3 Where under the terms of the relevant judgment payment of a judgment debt -

  • (a) is not required to be made until a specified date, or

  • (b) is to be made by instalments,

interest shall not accrue under this Order -

  • (i) until that date, or

  • (ii) on the amount of any instalment, until it falls due,

as the case may be."


Thus a lender under a regulated credit agreement who obtains judgment against a defaulting borrower in the county court will be entitled to recover the principal outstanding at the date of judgment and interest accrued up to that date but will not be entitled to an order for statutory interest after that date, and even if the court had power to award statutory post-judgment interest it could not do so, in any case where an instalment order had been made, unless there had been a default in the due payment of any instalment. The lender may recover post-judgment interest only if he has the benefit of an independent covenant by the borrower entitling him to recover such interest. There is nothing to preclude inclusion of such a covenant in a regulated credit agreement, unless it falls foul of the fairness requirement in the regulations.


Section 71 of the County Courts Act 1984 conferred a general power on the county court, where any judgment was given or order made for payment of a money sum, to order that the money might be paid "by such instalments payable at such times as the court may fix". The 1974 Act also conferred on the county court three powers relevant for present purposes. First, the court was empowered to make a time order. Sections 129 and 130 of the Act, so far as relevant, provided:

"129. (1) If it appears to the court just to do so -

(c) in an action brought by a creditor or owner to enforce a regulated agreement or any security, or recover possession of any goods or land to which a regulated agreement relates,

the court may make an order under this section (a 'time order').

(2) A time order shall provide for one or both of the following, as the court considers just -

(a) the payment by the debtor or hirer or any surety of any sum owed under a regulated agreement or a security by such instalments, payable at such times, as the court, having regard to the means of the debtor or hirer and any surety, considers reasonable;

"130. (1) Where in accordance with rules of court an offer to pay any sum by instalments is made by the debtor or hirer and accepted by the creditor or owner, the court may in accordance with rules of court make a time order under section 129(2) (a) giving effect to the offer without hearing evidence of means…."

Secondly, section 136 provided:

"136. The court may in an order made by it under this Act include such provision as it considers just for amending any agreement or security in consequence of a term of the order."

Thirdly, by sections 137, 138 and 139 of the Act the county court was given power to reopen credit agreements "so as to do justice between the parties" if it found a credit bargain to be "extortionate". A credit bargain was defined as extortionate if it

"(a) requires the debtor or a relative of his to make payments (whether unconditionally, or on certain contingencies) which are grossly exorbitant, or

(b) otherwise grossly contravenes ordinary principles of fair dealing."

In determining whether a credit bargain was extortionate regard was to be had to such evidence as might be adduced concerning interest rates prevailing at the time the bargain was made, a number of factors relating to the debtor and the circumstances of the transaction and "any other relevant considerations".


The provisions of the regulations directly at issue in these proceedings...

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