Distributional effects of political power-sharing arrangements and their negative consequences for post-agreement stability

Date01 June 2018
Published date01 June 2018
DOI10.1177/2057891118765223
Subject MatterResearch articles
Research article
Distributional effects of political
power-sharing arrangements
and their negative consequences
for post-agreement stability
Kazuhiro Obayashi
Hitotsubashi University, Japan; University of Oxford, UK
Abstract
Most of the previous studies of power-sharing arrangements (PSAs) find the political PSA to be
ineffective in stabilizing post-agreement peace. These studies argue that the political PSA is a signal
that is not costly enough to moderate the information asymmetry or commitment problem among
the signatories. In this article, I develop an alternative theory of the political PSA that identifies its
“negative” effect on post-agreement stability by highlighting two issues that have attracted little
attention in the previous studies, i.e. distributional effects of the political PSA and shifts in the
bargaining power among the signatories. To assess the validity of the theory, I first conduct a
logistic regression analysis of inclusion of political PSA provisions in peace agreements, and then
conduct a survival analysis of post-agreement peace duration.
Keywords
civil war, peacebuilding, power to hurt, power-sharing arrangement, conflict recurrence
Introduction
Power-sharing arrangements (PSAs) are often considered to be a useful means to end civil wars
and ensure post-agreement stability. However, previous studies are skeptical of their effectiveness
in reducing the risk of conflict recurrence. This is especially the case for the political power-
sharing arrangement (political PSA). While many studies find that military and territorial PSAs
(military PSAs and territorial PSAs) reduce the risk of a civil war recurring to some extent, these
studies mostly deny the influence of the political PSA (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Jarstad and
Nilsson, 2008). These studies often attribute the ineffectiveness of the political PSA to its low cost,
Corresponding author:
Kazuhiro Obayashi, Graduate School of Law, Hitotsubashi University, 2-1 Naka, Kunitachi, Tokyo, 186-8601, Japan.
Email: k.obayashi@r.hit-u.ac.jp
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics
2018, Vol. 3(2) 109–132
ªThe Author(s) 2018
Reprints and permission:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/2057891118765223
journals.sagepub.com/home/acp
which renders the arrangement ineffective as a device for signaling. However, these studies ignore
the distributional implications of the political PSA. If implemented, a political PSA has a long-
standing and significant distributional consequence for signatories to the peace agreement, and the
signatories are keenly aware of such effects. This awareness creates an incentive for some of the
signatories to renege on the peace agreement, which makes the post-agreement peace fragile. In
this article, I explore what implications the distributional effects of the political PSA have for
post-agreement stability.
The question is important for scholars of civil war and peacebuilding to improve the theories of
post-agreement stability. Scholars often identify the presence of a spoiler as an immediate cause of
conflict recurrence (e.g. Stedman, 1997). There is no consensus, however,about the relative impor-
tance of various factors that could be behind the emergence of a spoiler, such as information
asymmetry, the enforcement problem, and the distributional problem. It is not clear, either, whether
the cause of conflict recurrence lies in the persistence of the original dispute among the parties to a
conflict, in a dysfunctional agreement, or in mistakes and failures in the post-agreement peace-
building process. By conceptualizing PSAs as signaling, previous studies presume that the major
factor behind the emergence of a spoiler is information asymmetry and that the political PSA is not
relevant to success or failure in peacebuilding (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson,
2008). By not assessing the implications of the distributional effect of the political PSA on post-
agreement stability, these findings about the (non-)causes of conflict recurrence remain dubious.
The issue is also important for policymakers. The political PSA is often valued not only for its
potential contribution to post-agreement stability but also for its impact on the accountability and
fairness of the post-agreement political institution. This is why some of the scholars who are
skeptical of the political PSA’s contribution to post-agreement stability encourage its application
and improvement rather than its abandonment (Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008). In order to improve
political PSAs properly, however, it is necessary to understand why these arrangements have been
ineffective. This need is even more urgent if, as I argue below, political PSAs have perverse
consequences on post-agreement stability. In fact, some scholars discussed negative impacts of
the PSAs on post-agreement society (Jarstad and Sisk, 2008; Roeder and Rothchild, 2005). If the
problem is the political PSA’s imposition of only a low cost on signatories, it is necessary to raise
such costs by making the provisions in a political PSA stricter or by combining it with other sorts of
arrangements. If the problem lies with the political PSA’s distributional effects, however, such an
arrangement may increase the risk of conflict recurrence. It may therefore be necessary to mod-
erate the cost of concluding the arrangement for a would-be defector or simply to drop the
arrangement from the peace agreement.
I argue that previous studies underestimate the “negative” impact of the political PSA on post-
agreement stability because these studies ignore its distributional implications as well as the
conditions under which the parties to a conflict sign an agreement with a political PSA. A political
PSA tends to have a distributional implication that is highly unfavorable to the government or the
stronger party in a conflict. This distributional implication intensifies the commitment problem
among the signatories and increases the risk of conflict recurrence. The stronger party in the
conflict still signs the agreement because it suffers from a reduction in its power to hurt the other
side, which the stronger party believes is temporary or can be improved through a conclusion of a
political PSA. The weaker side signs the agreement either because they expect some gains for the
group, such as an increase in their international legitimacy, or because some leaders expect private
gains from the agreement. The theory, therefore, has implications for the causes of a political PSA
as well as its consequences.
110 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 3(2)

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