DNA, Secondary Transfer and Sufficiency of Evidence: R v Jones [2020] EWCA Crim 1021 R v Killick (Shane) [2020] EWCA Crim 785
| Author | Natalie Wortley,Tony Ward |
| Published date | 01 October 2020 |
| Date | 01 October 2020 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0022018320970107 |
| Subject Matter | Case Notes |
Case Note
DNA, Secondary Transfer
and Sufficiency of Evidence
R v Jones [2020] EWCA Crim 1021
R v Killick (Shane) [2020] EWCA Crim 785
Keywords
Expert evidence, DNA, secondary transfer, no case to answer
R v Jones [2020] EWCA Crim 1021
J appealed against his conviction for conspiracy to possess explosives for an unlawful purpose. He was
jointly tried with three others, all of whom were acquitted. The conspiracy was alleged to also involve
persons who had not been identified so were not named on the indictment.
The prosecution case was that the Appellant and his co-accused were part of an organised crime group
conspiring to supply class A drugs in the Warrington area. A series of ‘tit for tat’ incidents had taken
place between the group in which the Appellant was allegedly involved and a rival referred to as SS. On
24 February 2018, a hand grenade was located under a car outside SS’s address. The grenade was
homemade but was a viable device. Swabs were taken from the grenade before it was detonated in a
controlled explosion.
The prosecution and defence expert concluded that the sample obtained from the firing pin
contained DNA from at least three people and included all of the components in the appellant’s
profile. This meant ‘that it was 1 billion times more likely than otherwise that this DNA was
that of the appellant’ (at [10]). None of the co-accused contributed any of the DNA that was
found.
The experts produced a joint statement, which included the following key points:
i. Assuming the jury accepted this was the Appellant’s DNA, that could not assist in determining
the mechanism by which it was deposited, when it was deposited, nor whether the Appellant was
the last person to touch the firing pin before it was left in situ.
ii. In particular, it was not possible to say whether the DNA had been deposited directly (primary
transfer) or indirectly (secondary transfer): ‘If sufficient DNA from [the Appellant] was present
on another person or item then it may have been transferred to the safety pin indirectly’ (at
[10(7)]).
iii. Although primary transfer was ‘logically ...likely to occur more often than a path requiring two
steps ...it does not follow from this that the path requiring one step must have occurred in the
specific instance’ (at [10(11)]).
The Journal of Criminal Law
2020, Vol. 84(5) 512–515
ªThe Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0022018320970107
journals.sagepub.com/home/clj
To continue reading
Request your trial