Do liberal ties pacify? A study of the Cod Wars
| Author | Sverrir Steinsson |
| Published date | 01 September 2018 |
| Date | 01 September 2018 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0010836717712293 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836717712293
Cooperation and Conflict
2018, Vol. 53(3) 339 –355
© The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0010836717712293
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Do liberal ties pacify? A study
of the Cod Wars
Sverrir Steinsson
Abstract
The Cod Wars, three militarized interstate disputes between the UK and Iceland (1958–1961,
1972–1973, 1975–1976), have often been presented as an egregious exception to the liberal
peace. There are, however, few comprehensive analyses of the liberal dimensions of the
Cod Wars. This article comprehensively analyses the ways in which each of the Cod Wars is
consistent or inconsistent with the liberal peace. I find that while the supposedly pacifying factors
of the liberal peace – democracy, trade and institutional ties – effectively made the disputes more
contentious, they also ensured that escalation to actual war was impossible.
Keywords
Cod wars, democratic peace, Iceland, liberal peace, small states, United Kingdom
Introduction
The so-called Cod Wars occurred between states – Iceland and the UK – whose relations are
purportedly pacified by the Kantian tripod for peace. The states in question were democra-
cies with considerable economic interests that would have been compromised had a milita-
rized dispute occurred. Iceland and the UK were also members of NATO, OEEC, GATT and
the World Bank and, during the last two Cod Wars, maintained considerable ties through
European institutions. While militarized disputes between Western democracies over mari-
time rights are not uncommon (Hensel et al., 2008; Mitchell and Prins, 1999), it is rare for
the disputes to last as long, be as intense and revolve around such high stake-issues as was
the case with each of the Cod Wars. Therefore, it is not surprising that these disputes are
deemed a major exception to the tendency of North Atlantic and Western European states to
solve their problems through peaceful means (Cohen, 1994: 216; Kacowicz, 1995: 270).
Liberal thinkers argue that democracy, commercial ties and institutions have a
pacifying influence on states and contribute to the peaceful resolution of disputes.
These factors facilitate peace by shaping pacifist norms, providing common interests
between states, constraining leaders legislatively, raising the costs of mobilization for
Corresponding author:
Sverrir Steinsson, University of Iceland, Sæmundargata 2, Reykjavík 101, Iceland.
Email: sverrir.steinsson@gmail.com
712293CAC0010.1177/0010836717712293Cooperation and ConflictSteinsson
research-article2017
Article
340 Cooperation and Conflict 53(3)
war, and making it easier to signal resolve. The Cod Wars earn a mention in many
studies of the liberal peace, because scholars try to make sense of why they occurred
and what the implications are of the disputes (Gelpi and Griesdorf, 2001: 636–637;
Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997: 289; Hart, 1976; Hellmann and Herborth, 2008; Lebow,
2010: 198; Muller and Wolff, 2006: 57; Russett, 1993: 21–22). However, most of
these mentions are superficial and brief.
While the Cod Wars were not actual wars – only one individual died during the three
conflicts – the disputes did involve the use of force and could have potentially led to
more casualties. While it is central to the liberal peace that disputes between states are
solved through non-violent means, this was not the case with the Cod Wars. Furthermore,
scholars frequently fail to account for how costly and risky the disputes were, which
makes the occurrence of the conflicts even more noteworthy. Each Cod War increased
considerably the risk that Iceland would shut down the US base on Icelandic soil and
withdraw its NATO membership. Due to Iceland’s strategic importance to the US and
NATO, this meant that the disputes had the potential to affect adversely the balance of
power in the North Atlantic.1 That two allies with such extensive liberal ties and boasting
all of the purportedly pacifying characteristics of the liberal peace should enter into mili-
tarized disputes on three separate occasions is puzzling. Not only did the liberal peace
fail on three separate occasions, but also different British and Icelandic governments
were involved in the use of force. The disputes were therefore not flukes.
With one exception, there are no comprehensive studies in the literature on the
role of liberal factors in the Cod Wars.2 The article by Hellmann and Herborth (2008)
is the most comprehensive study to date, but its examination of the Cod Wars is still
fairly brief, each Cod War is not studied separately, and the authors did not use key
primary and secondary sources. Given the puzzling nature of the Cod Wars and the
interest in them among scholars dealing with the liberal peace, it is worthwhile to
study each of the Cod Wars separately and examine the ways in which the suppos-
edly pacifying factors pacified, aggravated or had no impact on the outbreak, con-
duct and resolution of the Cod Wars.
I find that liberal explanations for the disputes are only correct in so far as actual war
was highly unlikely between the states due to their democratic characteristics, economic
ties, and common membership of institutions. However, democratic processes and eco-
nomic interests were crucial factors in escalating the disputes as far as they went and in
limiting the ability of statesmen to resolve them. Common membership of institutions had
a mixed record. Iceland tended to use its strategic importance to NATO as a bargaining
chip, threatening to withdraw from the alliance or close the US base on Icelandic soil
unless the British would meet Icelandic demands. NATO membership therefore hardened
Icelandic resolve and eagerness to act unilaterally. Icelandic elites were, however, wary of
escalating the disputes further due to the significant negative impact it would have had on
Iceland’s US-reliant security arrangements and US-reliant economy.3 In addition, the UK
surrendered to Iceland when the disputes looked set to escalate to an unacceptably high
level. While NATO’s mediation capabilities were left wanting, NATO did engage in infor-
mal or formal mediation during the disputes, and this helped both sides find an agreement.
In short, while the liberal characteristics of the states played a role in escalating the dis-
putes, they effectively acted as a threshold on how far the conflicts could escalate.
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