Dispute inflation
| Published date | 01 December 2021 |
| Date | 01 December 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/13540661211045112 |
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JR
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https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661211045112
European Journal of
International Relations
2021, Vol. 27(4) 1136 –1161
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/13540661211045112
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Dispute inflation
Todd H Hall
University of Oxford, UK
Abstract
Much work has examined the phenomenon of dispute escalation, whereby the concrete
measures state actors take edge them closer to war. Less attention has been devoted
to the ways in which state actors’ perceptions of what is at stake in a dispute can also
change, with important consequences for the likelihood of conflict. This paper examines
the phenomenon of dispute inflation – wherein a contest over an object or issue
assumes ever greater stakes and significance for its protagonists – and identifies three
different mechanisms that can generate increasing non-material stakes. The upshot is
that theoretically even a minor dispute can grow into a major conflict due to swelling
stakes, especially when dispute inflation spirals. To illustrate these dynamics at work,
this paper looks to recent developments in the dispute between the People’s Republic
of China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
Keywords
Emotions, dispute escalation, power transitions, security dilemma, spirals, territorial
disputes, Sino-Japanese relations, Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute
Scholars of international conflict have dedicated considerable attention to the phenom-
enon of dispute escalation, seeking to identify what drives state actors closer to war (De
Mesquita et al., 1997; Fearon, 1997; Leng, 2004). Much of this work focuses on escala-
tory actions, treating the stakes involved as static. Less attention has been given to the
possibility that the significance imputed to a dispute may itself shift over time.1 But this
is also a key variable.
This is a paper about dispute inflation, defined as the phenomenon in which a contest
over an object or issue assumes ever greater stakes and significance for its protagonists.
Corresponding author:
Todd H. Hall, St Anne’s College, University of Oxford, Woodstock Road, Oxford, Oxfordshire OX26HS,
UK.
Email: todd.hall@politics.ox.ac.uk
1045112EJT0010.1177/13540661211045112European Journal of International RelationsHall
research-article2021
Article
Hall 1137
Dispute inflation can manifest through a variety of mechanisms; this paper introduces
three, each capable of generating increasing non-material stakes. The upshot is that theo-
retically even a minor dispute can transform into a major conflict due to swelling stakes,
especially when dispute inflation begins to spiral. Dispute inflation between states does
not necessarily predict conflict, but it does increase its likelihood. For what state actors
see hanging in the balance of a dispute informs how much they are willing to endanger
or lose in its pursuit (Diehl, 1992).
Positing dispute inflation does not negate the possibility of other significant stakes
already being in play – material or otherwise. Dispute inflation simply denotes subse-
quent growth in a dispute’s significance above and beyond its initial stakes, even where
the latter are already considerable. As such, it constitutes not a competing approach to
existing work, but rather an additional, complementary explanation of how disputes can
become even more acute.
This piece proceeds in five parts. First, it introduces the concepts of dispute inflation
and non-material stakes. Second, it outlines three potential mechanisms of non-material
dispute inflation. Third, it discusses the ways in which dispute inflation can intersect
with work on spirals and power shifts. Fourth, it offers an illustrative application of its
approach by examining the dispute between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and
Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Lastly, it concludes by discussing potential
future avenues of research, most importantly the possibilities for dispute deflation.
Dispute inflation and non-material stakes
Our starting point is that there already exists a dispute, defined as a situation in which
two or more actors have conflicting preferences over the final disposition of a particular
issue or thing, ranging anywhere from the level of import tariffs to the composition of the
international system. This piece specifically addresses disputes between state actors,
although the arguments below could conceivably extend to non-state actors as well.
Dispute inflation occurs when the perceived stakes in a dispute subsequently increase,
and the relative significance of the dispute grows. This can have important consequences.
Consider a simple model with two disputants weighing the costs and benefits of compro-
mise and concession versus war. In this context, dispute inflation can work in several
ways to tip the scales towards the latter. First, it can increase the relative value attached
to the prize vis-a-vis the perceived costs of war, reducing the range of mutually accept-
able solutions and making war more likely (Fearon, 1995: 404). Second, dispute inflation
can increase the stakes involved in backing down, also reducing the relative cost of war.
And finally, because dispute inflation by definition means that the disputants care more,
it can intensify competition such that actors come to see interactions in zero-sum terms
and cooperation becomes near impossible (Snidal, 1991: 702; Vasquez, 2009: 80–84).
Disputes can from their outset involve material stakes, non-material stakes, or a mix
of the two. Material stakes denote the concrete, tangible gains an actor will enjoy from
prevailing in a dispute, such as territory, wealth, strategic advantage, effective control, or
just plain survival. Unquestionably, material stakes can increase over the lifetime of a
dispute – for example, a disputed territory may jump in value due to newly discovered
resources. But material stakes face material constraints; in contrast, the potential for
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